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Abstract 
 
     The main aims of this thesis are to assess the efficiency of the current 
bankruptcy system in Oman and to offer specific proposals for bankruptcy reform 
to be adopted by the Omani legislator. Where appropriate, in proposing solutions 
for various issues lessons will be taken from the experience of both England and 
the US. 
     This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction to 
the thesis which outlines the structure and scope of the study. Chapter Two 
critically explores the main theories underpinning bankruptcy law across the world. 
The aim of this exploration is to provide a general understanding of the policies 
underpinning bankruptcy laws and to establish the view of this thesis. Chapter 
Three discusses the experience of England and the US by identifying the main 
differences and similarities between bankruptcy proceedings in these jurisdictions; 
such discussion is necessary as a basis for determining the possibility of taking 
lessons from these developed bankruptcy regimes. Chapter Four provides a critical 
analysis of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman and outlines the key features of 
this regime. This chapter also discusses in detail the main issues with the current 
bankruptcy regime. This discussion includes: (1) the definition of bankruptcy; (2) 
the qualification of persons administering bankruptcy processes (3) ranking of 
creditors; (4) position of employees; (5) available alternatives under the current 
regime; and (6) the effect of declaration of bankruptcy on existing contracts. 
Chapter Five outlines the possibility of legal transplants and why it is desirable for 
Oman to adopt some of the bankruptcy principles that are found in England and 
the US. However, to avoid the risk of rejection of such transplants, this thesis will 
highlight the necessity of assessing the functionality and workability of western 
bankruptcy principles before transplanting them. This chapter also offers a 
proposal for future bankruptcy reform in Oman. Such reforms include having a 
clear statutory mandate, making bankruptcy law certain and predictable, and 
establishing a bankruptcy regime that encourage the rehabilitation of viable 
II 
 
enterprises instead of liquidating them. Chapter Six is the overall conclusion of this 
thesis which explains the main ideas discussed and highlights the main 
contributions made by this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
     First of all, I am delighted to acknowledge the inspirations of ALLAH, who gave 
me the confidence to pursue this work to its conclusion.   
     I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my main supervisor Prof. 
James Devenney for his supervision and his constant support throughout my study 
at Exeter University. His constructive comments, careful reading and valuable 
suggestion have contributed to the success of this thesis. 
     Special thanks also go to my former supervisor, Dr. Horace Yeung, for his 
guidance and his valuable comments at the initial stage of my study. Not forgotten, 
my appreciation to my second supervisor, Dr. Greta Bosch, and Dr. Mitchell Travis 
(my mentor) for their support throughout my study. 
     Further, I would like to thank my parents, brothers and sisters for their 
enormous love, encouragement and prayers. Finally, I would like to express my 
gratitude to one who does not want to be named but she knows who she is; for her 
patience and sacrifice throughout my study.  
  
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
 
Journal Abbreviations 
A.B.I.L.R.                         American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 
A.B.L.J. 
A.E.L.                            
American Bankruptcy Law Journal 
Atlantic Economic Journal 
A.J.C.L.                            American Journal of Comparative Law 
A.J.C.L. 
A.L.Q. 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
Arab Law Quarterly 
B.B.L.J. Berkeley Business Law Journal 
B.C.I.C.L.R. Boston College International and Comparative Law  Review 
B.D.J.                              Bankruptcy Development Journal 
B.J.I.B.F.L.                        Butterworth’s Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
B.Y.U.L.R.                         Brigham Young University  Law Review 
C.I.L.J. 
C.J.I.C.L.                              
Cornell International Law Journal 
Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 
C.L. 
C.L.J.                                   
Company Lawyer 
Cambridge Law Journal 
C.L.N.                            Company Law Newsletter 
C.L.R. Cardozo Law Review 
C.L.W.R. 
C.R.I. 
Common Law World Review 
Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 
C.R.I.J. Corporate Rescue & Insolvency Journal 
D.L.J. 
E.B.D.J.                            
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Emory Bankruptcy Development Journal 
E.B.O.L.R. European Business Organization Law Review 
E.E.R. European Economic Review 
E.J.C.L.  
E.J.I.L.  
E.J.I.S.                                     
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
European Journal for International Law 
European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 
E.J.L.E. European Journal for Law and Economic 
E.J.L.R. 
E.J.P.S. 
E.L.R. 
European Journal of Law Reform 
Egyptian Journal of Political Science 
Environmental Law Review 
F.M.J. 
G.E.R.  
G.J.L.P.P. 
H.I.L.J.                              
Financial Management Journal 
Gas and Energy Resources 
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 
Harvard International Law Journal 
H.L.R.                      Harvard Law Review 
I.B.L.J. International Business Law Journal 
VI 
 
I.C.C.L.R.                                                      International Company and Commercial Law Review 
I.C.L.Q.                             International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
I.C.L.R.                             International and Comparative Law Review 
I.C.R. 
I.I. 
I.J.I.O. 
I.J.L.C. 
I.J.L.I. 
I.J.L.M.                         
International Corporate Rescue 
Insolvency Intelligence 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 
International Journal of Law in Context 
International Journal of Legal Information 
International Journal Law & Management 
I.L.J. 
I.L. 
I.L.P.                               
Indian L.J.                                    
International Law Journal 
Insolvency Lawyer 
Insolvency Law and Practice 
Indian Law Journal 
J.B.L. 
J.B.R. 
J.C.L.S.                               
Journal of Business Law 
Journal of Banking Regulation 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
J.F.E. 
J.I.B.L. 
J.P. 
J.P.E.  
J.V.I. 
J.L.S. 
J.L.E.O. 
J.S.L. 
L.C.P. 
L.Q.R. 
L.M.C.L.Q. 
L.U.L.R. 
M.L.R. 
M.L.R. 
M.L.R. 
N.I.L.Q. 
N.L.J. 
N.U.L.R. 
O.J.L.S. 
O.U.L.R. 
O.R.E.P. 
P.T.L. 
Journal of Financial Economics 
Journal of International Banking Law 
Journal of Philosophy 
Journal of Political Economy 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 
Journal of Legal Studies 
The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
Journal of Shari’a and Law 
Law and Contemporary Problems 
Law Quarterly Review 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
Lowa University Law Review 
Minnesota Law Review 
Michigan Law Review 
Modern Law Review 
Netherland Ireland Legal Quarterly 
Nottingham Law Journal 
Northwestern University Law Review 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
Osaka University Law Review 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
Practical Tax Lawyer 
VII 
 
Q.J.INSOL.I.                    
R.C.L. 
S.J.L.S.                                                            
S.L.R. 
T.L.R. 
U.B.C.L.R. 
UCL J.R. 
U.C.L.R. 
U.C.L.R. 
U.P.J.I.E.L. 
U.P.L.R. 
V.L.R. 
V.L.R. 
W.L.L.R. 
W.U.L.Q. 
W.Y.A.J.                          
Y.L.J.  
Quarterly Journal of INSOL International 
Review of Columbian Law 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
Stanford Law Review 
Texas Law Review 
University of British Columbia Law Review 
UCL Jurisprudence Review 
University of California Law Review  
The University of Chicago Law Review 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Virginia Law Review 
Washington and Lee Law Review 
Washington University Law Quarterly 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 
Yale Law Journal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ I 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ III 
Journal Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... V 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... IX 
Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 
1.1      Background ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.2     Issues with the Current Bankruptcy Regime in Oman ....................................... 5 
1.3        Terminology ...................................................................................................... 12 
1.3    The Scope of the Thesis ................................................................................... 14 
1.5        The Importance of this Study ............................................................................ 18 
1.6        Reasons for Selecting Oman as the Object of this Thesis ................................ 20 
1.7    Why Observe the Experience of England and the US? .................................... 24 
1.8      The Role of International Organisations in Proposing the Development of 
National Insolvency Laws .............................................................................................. 27 
1.9     Methodology of this Study ............................................................................... 30 
1.10     Structure of the Thesis..................................................................................... 31 
1.11     Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 36 
Chapter Two: Theoretical Approaches to Bankruptcy Law ..................................... 37 
2.1    Introduction ....................................................................................................... 37 
2.2        The Creditors’ Bargain Theory.......................................................................... 43 
2.2.1     The Principles of the Creditors’ Bargain Model ................................................ 44 
2.2.2     The Possible Advantages of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory ............................. 50 
A-    Reduction of Strategic Costs ............................................................................ 51 
B-    Aggregate Pool of Assets will be Increased...................................................... 53 
X 
 
C-    Administrative Efficiencies ................................................................................ 54 
2.2.3     Criticisms of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory ...................................................... 55 
2.3        Bankruptcy Choice Theory ............................................................................... 63 
2.3.1     The Principles of this Theory ............................................................................ 64 
2.3.2     Criticisms of this Theory ................................................................................... 68 
2.4        The Communitarian Theory .............................................................................. 72 
2.4.1     The Principles of this Theory ............................................................................ 72 
2.4.2     Criticisms of this Theory ................................................................................... 76 
2.5        The Forum Theory ............................................................................................ 78 
2.5.1     The Principles of this Theory ............................................................................ 78 
2.5.2     Criticisms of this Theory ................................................................................... 80 
2.6        The Multiple Values Theory .............................................................................. 82 
2.6.1     The Principles of this Theory ............................................................................ 82 
2.6.2     Criticisms of the Multipe Values Theory ........................................................... 89 
2.7        The Explicit Value Theory ................................................................................. 94 
2.7.1     The Principles of Explicit Value Theory ............................................................ 94 
2.7.2     Criticisms of this Theory ................................................................................. 100 
2.8        Evaluating Remarks ....................................................................................... 104 
2.9        Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..110……     
Chapter Three: Bankruptcy Proceedings in England and the US ......................... 113 
3.1        Introduction ..................................................................................................... 113 
3.2        Insolvency Proceedings in England ................................................................ 115 
3.2.1     Administration Proceedings ............................................................................ 117 
3.2.2     Administrative Receivership ........................................................................... 124 
3.2.3     Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) ........................................................ 126 
3.2.4     Scheme of Arrangement ................................................................................. 131 
XI 
 
3.3        Bankruptcy Proceedings in the United States ................................................ 133 
3.3.1     The US Chapter 11 ......................................................................................... 133 
3.4       A Comparative Analysis of Rescue Proceedings in England and the United 
States .......................................................................................................................... 138 
3.4.1     The Allocation of Control Right ....................................................................... 141 
3.4.1.1  Arguments in Favour of Management Displacement ...................................... 143 
3.4.1.2  Arguments against Management Displacement ............................................. 146 
3.4.2     Stay on Creditors (Moratrium) ........................................................................ 149 
3.4.3     Post-Petition Financing ................................................................................... 156 
3.4.4     Creditors Voting and the Notion of Cram-Down.............................................. 163 
3.5        Evaluating Remarks ....................................................................................... 168 
3.6        Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 175 
Chapter Four: An Overview of the Current Bankruptcy Regime in Oman ............ 179 
4.1        Introduction ..................................................................................................... 179 
4.2        Statutory Framework for Bankruptcy .............................................................. 182 
4.3        Available Bankruptcy Proceedings ................................................................. 185 
4.4        General Features of the Current Bankruptcy Regime ..................................... 186 
A-    Definition of Bankruptcy .................................................................................. 186 
B-    Handcuffing of the Debtor in Bankruptcy ........................................................ 190 
C-    Ranking of Creditors ....................................................................................... 192 
D-    Stay on Creditors’ Claims (Moratorium) .......................................................... 193 
E-    Persons Administering Bankruptcy ................................................................. 195 
F-    The Treatment of Small Bankruptcies…………………………….. ................... 197 
G-    The Position of the Employees ....................................................................... 198 
4.5.       Bankruptcy Procedures .................................................................................. 202 
4.5.1     Who can Request a Bankruptcy Declaration? ................................................ 203 
XII 
 
A-    Debtors ........................................................................................................... 203 
B-    Creditors ......................................................................................................... 205 
C-    The Court........................................................................................................ 207 
4.5.2     The Nature of the Debt ................................................................................... 208 
4.5.3     Declaration of Bankruptcy .............................................................................. 210 
4.5.4     Effects of the Bankruptcy ................................................................................ 212 
A-      Effect on the Debtor ........................................................................................ 212 
B-      Effect on Creditors .......................................................................................... 214 
C-      Effect on Contracts Concluded before the Declaration of Bankruptcy ............ 215 
4.5.5     Liability of Directors of Bankrupt Companies .................................................. 219 
4.5.6     Set-off in Bankruptcy ...................................................................................... 220 
4.6        Composition with Creditors ............................................................................. 222 
4.6.1     Judicial Composition ....................................................................................... 225 
4.6.2     Preventive Composition .................................................................................. 227 
4.6.2.1  Eligibility to Apply for Preventive Composition ................................................ 228 
(A) Disturbance of the Trader’s Business .......................................................... 228 
(B) Non-Committal of Fraud or Gross Fault ....................................................... 231 
(C) Trading Continuously for at Least Two Years .............................................. 232 
4.6.2.2  Opening of Composition Proceedings ............................................................ 233 
4.6.2.3  Management of the Business during Preventive Composition Proceedings ... 234 
4.6.2.4  Stay on Creditors’ Actions (Moratorium) ......................................................... 237 
4.6.2.5  Voting System and the Concept of ‘Cram Down’ ............................................ 238 
4.7        Liquidation Procedures ................................................................................... 240 
4.8        Assessing the Efficiency of Oman’s Current Bankruptcy Regime................... 241 
4.8.1     Bankruptcy Efficiency in Oman and the World Bank Report ........................... 242 
4.8.2     Pro-Debtor or Pro-Creditor Regime? .............................................................. 247 
XIII 
 
4.8.3     Preventive Composition Scheme and the Concept of ‘Rescue Culture’ ......... 251 
4.8.4     Bankruptcy and Liquidation vis-à-vis the Notion of Collectivity ....................... 255 
4.9        Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................... 256 
Chapter Five: A Call for Bankruptcy Reform in Oman ........................................... 259 
5.1        Introduction ..................................................................................................... 259 
5.2        Structure of the Chapter ................................................................................. 263 
5.3        Legal Transplants ........................................................................................... 264 
A-         Theoretical Debates ........................................................................................ 265 
B-    The Effect of Legal Transplants ...................................................................... 275 
C-    Measuring the Success of Legal Transplants ................................................. 279 
5.3.1     Transplanting Bankruptcy Laws...................................................................... 282 
5.3.2     Oman as an Importing Country....................................................................... 287 
5.4        The Necessity for Bankruptcy Reform in Oman.............................................. 299 
A-    Oman’s Economic Vision of 2020 ................................................................... 299 
B-    The Role of Small and Medium Enterprises ................................................... 306 
C-    Other Factors .................................................................................................. 311 
5.5        A Map for Future Reform ................................................................................ 313 
5.5.1     A Need for a Clear Statutory Mandate ............................................................ 320 
5.5.2     Certainty and Predictability in Bankruptcy Law ............................................... 324 
5.5.2.1  Certainty in Regard to Bankruptcy Test .......................................................... 325 
5.5.2.2  Clarity and Certainty in Regard to Priority Rules ............................................ 328 
5.5.3     Types of Desired Bankruptcy Regimes .......................................................... 339 
5.5.4     Establishing a Rescue Regime ....................................................................... 344 
5.5.4.1  Easing the Access to the Restructuring Process ............................................ 346 
5.5.4.2  Adopting the Notion of Debtor-in-Possession (DIP)........................................ 349 
5.5.4.3  Stay on Creditors’ Actions .............................................................................. 351 
XIV 
 
5.5.4.4  Allowing Post-Financing ................................................................................. 355 
5.5.4.5  Creditors’ Participation and the Approval of the Restructuring Plan ............... 357 
5.5.4.6  Having Qualified Bankruptcy Practitioners ..................................................... 360 
5.6        Reviewing Mechanism .................................................................................... 364 
5.7        Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 365 
Chapter Six: Conclusions ......................................................................................... 369 
6.1        Introduction ..................................................................................................... 369 
6.2        Theories Underpinning Bankruptcy Law ......................................................... 372 
6.3        Bankruptcy Proceedings in England and the US ............................................ 377 
6.4        Examining the Current Bankruptcy Regime in Oman ..................................... 281 
6.5        Proposals to Overcome the Current Problems ............................................... 384 
6.6        Areas for Future Research ............................................................................. 388 
6.7        Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................... 389 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 391 
 
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
     Bankruptcy law is a vital and an essential law because it is a central part of the 
economy.1 This is in part due to the fact that the flows of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) might be determined by the efficiency and ‘the quality’2 of the legal system3 in 
the host country.4 It is stated5 that, before choosing their preferred markets, 
investors normally look at the effectiveness of bankruptcy laws in the targeted 
markets.6 
                                                          
1
 Perry A., ‘Effective Legal System and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of the Evidence’, 
(2000) 49 (4) I.C.L.Q 779, p. 779; Moskvan D. & Vrbova V., ‘Connecting the Dots: Attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment Through Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law’, in Belohlavek A. & 
Rozehnalove N., Regulatory Measures and Foreign Trade 2013, (Czech Yearbook of International 
Law, 2013), p. 50; Hornberger K., Battat J.,& Kusek P., ‘Attracting FDI: How Does Investment 
Climate Matter’, view point, World Bank, available at: 
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/327-Attracting-FDI.pdf. 
accessed on 31/12/2012. 
2
 Hornberger K., Battat J., & Kusek P., ibid. 
3
 Perry A., above 1, p. 779; ‘World Bank Doing Business Report: 2013’, p. 47, available at:  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB13-full-report.pdf. accessed on 31/01/2012. 
4
 For the importance of reforming and transplanting bankruptcy law: see below sections 5.3.1 & 
5.3.2.    
5
 Moskvan D. & Vrbova V., above 1, p. 50; Kastrinou A., ‘Forum Shopping under the EC Regulation 
on Insolvency Proceedings’, (2013) 24 (1) I.C.C.L.R. 20, p. 22; Belohlavek A., ‘Center of Main 
Interest (COMI) and Jurisdiction of National Courts in Insolvency Matters (Insolvency Status)’, 
(2008) 50 (2) I.J.L. & M. 53. 
6
 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the efficiency of bankruptcy law might be one of the 
determinants of FDI. There is much literature on behavioural economics that has analysed the 
determinants of FDI decisions: see Bockem S. & Tuschke A., ‘A Tale of Two Theories: Foreign 
Direct Investment Decisions from the Perspectives of Economic and Institutional Theory’, (July 
2010) SBR 62, pp. 260-290, available at: 
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     Further, it is believed7 that building a viable bankruptcy system will help fuel a 
market economy.8 Thus, it is not enough for countries to have in place laws that 
regulate the starting up of a business. Rather, it is crucial to have bankruptcy laws 
that regulate exit from the market. In this regard, it is argued that9 having such laws 
may help in accelerating the rate of economic growth and may have an impact on 
saving and creating jobs.10 In acknowledgment of its importance, many countries11 
have promulgated laws that are designed to deal with bankruptcy cases.12 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.sbr-online.de/pdfarchive/einzelne_pdf/sbr_2010_july_260-290.pdf. accessed on 
02/01/2014 (They analysed FDI from the perspective of economic and institutional theory. Their 
result showed that a firm’s decision to engage in a foreign market is influenced by the attractiveness 
of the target market and by prior FDI decision of large and successful peers); see also Bolnigen B., 
‘A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants’, (2005) 33 A.E.J. 383 (This paper 
surveyed the literature on the determinants of Multinational Enterprises decisions and FDI location 
across the world. However, this study concluded by asserting that “the empirical literature on 
determinants of FDI is still young enough that most hypotheses are still up for grabs”): see pp. 397-
398. 
7
 Martin N., ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
The Perils of Legal Transplantation’, (2005) 28 B.C.I.C.L.R. 1, p. 4. 
8
 In this regard, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia have attempted to establish a 
reorganisation regime for failing traders like Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code: see Tomasic 
R., Little P., Francis A., Kamarul K. & Wang K., ‘Insolvency Law Administration and Culture in Six 
Asian Legal Systems’, (1996) 6 A.J.C.L. 248, p. 248; Martin N., above 7, p. 4. 
9
 Helmy O., ‘The Efficiency of the Bankruptcy System in Egypt’, (2005) Working Paper No. 100, 
E.C.E.S. 1-27, p. 1; for further discussion: see below pp. 305-306. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 The UK Enterprise Act 2002, French Business Safeguard Act of 2006 and German Company 
Restructuring Facilitation Act of 2012; also China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia have 
already reformed their bankruptcy laws: see Tomasic R., Little P., Francis A., Kamarul K. & Wang 
K., above 8, p. 248. 
12
 In this regard, it is worth noting that while some countries have a separate bankruptcy/ insolvency 
law to regulate the insolvency and liquidation of traders, others do not have a separate bankruptcy 
law. Examples of countries that have separate bankruptcy laws are: the US Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 
the UK Insolvency Act 1986 & the UK Enterprise Act of 2002, French Business Safeguard Act of 
2006, German Company Restructuring Facilitation Act of 2012 and Enterprise Insolvency Law of 
3 
 
However, national bankruptcy laws differ from one jurisdiction to another from a 
number of perspectives.13 For instance, while some bankruptcy laws, like the US, 
regulate limited types of bankruptcy regimes,14 others, like England, regulate 
various types of bankruptcy regimes.15 In this regard, in the US there are two 
bankruptcy regimes: Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures and Chapter 7 liquidation 
proceedings. However, in England there are five bankruptcy regimes: 
administration, administrative receivership, creditors’ voluntary arrangement, 
scheme of arrangement and liquidation. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Three,16 each one of these regimes has its own features. For example, while in the 
US Chapter 11 and England’s creditors’ voluntary arrangement the management 
retain their position during bankruptcy processes, they are displaced by bankruptcy 
practitioners under the administration regime in England.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the People’s Republic of China of 2007. However, countries such as Oman, UAE, Egypt and 
Jordan, their Commercial Codes and Commercial Companies Laws provide a framework for the 
bankruptcy of traders and liquidation of companies: see below pp. 182-184. 
13
 See Azar Z., ‘Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and Practices in 
Fifty Countries Worldwide’, (2008) 16 C.J.I.C.L. 279, pp. 282-283; McCormack G., ‘Control and 
Corporate Rescue: An Anglo- American Evaluation’, (2007) 56 (3) I.C.L.Q. 505; Tomasic R., Little 
P., Francis A., Kamarul K. & Wang K., above 8. 
14
 Dahl H., ‘USA: Bankruptcy under Chapter 11’, (1992) 5 I.B.L.J. 555, p. 555; McCormack G., 
‘Apples and Oranges? Corporate Rescue and Functional Convergence in the US and UK’, (2009) 
18 INSOL International Insolvency Review 109, pp. 111-116.  
15
 Armour J. & Mokal R., ‘Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 
2002’, (2005) 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 28-64; Fletcher F., ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Development- 
Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements- 
the Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’, (2004) 5 (1) 
E.B.O.L.R. 120, p. 151; Goode R., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (4
th
 edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011), pp. 29-45. 
16
 See below sections 3.2 & 3.3. 
17
 See below section 3.4.1. 
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     Whether the aim of bankruptcy laws should be to maximise merely the interests 
of creditors or whether there are other interests that deserve such protection is 
subject to debate.18 Perhaps the main issue debated is whether bankruptcy law is 
only about creditors’ rights or whether other interests, including the interests of 
employees and public interest, should be taken into account.19 As will be shown in 
the Second Chapter, the creditors’ bargain theory20 argues that bankruptcy laws 
should be designed to maximise the interests of creditors, and as a result, 
promoting the concept of a rescue culture should not be within the objectives of the 
bankruptcy law unless it leads to the wealth of creditors.21 However, it is argued22 
that there are a number of values that need to be protected which go beyond the 
                                                          
18
 As will be discussed in Chapter Two, some scholars argue that the sole objective of bankruptcy 
laws should be to maximise the interest of creditors, for this view see: Jackson T., The Logic and 
Limits of Bankruptcy Law (hereinafter ‘Logic and Limits’), (Harvard University Press, 1986); Jackson 
T. and Scott R., ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’, 
(1989) 75 V.L.R. 155; Baird D. & Jackson T., ‘Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the 
Absolute Priority Rule’, (1988) 55 U.C.L.R. 738; However, some scholars argue that the protection 
of bankruptcy law should be extended to other interests beyond the interests of creditors: for this 
view see: Korobkin D., ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’, 
(1993) 71 T.L.R. 541; Mokal R., ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors Bargain 
and Corporate Liquidation’, (2001) 21 J.L.S. 400; Gross K., ‘Taking Community Interests into 
Account in Bankruptcy’, (1994) 72 W.U.L.Q. 1031; Keay A., ‘Insolvency Law: A Matter of Public 
Interest’, (2000) 51 N.I.L.Q. 509; Gross K., Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy 
System, (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 205; Warren E., ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, (1987) 54 (3) 
U.C.L.R. 755; Korobkin D., ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’, (1991) 91 R.C.L. 
717; see below Chapter Two.  
19
 Keay A. & Walton P., Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, (Longman, 2003), p. 25.  
20
 See below section 2.2.1. 
21
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 18, p. 2. 
22
 Warren E., above 18, p. 796; Korobkin D., above 18, p. 787; Gross K., above 18, p. 1031. 
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interests of existing creditors.23 It will be argued later that24 besides creditors’ 
interests, bankruptcy laws should take into account other interests that might be 
affected by the debtor’s bankruptcy.25 As will be shown below,26 there are, also, 
other means of maximising the return of the creditors, some of which will also 
benefit other interests.27 For instance, rehabilitating the firm may benefit all 
creditors, whether secured or unsecured, in the long term.28 
1.2  Issues with the Current Bankruptcy Regime in Oman 
     Although there is no separate bankruptcy law in Oman,29 both Oman's 
Commercial Code of 1990 and the Commercial Companies Law of 1974 provide a 
framework for the bankruptcy of traders and liquidation of insolvent companies.30 In 
                                                          
23
 Example of these values are: the interests of shareholders in the preservation of their future 
expectations, as well as the interests of the community at large in the continuation of the business: 
see below Chapter Two; see below section 2.4.1. 
24
 For a further treatment of this point: see below pp. 107-110. 
25
 As will be shown below, this should be done by providing for the possibility of rehabilitation of 
distressed debtors as an alternative to liquidation: see ibid.  
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Goode R., above 15, p. 73. 
28
 In this regard, an empirical study has revealed that post-Enterprise administrations deliver more 
returns to secured creditors than pre-Enterprise Act administrations: see Frisby S., ‘Interim Report 
to the Insolvency Service on Returns to Creditors from Pre-and-Post Enterprise Act Insolvency 
Procedures’, p. 14, Baker & Mckenzie Lecturers in Company and Commercial Law, 24 July 2007, 
available at:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandl
egislation/research/returntocreditors.pdf. accessed on 25/01/2014. 
29
 In this regard, it is worth noting that the issue is not with the absence of a separate bankruptcy 
law. Rather, the main issue debated in this thesis is that bankruptcy proceedings should be 
designed in a way that facilitates the rescue of viable enterprises and liquidate promptly the 
unviable ones: see below p. 181. 
30
 In this regard, it is worthy to briefly introduce how Omani law is structured. Currently, there is 
what is called Majlis Oman (Parliament of Oman) which consists of Majlis AL Dawla and Majlis AL 
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this regard, the Commercial Companies Law sets out procedures to be followed in 
the dissolution of a company and its extinction.31 In addition, the Commercial Code 
contains rules and procedures governing the bankruptcy of individual traders and 
companies.32 Generally speaking, the articles of this Code cover the adjudication of 
bankruptcy,33 bankruptcy officials,34 the legal effects of bankruptcy,35 management 
of bankruptcy,36 the termination of bankruptcy (including the composition with 
creditors scheme),37 bankruptcy of companies,38 discharge of bankrupts and 
bankruptcy-related offences.39 The provisions of this Code relate to all ‘traders’, 
which covers companies and persons that carry out commercial activities.40 In this 
regard, Article 16 of the Commercial Code defines a trader as “any person who has 
the legal capacity to engage in commercial activities as his or her profession in his 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Shura: see Article 58 of Basic Statute of the State of 1996 (BSS). According to Article 58 (bis 35) of 
the BSS, draft laws prepared by the Government (Council of Ministers) shall be referred to Majlis 
Oman for approval or amendment and then they shall be directly submitted to His Majesty the 
Sultan to be promulgated. In case of any amendments by Majlis Oman on the draft law, His Majesty 
the Sultan may refer it back to the Majlis for reconsideration of the amendments and then 
resubmission to His Majesty the Sultan. However, Majlis Oman may propose draft laws and refer 
them to the Government for review, and then the Government shall return the same to the Majlis: 
Article 58 (bis 36) of the BSS. According to Article 58 (bis 39) of the BSS, His Majesty the Sultan 
may promulgate Royal Decree that have the force of law between the sessions of Majlis Oman and 
while Majlis Al Shura is dissolved and the sessions of Majlis AL Dawla are suspended. The BSS 
can be downloaded from http://mola.gov.om/eng/basicstatute.aspx. 
31
 Articles 14-45 of the Commercial Companies Law 1974. 
32
 Book Five of the Commercial Code (CC) 1990, Articles 579 to 786. 
33
 Ibid, Articles 579-596. 
34
 Ibid, Articles 645-654. 
35
 Ibid, Articles 602-614 & 630-633. 
36
 Ibid, Articles 645-678. 
37
 Ibid, Articles 696—740 & 753-786. 
38
 Ibid, Articles 681-695. 
39
 Ibid, Articles 741-752. 
40
 Ibid, Articles 16. 
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or her name” and “any company undertaking any commercial activities or taking 
one of the forms stipulated in the Commercial Companies Law”. This includes 
foreign traders who have offices, local branches, or any other establishments in the 
country irrespective of whether they are also declared bankrupt abroad.41 
     Although these laws set out the procedures to be followed in the event of a 
trader’s bankruptcy, a number of issues need to be discussed.42 First, as will be 
shown,43 under the current Commercial Code a distressed debtor is allowed to 
seek composition with its creditors.44 However, as will be shown,45 the provisions 
relating to such a scheme do not have enough detail.46 Moreover, as will be shown 
in Chapter Four,47 the main purpose of the preventive composition scheme with 
creditors is not to rescue the company.48 Rather, the aim of this scheme is to allow 
the trader to escape the consequences of a bankruptcy declaration.49 Therefore, 
this scheme is not intended to promote the rescue of the distressed traders, but it 
is an alternative designed to protect the traders from falling into bankruptcy. 
                                                          
41
 Ibid, Articles 19. 
42
 It is worth noting that this section will highlight only some of the issues that this study will address.  
43
 See below section 4.6.2. 
44
 Ibid, Articles 753-786 set out the procedures of the preventive composition scheme with creditors. 
45
 See below sections 4.6.2 & 4.8.3. 
46
 For a detailed discussion: see below section 4.4.2.2. 
47
 See below section 4.6.2. 
48
 Article 753 of the CC. 
49
 Article 753 of the CC; also as will be shown below (section 4.6.2), the title of Part Four of the Five 
book of the Commercial Code is “Preventive Composition from Bankruptcy”. This title indicates that 
the aim of preventive composition is merely to prevent the trader from bankruptcy. Thus, preventive 
composition is an alternative available for a distressed trader to avoid bankruptcy declaration and to 
continue the operation of the business if a composition with creditors is reached. 
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     Further, even though the Commercial Code of 1990 makes reference to a 
bankruptcy supervisor/manager or even a liquidator,50 in reality, unlike the case in 
England51 or the US,52 there is no formal body that regulates bankruptcy 
practitioners in Oman.53 In England, for example, insolvency practitioners are 
required to obtain a professional qualification from a recognised professional body, 
the Secretary of State or a competent authority designated by the Secretary of 
State.54 In Oman, the liquidator, the bankruptcy trustee or the supervisor is neither 
required to have any qualification nor to obtain specific training.55 Therefore, this is 
one of the issues with the current bankruptcy regime in Oman that this thesis is 
going to address.56 As will be argued later,57 it is the role of bankruptcy 
practitioners to administer the bankruptcy process from the day of filing until 
                                                          
50
 Articles 645-654 of the CC. 
51
 Finch V., ‘Insolvency Practitioners: Regulation and Reform’, (1998) J.B.L. 334, p. 339; for further 
detail about Insolvency practitioners in the UK see http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/. This 
site provides information about the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA) which is a 
membership body recognised for the purposes of authorising and licensing insolvency practitioners 
under the Insolvency Act 1986. 
52
 For further detail see www.justice.gov/ust. This site contains information about the United States 
Trustee Program and the federal bankruptcy system. The Program was established by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Program monitors the conduct of bankruptcy parties and 
private estate trustees, oversees related administrative functions, and acts to ensure compliance 
with applicable laws and procedures.  It also identifies and helps investigate bankruptcy fraud and 
abuse in coordination with United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other 
law enforcement agencies. 
53
 Oman’s Commercial Code and Commercial Companies Law do not set any requirements or 
conditions for persons who want to act as bankruptcy trustees or liquidators. 
54
 See above footnote 51. 
55
 See below section 4.4 (E); for the suggestions of this thesis: see below section 5.5.4.6. 
56
 For criticism of the position under the current bankruptcy regime in Oman: see below section 4.4 
(E); for the view of this thesis: see below section 5.5.4.6. 
57
 See below pp. 195-197. 
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bringing the process to its conclusion. These practitioners should be equipped with 
the necessary skills in order for them to control the process successfully.58 
     In addition, under the current system there are three bankruptcy options 
available: bankruptcy proceedings,59 the preventive composition scheme60 and 
liquidation procedures.61 These proceedings apply to all companies whatever their 
size.62 However, in this thesis it is argued that due to the significance of small and 
medium enterprises in Oman,63 there is a need for special bankruptcy proceedings 
for these types of enterprises. At present, all companies have to follow the same 
procedures and have to bear the same costs.64 This is unlike the case in England 
and the US. As will be shown in Chapter Three,65 in England there is a company 
voluntary proceeding with moratorium that is solely designed for small 
companies.66 Also, in the US there are special procedures designed for small 
businesses.67 
                                                          
58
 See below section 5.5.4.6. 
59
 Articles 579-752 of the CC. 
60
 Articles 753-786 of the CC. 
61
 Articles 14-27 of the Commercial Companies Law 1974. 
62
 Article 14 of the Commercial Companies Law & Article 681 of the CC. 
63
 For the important role that is played by SMEs in Oman: see below section 5.4 (B).  
64
 Article 681 of the CC. 
65
 See below section 3.2.3. 
66
 Only smaller companies as defined in section 382 of the Companies Act 2006 may use the 
procedure. According to this section, a company is considered to be small if it meets two of the 
following three criteria: (1) its annual turnover is not greater than £5.6m; (2) its balance sheet total is 
not more than £2.8m and (3) its employees are not more than 50; As will be discussed below 
(section 5.4 (B)), at present there is no common definition of small and medium enterprises and 
such a definition varies from country to country: see Tambunan T., Development of Small and 
Medium Enterprises in ASEAN Countries, (Readworthy, 2009), p. 10. 
67
 See below pp. 136-137. 
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     Furthermore, it differs from the case in both England and the US where secured 
creditors are prevented from enforcing their claims during bankruptcy 
proceedings.68 In Oman secured creditors’ actions are not stayed during 
bankruptcy proceedings.69 Thus, secured creditors are allowed to pursue their 
claims and, as a consequence, the notion of collectivity70 is not adopted. This is 
one of the issues this thesis will address. As will be shown in Chapter Two71 and 
Chapter Three,72 not imposing a stay on creditors’ claims could mean that the 
assets of the debtor would be dismantled73 and the creditors would run to the court 
house to be first to enforce their securities.74 Therefore, one of the main 
deficiencies of both bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings that this thesis will 
address is lack of imposing a stay on creditors’ action during bankruptcy 
proceedings.75 
     Being a bankrupt is, also, regarded as some kind of reprehensible disgrace or 
reproach in Oman.76 Bankruptcy is not viewed as a risk of doing business; but it is 
                                                          
68
 This is the case, for example, during the US Chapter 11 proceedings and during administration 
procedures in England: see below section 3.4.2. 
69
 See below section 4.4 (D). 
70
 See below section 4.8.4. 
71
 See below section 2.2.2 (A). 
72
 See below section 3.4.2. 
73
 Because creditors will have to spend time and money monitoring each of their debtors’ assets 
and they will run to the court to take action to win the race to enforce their debt more quickly than 
other creditors: see Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 18, p. 16; see below section 2.2.2. 
74
 Jackson T., ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement, and the Creditors’ Bargain’, (1991) Y.L.J. 
857, pp. 860-861. 
75
 For addressing this issue under the current Oman’s bankruptcy regime: see below sections 4.4 
(D) & 4.6.2.4.  
76
 Uttamchandani M., ‘No Way Out: The Lack of Efficient Insolvency Regimes in the MENA Region’, 
(March 2011), Policy Research Working Paper 5609, the World Bank, p. 1, available at:  
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always attributed to management failure.77 Also, once a bankruptcy adjudication is 
declared by the court,78 the owners of such a company might be deprived of a 
number of civil rights.79 For instance, currently upon bankruptcy declaration, the 
bankrupt is prohibited from becoming a director or a member of the management 
board of any company and he/she is not allowed to apply for a public job or 
position.80 This kind of attitude towards bankruptcy needs to be changed in order to 
promote a culture of rescue.81 As mentioned above, the current bankruptcy regime 
in Oman focuses only on the complete dissolution of the distressed debtor. It will 
be argued later that there is an urgent need to have a modern bankruptcy law 
based on some of the international regimes to maintain a certain level of 
investment needed in the future.82  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/Resources/DECMENAFlagshipInsol
vencyRegimes.pdf. accessed on 05/01/2014. 
77
 This is clear from displacing the management during bankruptcy proceedings (section 604 of the 
CC) and from holding them accountable and forcing them to pay all or some of the debts of the 
debtor: see below section 4.4.1.5; This is also the case in England where managers might be 
deemed responsible for the failure of the company and as a result they are displaced: see Goode 
R., above 15, p. 394; for discussing various arguments in favour of management displacement: see 
below section 3.4.1.1. 
78
 As will be discussed below, the court makes an order declaring the debtor bankrupt if the 
conditions for adjudication exist. These conditions are: an application is submitted by the debtor 
itself, creditors or the court; the debtor ceases to pay a due commercial debt: see below sections 
4.5.1, 4.5.2 & 4.5.3.    
79
 Article 602 of the CC; see below section 4.4 (B). 
80
 Ibid; see also below section 4.5.4 (A). 
81
 See below section 5.5.4.2. 
82
 See below section 5.4. 
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1.3 Terminology 
     It is necessary at the onset of a study of this kind to attain clarity in the 
terminology used. As legal terms, the meaning of ‘bankruptcy’ and ‘insolvency’ vary 
from one country to another.83 For instance, in England the term ‘insolvency’ to 
companies and ‘bankruptcy’ applies to individuals.84 In the United States, the term 
‘bankruptcy’ applies for both individuals and corporations.85 In Oman, the term 
‘bankruptcy’ applies to traders86 and the term ‘insolvency’ to individuals. In the 
interest of simplicity, however, this study will use both terms ‘bankruptcy’ and 
‘insolvency’ as synonyms and both will be used interchangeably. Thus, both 
‘bankruptcy’ and ‘insolvency’ extend to traders which covers companies and 
individuals that carry out commercial activities.87 
     Further, this thesis encourages the Omani legislator to promote a ‘rescue 
culture’.88 In this regard, Campbell stated that a company rescue “includes the 
available legal processes as well as possible management responses and is more 
appropriate to the legal response to company distress as it recognises the need for 
major intervention in the company’s affairs, such intervention not necessarily 
                                                          
83
 See Keay A. & Walton P., above 19, p. 12; see Kipli J., The Ethics of Bankruptcy, (Reprinted 
edition, Routledge, 2002), p. 8. 
84
 Keay A. & Walton P., above 19, p. 12 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Article 579 of the CC. 
87
 For the purpose of this thesis, the terms bankruptcy and insolvency will not dictate any difference. 
88
 See below section 5.5.4; Belcher defines the term ‘rescue’ “as a major intervention necessary to 
avert eventual failure of the company”: Belcher A., ‘The Economic Implication of Attempting to 
Rescue Companies’, in Rajak H., Insolvency Law: Theory and Practice, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), 
p. 236. 
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attempting to restore the company to the pre-financial crisis position”.89 “The 
purpose of the intervention is to avoid the failure of the company.”90 Hence, for the 
purpose of this thesis, the term refers to a legal and institutional response to 
financial distress that is geared in the first instance to attempting to save troubled 
traders, rather than simply to close them down and distribute the proceeds to 
creditors as quickly as possible.91 In this regard, some of the key features of a 
rescue procedure92 are the easing of access to the rescue process, encouraging 
distressed traders to apply for the proceedings at an early stage, staying creditors’ 
claims, easing the access to new funding during the reorganisation process and 
cramming-down dissenting creditors. Also, in his article,93 Hunter summarised the 
principles governing rescue culture.94 These principles might include the capacity 
to exercise judicial pressure on petitioning creditors to accept a reasonable 
composition proposed by the debtor, an enforceable means of collectively binding 
creditors, the availability of a moratorium and the availability of qualified bankruptcy 
practitioners.95  
 
 
                                                          
89
 Campbell A., ‘Company Rescue: The Legal Response to the Potential Rescue of Insolvent 
Companies’, (1994), 5 (1) I.C.C.L.R. 16, p. 16. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Armour J. & Mokal R., above 15, p. 32; Finch V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and 
Principles, (2
nd
 edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 187-188. 
92
 See Tolmie F., Introduction to Corporate and Personal Insolvency Law, (2
nd
 edition, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 64.   
93
 Hunter M., ‘The Nature and Function of A Rescue Culture’, (1999) J.B.L. 491, p. 500. 
94
 Ibid.  
95
 Ibid. 
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1.4 The Scope of the Thesis 
     The main purposes of this study are to assess the efficiency96 of the current 
bankruptcy system in Oman and to offer specific proposals for bankruptcy reform 
to be adopted by the Omani legislator. However, this study will be restricted to 
some aspects of bankruptcy. Examples of such issues are as follows: whether 
Omani law strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of creditors and 
other stakeholders; whether a distressed trader is given an alternative to winding 
up; ranking of creditors; the liability of directors of bankrupt companies; whether 
employees of an insolvent company are protected under the current Omani regime; 
and the concept of moratorium and the notion of cram-down. The time and word 
limit are rationales for such restriction. Also, the selection of specific issues to be 
addressed in this thesis is not random but deliberate. Tolmie,97 for example, 
mentioned a number of requirements for having a successful rescue regime.98 
Further, as will be stated below,99 in the UNITRAL Legislative Guide it is affirmed 
that bankruptcy laws should be designed in a way that achieves a number of 
objectives. Examples of these objectives include offering distressed companies an 
alternative to liquidation, easing and facilitating the bankruptcy processes and 
establishing a clear priority rule.100 Thus, the aim of this study is not to examine 
                                                          
96
 This refers to its suitability to deal with various issues that occur during the bankruptcy of traders. 
97
 Tolmie F., above 92, p. 64. 
98
 See above p. 13; it is within the scope of this thesis to provide an overview of the current 
bankruptcy regime in Oman and to assess the availability of these requirements: see below section 
4.6.2; However, it is worth noting that not all issues addressed by this thesis are related to rescue 
culture: see below, for instance, sections 4.8 (in particular section 4.8.4 & 4.8.1) 
99
 See below pp. 28-29. 
100
 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law’, (2005), available at: 
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every single article in the law or to study in depth the procedures of various 
bankruptcy regimes under the current bankruptcy system in Oman101, but to look at 
some bankruptcy issues that are, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, 
insufficiently regulated or not regulated at all.102  
     It is necessary, first, to examine the current theoretical debates regarding the 
aims of bankruptcy/ insolvency law. Such debates focus on which policy objectives 
and policy mechanisms should be adopted in designing bankruptcy/ insolvency 
law.103 Exploring these theoretical debates provides us with an understanding of 
the policy underpinning bankruptcy laws based on the perspectives of various 
scholars104 and the view of this thesis.105 This thesis argues that highlighting the 
principles and criticisms of various bankruptcy law theories allows us to envisage 
how policymakers can make the most of these theories in designing bankruptcy 
laws. 
     In addition, this study is going to draw lessons from two developed bankruptcy 
regimes:106 England and the United States.107 However, it is worth noting that it is 
not possible, even if this was desired, to transfer the whole experience of both 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/0580722_Ebook.pdf, pp. 9-14, accessed on 
10/01/2014. 
101
 In this thesis, reference will be made to both the Omani Commercial Code of 1990 and 
Commercial Companies Law of 1974. It is not within the scope of this study to go into the 
procedures under both laws in depth. However, a focus will be given, as explained earlier, to a 
number of bankruptcy issues.  
102
 For example, see below sections 4.4 & 4.8. 
103
 Keay A. & Walton P., above 19, p. 25. 
104
 See below Chapter Two. 
105
 For the view of this thesis: see below section 2.8. 
106
 See below Chapters Three, Four and Five.  
107
 For the rationale behind this selection: see below section 1.7. 
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England and the US since each jurisdiction has its own characteristics.108 Thus, the 
aim of this thesis is to opt for bankruptcy principles that are appropriate for 
Oman.109 As will be discussed in Chapter Five,110 the capacity of courts and the 
competence of persons administering the bankruptcy process in Oman111 play an 
important role in determining what sort of bankruptcy regimes should be adopted112 
and what sort of rules should be transferred or are applicable to be transferred. 
     Having discussed all of the above issues, this study will proceed by proposing a 
map for future reform.113 However, it is worth mentioning that it is not enough to 
have an effective bankruptcy regime; rather, there is a need to combine it with 
other reforms, for instance, training judges, enacting practitioners’ regulations,114 
and changing people’s mentality towards bankruptcy through advising them of the 
potential of a rescue culture. As a consequence, this study provides an analysis of 
the essential elements of an effective insolvency regime.115 
     At this stage, it is worth mentioning that the provisions of the Commercial Code 
do not apply to the bankruptcy of distressed banks. In this regard, Chapter 
Seven116 of the Banking Law of 1974 regulates the bankruptcy of banks. However, 
the aim of this chapter is not to offer a reorganisation procedure, rather it merely 
                                                          
108
 For detailed discussion of this point: see below pp. 278-279.  
109
 See below section 5.5.4. 
110
 See below section 5.5. 
111
 This thesis outlines the necessity of having qualified bankruptcy practitioners: see below section 
5.5.4.6. 
112
 See below section 5.5.3. 
113
 See below section 5.5. 
114
 See below section 5.5.4.6. 
115
 See below section 5.5 
116
 Articles 82-89 of the Omani Banking Law 1974. 
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regulates the liquidation of distressed banks.117 At present, there is no rescue 
proceeding available for distressed banks and other financial institutions in Oman. 
In addressing this issue, Tomasic argued that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
has demonstrated the weakness of legal regimes and regulatory structures in 
dealing with troubled banks and financial institutions in many advanced markets.118 
It is worth noting that even though discussing the bankruptcy of banks and financial 
institutions is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to introduce a 
bankruptcy reform in which viable types of these institutions should be allowed to 
restructure their affairs instead of liquidating them. 
     To summarise, it is within the scope of this thesis to deal with a number of 
issues/ questions. These issues/questions include: Whether bankruptcy law should 
be directed at maximising returns for creditors? Or should it be directed at 
protecting the interests of creditors and non-creditors, such as employees and the 
community?; To what extent, if at all, British and American bankruptcy laws 
encourage the rehabilitation of distressed debtors?; Critically examine various 
bankruptcy procedures in Oman in order to identify whether, or not, Oman should 
adopt a rescue culture; Exploring how employees of the distresses traders are 
treated under the current Oman’s bankruptcy regime; How are the claims of 
various creditors ranked under the current bankruptcy system in Oman?; Outlining 
                                                          
117
 Ibid. 
118
 Tomasic R., ‘Establishing a UK Rescue Regime for Failed Investment Banks’, (2010) 3 (2) C.R.I. 
160, p. 160; Campbell also stated that it has become the international norm for countries to 
establish a separate legal system to deal with banking crises: Campbell A., ‘Bank Insolvency and 
the Interests of Creditors’, (2006), 7 J.B.R. 133, p. 134; also in their article, Peter Cartwright and 
Andrew Campbell highlighted the main objectives of bank insolvency laws by discussing the 
position in the United Kingdom: ‘Bank Insolvency Issue’, (2002), 6 I.L. 198.   
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the importance of designing a special bankruptcy regime for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs); what kind of bankruptcy regime should be adopted by Oman; 
and, finally, how can the legislator of Oman take lessons from the experience of 
England and the US? 
1.5 The Importance of this Study 
     This study is important from a number of angles. First, it will highlight the 
importance of bankruptcy law theories and how it is essential for policy makers to 
have recourse to these theories when considering further development of particular 
bankruptcy laws. As will be argued later, the above discussed theories highlight the 
different roles that might be played by bankruptcy law and in this regard each one 
has its own merits.119 Secondly, this study is also significant as it observes the 
experience of England and the US in constructing their insolvency laws and 
explores to what extent, if at all, the Omani legislator can take lessons from their 
experience. It will be shown that many countries120 have reformed their bankruptcy 
laws through transplanting, imitating and borrowing other countries’ laws.121 In this 
regard, these countries have attempted to establish a reorganisation regime for 
failing traders, like Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.122 Thirdly, the main 
importance of this study lies in critically examining the current bankruptcy regime in 
Oman and in proposing a map for future bankruptcy reform. In examining existing 
bankruptcy regimes in Oman, this thesis will explore various alternatives available 
                                                          
119
 See below pp. 104-107. 
120
 These include China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia: see Tomasic R., Little P., Francis A., 
Kamarul K. & Wang K., above 8, p. 248; Martin N., above 7, p. 4. 
121
 For a fuller treatment of this point: see below section 5.3.1. 
122
 Martin N., above 7, p. 4. 
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for distressed enterprises there and discuss the general features of each 
alternative. Exploring these alternatives should help in identifying clearly the 
deficiencies of the current bankruptcy regime in order to propose a number of 
means to overcome them.123 In addition, besides proposing a map for future 
bankruptcy reform in Oman, this study places emphasis on the importance of 
having an adequate judicial system and qualified bankruptcy practitioners.124 This 
is due to the fact that the complexity of bankruptcy cases requires having in place 
persons who are able to deal with them in an orderly manner. Furthermore, the 
outcome of this study may also benefit some Arab countries since they still do not 
have a bankruptcy law that recognises the concept of a rescue culture.125 In this 
regard, it is stated that126 “insolvency systems in MENA127 are generally 
inconsistent with international best practice”.128 Finally, such an outcome that leads 
to bankruptcy reform in Oman may help in allowing the distressed enterprises to 
                                                          
123
 For a detailed discussion of some deficiencies of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman: see 
below sections 4.4 & 4.8. 
124
 For the current position in Oman: see below section 4.4 (E); for the suggestion made by this 
thesis to change the current position: see below section 5.5.4.6. 
125
 See Uttamchandani M., above 75, pp. 1-3. 
126
 Hawkamah/ World Bank/ OECD/ INSOL International, ‘Survey on Insolvency System in the 
Middle East and North Africa’ (2009), available at: 
 http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/44375185.pdf. accessed on 
 12/01/2014. 
127
 The MENA Region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
West Bank and Gaza and Yemen. 
128
 Hawkamah/ World Bank/ OECD/ INSOL International, above 126, p. 4. 
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rehabilitate their business instead of liquidating their assets and dismissing their 
employees.129 
1.6 Reasons for Selecting Oman as the Object of this Thesis 
     This will be the first study to examine in depth the effectiveness of the Omani 
bankruptcy regime. At present, there are only two books and two master degree 
dissertations130 that have been written in regard to bankruptcy law in Oman. The 
first book is A. AL-Muqdadi, Commercial Companies Law in Oman.131 This book 
considers the procedure for the formation and registration of various types of 
companies which may be formed in Oman. It also discusses the nature and 
constitution of companies and the establishment of limited liability and joint stock 
companies.132 It further provides a concise coverage of the main principles of 
company law, including liabilities and responsibilities of a company as a legal 
person. However, in regard to bankruptcy law, this book provides only a brief 
introduction to the range of liquidation procedures available in Oman, various 
grounds upon which a company may be wound up by the court, powers of 
liquidators and distribution of assets. Thus, this book does not include a critical 
analysis of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman. 
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     The second book is S. Darmaki, Bankruptcy Procedures under the Commercial 
Code in Oman.133 This is a small book (120 pages) that provides an overview of 
the available bankruptcy procedures under Oman’s Commercial Code of 1990. It 
considers application procedures for both bankruptcy proceedings and preventive 
composition schemes. It also discusses the requirements upon which a trader may 
be declared bankrupt by a court and the possible consequences of declaring a 
trader bankrupt. Although this book provides a brief discussion of the available 
bankruptcy procedures in Oman, this thesis will go further134, which differentiates it 
from this book. Since the aim of this thesis is to assess the efficiency of Oman’s 
current bankruptcy system, the discussion will not be focused merely on providing 
an overview of the current bankruptcy procedures in Oman. Rather, it is going to 
criticise the current bankruptcy system and propose a means to overcome the 
problems of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman based on the experience of 
England and the US. 
     The first dissertation is by S. Al-Hinai, ‘Preventive Composition Scheme under 
Omani Commercial Code 1990’.135 This dissertation provides a detailed discussion 
of preventive composition procedures in Oman. It starts by providing definitions of 
preventive composition scheme and its requirements. It then explores various 
issues, including the procedures to be followed in order to initiate preventive 
composition scheme, the consequences of initiating such a scheme on creditors’ 
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claims (i.e. stay on creditors’ actions), and how such schemes are concluded. As 
will be shown in Chapter Four, this thesis will make reference to this dissertation, 
since for example this dissertation has already highlighted the necessity of stating 
clearly what is meant by ‘inability to pay debts’.136 However, this thesis differs in 
that it is going to criticise preventive composition schemes and show how different 
they are from being a rescue process. Thus, this thesis criticises this scheme from 
a number of perspectives.137 
     The Second dissertation is by B. AL-Mahruqi, ‘Liquidation Procedures under 
Omani Commercial Companies Law’.138 This dissertation explores liquidation 
procedures for distressed companies in Oman. It first provides an overview of the 
various types of companies that may be registered in Oman. It then discusses the 
grounds upon which a company may be wound up. It finally discusses various 
liquidation procedures in Oman, the powers, duties and obligations of the 
liquidator, and the distribution of assets. Although this dissertation explores various 
liquidation procedures in Oman, it does not criticise the current liquidation 
procedures there. In particular, it does not refer to the concept of collectivism and 
its importance in protecting the assets of the company from being wasted. Also, it 
does not stress the significance of having in place qualified bankruptcy 
practitioners to administer liquidation procedures. Therefore, this thesis gains its 
importance from approaching these issues and from offering suggestions to the 
Omani legislator. 
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     In addition, this thesis selects Oman as an object of this study because there 
are approximately 250,000 registered businesses139 in Oman, of which small and 
medium enterprises (SME) represent 90 per cent.140 Family-owned companies and 
SMEs are the major contributors of Oman’s GDP141 as well as being the engine for 
job creation.142 According to Sheikh Salah AL-Maawali, Director General for the 
Directorate General of SME Development at the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, almost 13.8 per cent of Oman’s GDP is accounted for by small and 
medium enterprises.143 Thus, it will be argued that144 there is a need to protect 
these businesses in the event of financial difficulties by offering them a legal 
mechanism whereby it is possible to rehabilitate their businesses instead of 
liquidating them and causing job losses. Further, following an order made by 
Sultan Qaboos, the ruler of Oman, in January 2013 a three day ‘Government 
Symposium for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises in Oman’ was 
held. One of the issues discussed in this symposium was bankruptcy of small and 
medium enterprises and how reform of bankruptcy law is needed. In this regard, 
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 AL-Shanfari D., AL-Said A., AL-Said F. & AL-Busaidi S., ‘SME Development Symposium: 
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this study will explore the gap in this area and propose a regime to be considered 
by the Omani legislator.145 
     The more modern concept of corporate restructuring or reorganisation which 
appears, for example, in the bankruptcy/ insolvency laws of England and US is 
currently not an alternative under Omani Law.146 At this time, Omani law allows for 
complete dissolution of the distressed trader rather than reorganisation.147 Also, as 
we shall see, currently the bankruptcy procedures are costly, lengthy and 
inefficient, such that both debtors and creditors have very little incentives to use the 
bankruptcy system as a formal mechanism.148 It will be argued that Oman should 
reform its laws since the development of a proper bankruptcy regime is one of the 
most important factors contributing to successful economic growth.149 Hence, the 
need for a proper and effective bankruptcy regime in Oman is essential. In this 
regard, lessons should be learned from other jurisdictions for example, from 
England and from the US Bankruptcy Law. However, careful consideration should 
be taken when proposing a bankruptcy regime since there is no ‘one size fits all’. 
1.7  Why Observe the Experience of England and the US? 
     This study observes the experience of both England and the US since both of 
them have bankruptcy regimes in which a rescue culture is recognised150 and 
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many other countries151 have learned from their experience. More specifically, 
England is selected for comparative purposes because of its creditor-friendly 
regime.152 England has adopted a rescue model in which creditors’ interests 
continue to affirm a prevailing influence.153 As will be shown in Chapter Three,154 
even though England modernised the administration regime in 2002, Fletcher 
argued that under the current administration regime “the traditional disposition of 
English insolvency law to elevate the interests of creditors above the possible 
benefits of a corporate rescue” still prevails.155 This is also affirmed by Finch, a UK 
scholar, who criticised the whole UK insolvency regime by maintaining that 
“present English rescue procedures might be portrayed as giving strong priority to 
the protection of creditors’ interests and limited priority to rescue”.156 Further, in 
England there are various insolvency proceedings, namely administration, 
receivership, company voluntary arrangement and scheme of arrangement. 
Chapter Three will explore these proceedings and see how they differ from each 
other. Hence, one of the aims of this thesis is to observe the experience of England 
in this regard and then see how it diverges from that of the US.   
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 These countries include China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia. It is stated that “as 
globalization takes place…[M]any countries have attempted to create a reorganization scheme for 
failing enterprises like Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code”: see Martin N., above 7, p. 4; see 
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     The United States is selected for comparative purposes because it has an 
insolvency regime which is considered to be friendlier157 to debtors rather than to 
creditors from a number of perspectives.158 As will be discussed in Chapter Three, 
during US Chapter 11 proceedings, the management of the company will not be 
displaced and they will continue running the business of the company.159 Also, the 
debtor is allowed to obtain new funding and existing creditors might be taken over 
by the new lender.160 
     Hence, it is within the aim of this study to observe the experience of both 
England and the US and explore to what extent the Omani legislator can benefit 
from their experience. The rationales behind the observation of England and the 
US bankruptcy regimes are to identify the principles underpinning each regime and 
to examine the possibility of adopting such principles. Examples of such principles 
include staying creditors’ claims during the proceedings, cramming-down 
dissenting creditors and nominating professional persons to administer the 
processes.161 
     It is worth mentioning that choosing England and the US regimes in this study 
does not mean that the aim of this study is to import the whole experience of 
England or the US. Rather, the aim of examining these bankruptcy regimes is to 
see how these jurisdictions deal with debtors’ financial difficulties and how the 
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above mentioned principles162 are deployed under both systems. Hence, this study 
will avoid the wholesale transplantation of these systems since this thesis believes 
that what might be applicable in the US and England might not be applicable in 
Oman.163 This is due in part to the fact that, at present, Oman does not have an 
adequate institutional infrastructure and professional expertise164 and, as a 
consequence, a number of considerations should be taken into account in 
proposing a new approach to be adopted by the Omani legislator.165 As will be 
shown below,166 due to cultural factors, it is not appropriate to allow the 
management to run the company during bankruptcy proceedings without any kind 
of supervision in Oman. In this regard, it will be argued later that although the 
concept of debtor-in-possession is a common feature of the US Chapter 11, it is 
not suitable to be wholly adopted by the Omani legislator.167 
1.8 The Role of International Organisations in Proposing the Development of 
National Insolvency Laws 
     A number of international organisations recognise the importance of having in 
place an effective insolvency law.168 Both the World Bank and United Nations 
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Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have issued guidelines to 
assist countries in assessing and developing their domestic insolvency regimes.169 
For instance, the aim of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law is to 
assist countries in establishing an effective legal framework to address the 
bankruptcy of the debtor which might lead to its insolvency.170 “It is intended to be 
used as a reference by national authorities and legislative bodies when preparing 
new laws and regulations or reviewing the adequacy of existing laws and 
regulations”.171 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide does not provide a single set of 
model solutions to be adopted by countries, but rather it provides various 
approaches available worldwide.172 Thus, it should be noted that in proposing 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Law, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf), The 
American Law Institute (in issuing Principles for Transnational Insolvency for the NAFTA Countries, 
available at: http://www.ali.org/doc/InsolvencyPrinciples.pdf) and International Association of 
Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals (in issuing a Guide to Recognition and 
Enforcement in regard to Cross-Border Insolvency, available at: 
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international and regional conventions, model laws, EC regulations and directives, uniform rules, 
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International Instruments and Commentary, (Kluwer International Law, 2007). 
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future bankruptcy reform in Oman reference to the UNCITRAL legislative guide 
and the World Bank principles guide173 will be made by this thesis.174 
     In the UNICTRAL Guide, it is stated that even though there is no universal 
solution to the design of insolvency law, there is a broad agreement that effective 
and efficient insolvency regimes should aim to achieve a number of key 
objectives,175 such as striking a balance between liquidation and reorganisation; 
providing equitable treatment for similarly situated creditors; providing for timely, 
efficient and impartial resolution of insolvency; and recognising existing creditors’ 
rights and establishing clear rules for the ranking of priority claims.176 However, in 
addressing such issues, insolvency laws vary worldwide.177 In this regard, some 
jurisdictions178 favour stronger recognition and enforcement of creditors’ rights and 
commercial bargains in insolvency and give creditors more control over the 
conduct of insolvency proceedings than the debtor (sometimes referred to as 
‘creditor-friendly regimes).179 Other laws180 lean towards giving the debtor more 
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control over the proceedings (referred to as ‘debtor-friendly regimes).181 As will be 
shown in Chapter Three182 of this thesis, during the administration regime the 
management is displaced and an insolvency practitioner is appointed to run the 
business.183 However, during the US Chapter 11 proceedings, the management 
retains their position and secured creditors might be overcome by a new lender 
who will be granted a super-priority ranking.184 
1.9  Methodology of this Study 
          Since the main purposes of this study are as follows: (i) to examine the 
formal bankruptcy proceedings in England and the US and to identify differences 
and similarities between these jurisdictions; and (ii) to examine the formal 
bankruptcy proceedings in Oman and to offer specific proposals for bankruptcy 
reform to be adopted by the Omani legislator, this study opts for using both 
comparative and analytical approaches. Because bankruptcy procedures in these 
three jurisdictions are examined, the study is comparative. Furthermore, since an 
assessment of many bankruptcy principles185 is undertaken, the study is analytical. 
Hence, Chapter Three provides an examination of the statutory rescue 
proceedings in England and the US and points out the differences and similarities 
between them. Then, this chapter offers a detailed analysis of a number of issues 
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and how such issues are dealt with under both jurisdictions. In addition, Chapter 
Four examines the formal bankruptcy proceedings in Oman and critically assesses 
their efficiency. Furthermore, Chapter Five discusses the possibility of legal 
transplantations and provides a proposal for future bankruptcy reform in Oman by 
determining the extent to which Oman can adopt some of the bankruptcy principles 
that are found in both England and the US. 
     This thesis has been conducted primarily through library-based research, which 
has relied on a comprehensive review of existing literature, legislations, and court 
decisions. Relevant books and journals relating to the theories underpinning 
bankruptcy law are used in Chapter Two.  Further, relevant books and journals 
relating to the UK insolvency laws and the US bankruptcy law are referred to. For 
the Omani bankruptcy regime, the main references are the Commercial Code of 
1990 and the Commercial Companies Law of 1974. In this regard, a number of 
court cases are consulted to interpret some provisions in Omani law. Furthermore, 
relevant books and articles written on Oman’s bankruptcy law are referred to.  
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
     The next chapter deals with a number of theories underpinning bankruptcy law. 
The focus of these theories is upon what sort of objectives bankruptcy law should 
be designed to achieve. Is it the aim of the bankruptcy law to maximise merely the 
interest of the creditors or are there other interests that should be taken into 
consideration such as employees’, customers’, and suppliers’ interests? In 
answering such a question a number of theories have been proposed. Chapter 
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Two explores five distinct theories, namely the creditors’ bargain theory,186 the 
bankruptcy choice theory,187 the communitarian theory,188 the forum theory,189 the 
multiple values theory190 and the explicit value theory.191 However, as will be 
shown in that chapter, these theories can be categorised into two main camps.192 
The first camp has the view that it should not be within the aim of bankruptcy law to 
maximise the interests of employees, customers, suppliers and the local 
community. Rather, the sole objective of such law should exclusively be to 
maximise the return of creditors.193 As a result, this camp does not recognise the 
concept of reorganising the business of the debtor unless following such a concept 
will maximise the interest of the creditors. On the other hand, the second camp 
takes the view that besides taking into consideration the interests of creditors, 
bankruptcy law should take into account other interests. At the end of that chapter, 
this thesis will evaluate these theories and opt for a combination of various 
theories.194 
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     Chapter Three explores the experience of two jurisdictions which have 
developed insolvency systems. That chapter will study insolvency proceedings of 
England and the US. A brief examination of four insolvency procedures in England 
will be undertaken, namely administration, receivership, voluntary arrangement and 
scheme of arrangement. Then the US Chapter 11 will be dealt with. Here, the 
focus will be on examining some bankruptcy issues195 to ascertain how they are 
regulated under both England and the US laws. Whether or not management 
should be displaced during bankruptcy processes is one of the issues 
discussed.196 As will be shown in that chapter, the position in England differs from 
that of the US.197 Also, the issue of staying creditors’ action will be dealt with. In 
this regard, the importance of such stay will be highlighted and how the rights of 
secured creditors are protected.198 Then, the issue of post financing will be 
approached and how such financing might affect the success of the rescue attempt 
will be discussed. In this regard, the difference between England and the US will 
be highlighted.199 Further, the notion of cramming-down dissenting creditors during 
insolvency processes will be dealt with. Finally, at the end of that chapter, the 
thesis will evaluate the experience of both England and the US.200 
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     Chapter Four provides an overview of the general features of the current 
bankruptcy regime in Oman,201 for instance, the definition of bankruptcy according 
to the Commercial Code, persons administering bankruptcy processes, the position 
of employees and the treatment of small bankruptcies.202 Also, an overview of the 
current bankruptcy regime in Oman will be given by identifying various alternatives 
available to distressed debtors.203 First, bankruptcy procedures under Oman’s 
Commercial Code and the eligibility for applying will be discussed. In this regard, 
that chapter will focus on the main problems with the current bankruptcy 
procedures.204 For example, unlike the case in both England and the US, under the 
current bankruptcy regime in Oman, secured creditors’ actions are not stayed and 
they have the right to enforce their securities despite the initiation of such 
proceedings. Secondly, the aims and procedures of the preventive composition 
scheme will be explored by identifying the reasons for its inefficiency.205 After that, 
an assessment of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman will be undertaken.206 
     Having discussed the theories of insolvency law, observed the experience of 
both England and the US and examined the current bankruptcy regime in Oman, 
Chapter Five is an attempt to propose a bankruptcy regime that suits Oman. That 
chapter will start by exploring the theories underpinning legal transplantations. As 
will be discussed,207 some scholars argue that legal transplants are possible and 
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even necessary for legal development.208 However, others argue that legal rules 
mirror the needs of a specific society and, as a result, it is impossible to transplant 
such rules to other jurisdictions.209 However, as will be explained further, the later 
view overlooks the vast amount of legal transplantations occurring worldwide.210 
Then, the effect of legal transplantations on the receiving countries211 and the ways 
to measure the success of such transplantations will be dealt with.212 After that, 
that chapter will discuss legal transplants in the area of bankruptcy laws.213 Also, 
the experience of Oman in transplanting legal rules will be observed. In addition, 
this thesis will demonstrate how important it is for Oman to transplant bankruptcy 
principles from other developed jurisdictions.214 However, it will be argued that in 
adopting such principles caution should be taken since what is workable in other 
jurisdictions might not be so in Oman.215 Furthermore, that chapter will 
demonstrate how necessary it is for Oman to introduce a bankruptcy law reform.216 
In this regard, reference will be made to Oman’s Economic Vision 2020 and to the 
role played by Small and Medium Enterprises in enhancing the national economy. 
That chapter will conclude by suggesting a map for future bankruptcy reform in 
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Oman.217 It will be emphasised that future bankruptcy law should have a clear 
statutory vision and various bankruptcy procedures should be designed in a way 
that reflects such a mandate. Also, as will be argued, designing a bankruptcy law in 
a way that provides a level of certainty and predictability is important and this might 
be achieved, for instance, by offering clarity in regard to the bankruptcy tests and 
priority entitlements rules. Further, the call for the establishment of a rescue regime 
is one of the suggestions put forward by this thesis and Chapter Five emphasises 
the necessity of taking into account a number of issues in a designing future 
rescue regime. Finally, the importance of having qualified bankruptcy practitioners 
and of assessing the implementation of the bankruptcy law by establishing a 
reviewing mechanism will be highlighted.  
1.11 Conclusion 
     The aim of this chapter was to provide a general overview of the themes of this 
thesis. This chapter started by highlighting some issues with the current bankruptcy 
regime in Oman that this thesis will address. Then, clarification of the terminology 
that will be used in this thesis was outlined. Also, the scope, the importance and 
the questions of this study are explained. Further, this chapter stated the reasons 
for selecting Oman as the subject of this study and the reasons for selecting to 
observe the experience of both England and the US. In addition, the role played by 
international organisations in proposing the development of national insolvency 
laws has been highlighted. Also, the methodology used to accomplish this study 
has been clarified. Finally, this chapter outlined the structure of this thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Approaches to Bankruptcy Law 
2.1 Introduction 
     A broad range of interests can be affected by the bankruptcy of a company,1 
such as the interests of secured and unsecured creditors and the interests of 
employees.2 As a consequence of bankruptcy, shareholders may lose their 
investment.3 Employees may have direct claims in the form of unpaid wages and 
may be concerned about their future employment.4 Suppliers might be brought into 
bankruptcy5 and the Government may lose out on tax revenue.6 Employees may 
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company can affect many thousands, even tens of thousands, of innocent people…[I]n the case of 
a major trading company it can affect its customers and suppliers and the livelihood of many 
thousands of persons employed by other companies whose viability is threatened by the collapse of 
the company in liquidation”: [1991] BCLC 750, p. 760; Keay A., ‘Insolvency Law: A Matter of Public 
Interest’ (hereinafter ‘Public Interest’), (2000) 51 N.I.L.Q. 509, pp. 527-528.  
3
 It is also argued that in the event of bankruptcy, shareholders may not receive any payment since 
secured creditors will seek court permission to enforce their collateral and unsecured creditors may 
suffer significant losses because they may not be given their money in full: see Fabozzi F., Bond 
Portfolio Management, (John Wiley & Sons, 2001), p. 57. 
4
 Bose T., ‘Resolving Financial Distress- Justice as Fairness and Reciprocity’, (2004) UCL 
Jurisprudence Review 230, p. 243. 
5
 As regards the impact on their business of the insolvent company’s failure. Particularly, if their 
businesses are heavily reliant on the existence of the insolvent company: see Goode R., above 2, 
p. 72. 
6
 In this regard, the US Bankruptcy Act ,in particular, sections 523 (a), 507 (a) (2) & 507 (a) (8) 
permits the discharge of many tax debts: see Waldman P. & Berke K., ‘Bankruptcy Discharge of 
Tax Debts: Navigating the Minefield’, (2004) 18 P.T.L. 41, p. 47; see also Swain A., ‘The Effect of 
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be left without jobs.7 As a consequence, if a company becomes bankrupt,8 a 
number of questions are raised, such as whether bankruptcy law should be 
directed at maximising returns for creditors? Or should the aim of bankruptcy law 
be to protect the interests of creditors and non-creditors, such as employees and 
the community? Should bankruptcy law be directed at striking balance between the 
rights of creditors, debtors and those parties affected by the bankruptcy of the 
company? Also, how should bankruptcy law respond to the competing interests of 
different creditors?  
     In an attempt to address such questions, a number of theories having different 
views concerning the aims and policies underpinning bankruptcy law have 
emerged.9 Examples of such theories are the creditors’ bargain theory,10 the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Bankruptcy on State Tax Enforcement and Proceedings’, Tax Analyst, Special Report, (March 19
th
, 
2012) available at: http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/63st0947.pdf. as accessed on 20/01/2014.   
7
 For instance, an official report in the US revealed that companies that have been declared 
bankrupt in asbestos-related bankruptcy cases employed more than 200,000 workers before their 
bankruptcies. However, asbestos-related bankruptcies led to the direct loss of as many as 60,000 
jobs: see Senate Reports: numbers 1-39- United States, Congress, (Government Printing Office, 
2003), pp. 19-20.  
8
 There are a number of circumstances in which a merchant (including individual traders and 
companies) might be regarded as bankrupt. For example, Article 579 of the Oman’s Commercial 
Code 1990 states that any merchant whose financial affairs are in difficulty and who ceases to pay 
due debts might be bankrupt: see below pp. 208-210. 
9
 See Goode R., above 2, pp. 68-79; Finch V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and 
Principles (hereinafter Corporate Insolvency), (2
nd
 edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 
32-62; Keay A. & Walton P., Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, (Longman, 2003), pp. 24-30. 
10
 For this view: see Jackson T., The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (hereinafter Logic and 
Limits), (Harvard University Press, 1986); Jackson T. & Scott R., ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An 
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (hereinafter ‘The Nature of Bankruptcy’) 
(1989) 75 V.L.R. 155; Baird D. & Jackson T., ‘Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the 
Absolute Priority Rule’ (hereinafter ‘Absolute Priority Rule’) (1988) 55 U.C.L.R. 738; Rasmussen R., 
‘Debtor’s Choices: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy’, (1992) 71 T.L.R. 51; Baird D., ‘The 
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bankruptcy choice theory,11 the communitarian theory,12 the forum theory,13 the 
multiple values theory14 and the explicit value theory.15 As Walton rightly stated, 
there are almost as many theories as there are writers in this particular area.16 
However, these theories can be, in broad terms, categorised into two groups. The 
first group holds the view that the main role and objective of bankruptcy law should 
be to maximise the collective returns to creditors,17 while the other group is of the 
opinion that bankruptcy creates a community of parties who are affected by the 
debtor’s financial distress, which not only includes creditors, but covers a wider 
group which may include workers, customers, suppliers and local authority.18 
Therefore, it has been said that focus of the whole debate on bankruptcy theories 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations’, (1986) 15 J.L.S. 127; Bebchuk L., ‘A New Approach 
to Corporate Reorganization’, (1988) 101 H.L.R. 755. 
11
 Korobkin D., ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (hereinafter 
‘Contractarianism’), (1993) 71 T.L.R. 541; Mokal R., ‘The Authentic Consent Model: 
Contractarianism, Creditors Bargain and Corporate Liquidation’ (hereinafter ‘The Authentic Consent 
Model’), (2001) 21 J.L.S. 400; see below section 2.3.1. 
12
 Gross K., ‘Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy’ (hereinafter ‘Community 
Interests’), (1994) 72 W.U.LO.Q. 1031, p. 1042; Keay A., ‘Public Interest’, above 2; Gross K., 
Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (hereinafter Failure and 
Forgiveness), (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 205; see below section 2.4.1. 
13
 Flessner A., ‘Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: An International Overview’, in Ziegel J., 
Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law, (Clarendon 
Press, 1994), p. 24; see below section 2.5.1.  
14
 Warren E., ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, (1987) 54 (3) U.C.L.R. 755; Korobkin D., ‘Rehabilitating Values: A 
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy (hereinafter ‘Rehabilitating Values’), (1991) 91 R.C.L. 717; see below 
section 2.6.1. 
15
 Finch V., Corporate Insolvency, above 9, pp. 52-63; see below section 2.7.1. 
16
 Walton P. ‘When is Pre-Packaged Administration Appropriate? A Theoretical Consideration’, 
(2011) 20 N.L.J. 1, p. 1. 
17
 See above, footnote 10.    
18
 See, for example, the works of Gross K., ‘Community Interests’, above 12, Warren E., 
‘Bankruptcy Policy’, above 14 and Korobkin D., ‘Rehabilitating Values’, above 14. 
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involves deciding who and what is to be protected and recognised by bankruptcy 
law.19 
     Unlike the situation in the United States where scholars have long been 
interested in the philosophy of bankruptcy law, in the United Kingdom there have 
been few developed comments on the theories underpinning bankruptcy law.20 
This, as argued by Goode,21 might be because of the pragmatic way in which 
English law has developed. In addition, Keay and Walton argued that the focus of 
scholars in the UK has been on statutory developments and case law instead of 
‘divining theoretical framework’.22 However, recently, some scholars from the UK 
have begun to concern themselves more with normative theories of insolvency law, 
for instance, the Explicit Value Theory promoted by Finch and the Authentic 
Consent Theory promoted by Mokal.23 
     In Oman, there is also no developed discussion on the theory underpinning 
bankruptcy law. This thesis takes the view that there are a number of reasons 
behind the absence of such discussion in Oman. First, as was the case in the UK 
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 Keay A. & Walton P., above 9, p. 25.  
20
 Goode R., above 2, p. 69; In 1997, Vanessa Finch has established a theoretical base for herself 
by promoting her Explicit Value Theory: see Finch V., Corporate Insolvency, above 9, pp. 48-63; 
Finch V., ‘The Measures of Insolvency Law’ (hereinafter ‘Insolvency Measures’) (1997) 17 O.J.L.S. 
227. 
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 Goode R., above 2, p. 69 
22
 Until the late 1980s insolvency law in the UK was rarely subject of scholarly articles or texts, and 
was rarely discussed on undergraduate and postgraduate courses: see Keay A. & Walton P., above 
9, p. 4 & p. 25.  
23
 See, for example, Mokal R., Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (hereinafter 
Corporate Insolvency), (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 61-91; Finch V., Corporate Insolvency, 
above 9, pp. 48-63.  
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before the 1980s,24 until now Bankruptcy Law in Oman has rarely been the subject 
of scholarly articles and texts.25 This might be because of the fact that, at present, 
there is no separate bankruptcy law in Oman. In this regard, even though both 
Oman’s Commercial Code of 1990 and the Commercial Companies Law of 1974 
incorporate a number of bankruptcy provisions,26 few scholars have examined 
these laws.27 Secondly, over the past forty years, bankruptcy law has not enjoyed 
significant government focus. As will be discussed below,28 the focus was on 
enacting legislations that facilitate and promote the access of domestic and foreign 
investments instead of regulating the exit of such investments.29 
     The aim of this chapter is to explore some of the theories which may underpin 
bankruptcy law. However, it is worth noting that this chapter on theoretical 
frameworks is not exhaustive and could hardly do full justice to the enormous 
debate that has been advocated.30 Yet the discussion below will point out some of 
the theories that have been put forward by the US and the UK scholars. Thus, first 
of all, the creditors’ bargain theory will be discussed. Mokal stated that “there is no 
doubt that insolvency law scholarship has long been dominated by the creditors’ 
                                                          
24
 See Keay A. & Walton P., above 9, p. 4. 
25
 For a brief overview of the existing literatures in Oman: see above pp. 20-22.  
26
 Generally speaking, this Code covers the adjudication of bankruptcy, bankruptcy officials, the 
legal effects of bankruptcy, management of bankruptcy, the termination of bankruptcy (including 
composition with creditors scheme), bankruptcy of companies, discharge of bankrupts and 
bankruptcy-related offences. The Commercial Companies Law of 1974 governs companies’ 
liquidation procedures. 
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 See above footnote 25. 
28
 See below pp. 302-304. 
29
 Examples of such laws are: the Commercial Companies Law of 1974, the Commercial Code of 
1990, the Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1994, Arbitration Law of 1997, Privatisation Law of 
2004, Industrial Property Rights Law of 2008 and Copyright Law of 2008: see below p. 304. 
30
 This statement has been borrowed from Keay A. & Walton P., above 9, p. 25. 
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bargain theory. For almost two decades, insolvency scholars have either argued 
within its assumptions, or have proceeded by making it their first (and often 
primary) target.”31 Then, the bankruptcy choice theory, the communitarian theory, 
the forum theory and multiple values theory will be dealt with. Further, the 
alternative approach to those existing theories promoted by Finch in terms of the 
explicit value theory will be discussed. Finally, this chapter will conclude by 
evaluating those normative theories and by discussing the approach that is 
favoured by this thesis. 
     It is worth noting that once bankruptcy theories have been examined and 
evaluated, a separate chapter will explore the experience of both England and the 
United States by identifying to what extent such theories are adopted by the 
legislators. Also, the notions underpinning some of the theories discussed in this 
thesis will be utilised in proposing a bankruptcy regime to be adopted by the Omani 
legislator. As will be discussed below,32 this thesis will emphasise the fact that 
policy makers in Oman should have recourse to these normative theories when 
considering further development to bankruptcy law. Further, as will be shown in 
Chapter Four,33 even though the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is in favour of 
secured creditors’ interests, the notions of the creditors’ bargain theory are not fully 
                                                          
31
 Mokal R., Corporate Insolvency, above 23, p. 33; it is also stated that ‘this theory of insolvency 
law has, arguably, dominated the field in the past 20 years and continues to have a profound 
influence despite the fact that its main champion, Prof. Jackson, no longer writes in the area: see 
Keay A. & Walton P., above 9, p. 25. 
32
 See below pp. 107-110. 
33
 See below section 4.8.2. 
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adopted. This is because of the fact that staying secured creditors’ actions34 is not 
one of the features of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman.35 
2.2 The Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
     The most widely debated bankruptcy law theory36 can be said to be the 
creditors’ bargain theory. This theory was proposed by Thomas Jackson through 
his lectures and writing in the 1980s’.37 Subsequently, Douglas Baird38 and Robert 
Scott39 joined him as the main supporters of the creditors’ bargain theory. The 
premises of this theory, more particularly, are influenced prominently by the law 
and economics movement which was born in the United States in the mid- 1970s 
                                                          
34
 The moratorium is considered part of the compulsory debt collection system: see below section 
2.2.1. 
35
 For in-depth discussion of the case in Oman: see below sections 4.4 (D) & 4.6.2.4.  
36
 Mokal R., Corporate Insolvency, above 23, p. 33; Keay A. & Walton P., above 9, p. 25. 
37
 The decade of the 1970s brought forth a number of important corporate –finance works on 
bankruptcy and related issues. However, before the 1980s, the focus of scholars has not been in 
divining theoretical framework. In the 1980s, it is Thomas Jackson who has been most explicit in 
seeking to establish a theoretical base for himself: see Ayer J., ‘So Near to Cleveland, So Far From 
God: An Essay on the Ethnography of Bankruptcy’, (1992) 61 U.Cin.L.Rev. 407, pp. 416-417; 
examples of some works on bankruptcy and related issues in the 1970s are: Bulow J. & Shoven J., 
‘The Bankruptcy Decision’, (1978) 9 Bell J. Econ. 437; Galai D. & Masulis R., ‘The Option Pricing 
Model and the Risk Factor of Stock’, (1971) 26 J. Fin. 347; Warner J., ‘Bankruptcy, Absolute, 
Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims’, (1977) 4 J. Fin.Econ. 239; Warner J., ‘Bankruptcy 
Costs: Some Evidence’, (1977) 32 J. Fin. 337.    
38
 Baird D., ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, And Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren’ (hereinafter ‘A 
Reply to Warren’), (1987) 54 U.C.L.R. 815; also Baird D. & Jackson T., ‘Absolute Priority Rule’, 
above 10. 
39
 See the work of Jackson T. & Scott R., ‘The Nature of Bankruptcy’, above 10. 
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and which had a substantial impact on scholarship, not only in the United States, 
but also in the UK and around the world.40 
     Since the creditors’ bargain theory is considered41 to be the most controversial 
theory,42 the focus of this part of this chapter will be on the principles of this theory, 
its advantages and the critiques of the creditors’ bargain theory. 
2.2.1 The Principles of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
     Jackson,43 followed by his supporters,44 argued that the main role and objective 
of bankruptcy law should be to maximise the collective return to creditors of the 
insolvent debtor. It is concerned with neither the interests of the debtor nor the 
interests of the community.45 Bankruptcy law, based on Jackson’s view, is a 
collective debt-collection device and it only deals with the rights of the creditors of 
the insolvent company.46 This theory does not recognise rehabilitation47 of the 
distressed enterprise as a legitimate objective of bankruptcy law unless, and to the 
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 Keay A. & Walton P., above 9, p. 25; Goode R., above 2, p. 69; Ayer J., above 37, pp. 417-418. 
41
 See above p. 42 & footnote number 31. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10.  
44
 Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, (1987) L.C.P. 173, p. 184; Baird D., ‘A Reply to Warren’, 
above 38; Baird D. & Jackson T., ‘Absolute Priority Rule’, above 10; Jackson T. & Scott R., ‘The 
Nature of Bankruptcy’, above 10. 
45
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 5. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Jackson clearly stated that “it is wrong to think that there should be an independent substantive 
policy of reorganisation law to give firms breathing space or to reorganise them to preserve jobs. 
These policies should not be bankruptcy policies”: Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 201; 
Bose T., above 4, p. 231. 
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extent that, it leads to maximise returns to creditors.48 Thus, according to Jackson, 
bankruptcy law can and should help a firm stay in operation when it is worth more 
to its creditors alive than dead.49 Even though the regime should help a firm to 
continue its business if it is worth more to the debtor’s creditors as a going concern 
than selling it piecemeal, rehabilitation per se should not be an independent policy 
because it does little to reconcile the diverse interests of creditors.50 Baird argued 
that “embracing a “rehabilitation” goal as a matter of bankruptcy policy does little to 
resolve many bankruptcy disputes”.51 One of the most common disputes in 
bankruptcy law is over the issue of priorities. When there are not enough assets to 
go around, some creditors are not going to be paid in full.52 In this regard, Baird 
argued that there is nothing bankruptcy law can do to change this, irrespective of 
what goals it embraces.53 He, further, claimed that a dispute over priorities has 
nothing to do with the question whether a firm should stay in operation to save 
                                                          
48
 Jackson viewed bankruptcy law as a collective debt-collection device, and it merely deals with the 
rights of creditors: Ibid. 
49
 This might be the case if the value of a firm as a going concern is greater than its value as 
piecemeal. Baird provided an example of a restaurant in a small town which servers heavy, 
overpriced food that few wanted. The restaurant is a firm that has failed. In this regard, all creditors 
might agree, if they were able to meet and bind one another, that it was in their best interest to give 
the restaurant owner a second chance. The restaurant might work with a new chef and a new 
menu, and the value of a successful restaurant is much greater than the value of a restaurant’s 
equipment sold piecemeal: Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, above 44, p. 183; Jackson T., 
Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 2; furthermore, Jackson and Scott stated that “the assumption of 
greater going concern value depends upon the existence of two factors: the debtor's assets must be 
worth more in combination than if they were broken up and sold, and the long-term prospects of the 
debtor must be brighter than the short-term prospects”: Jackson T. & Scott R., ‘The Nature of 
Bankruptcy’, above 10, p. 159.  
50
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 2. 
51
 Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, above 44, p. 184. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
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jobs.54 A rehabilitation goal should not lead to favour denying secured creditors the 
time value of their claims during bankruptcy proceedings.55 
     Under the creditors’ bargain theory, regulating the inherent conflicts among 
diverse groups having separate claims against debtor’s assets are a primary 
objective of any bankruptcy process.56 As a result, the bankruptcy normative policy 
objective is to collectivise the process by which debtors’ assets are made available 
to claimants.57 According to Jackson,58 bankruptcy law is a response to a ‘common 
pool’ problem arising when diverse co-owners59 affirm rights against a common 
pool of assets. Baird, in addition, clarified this by maintaining that the self-interest 
of creditors leads to a collective action problem,60 and it is important to have a 
compulsory mechanism to ensure that the self-interest of individuals does not 
conflict with the interests of the group.61 In order to tackle such a problem, this 
theory suggests that there should be a compulsory collective system where the law 
“must usurp individual creditor remedies in order to make the claimants act in an 
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 Ibid. 
55
 For further discussion of Baird’s view about the rehabilitation of corporate debtors: see ibid, pp. 
181-186. 
56
 Ibid, p. 158. 
57
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, pp. 16-17. 
58
 See Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 16; Finch V., Corporate Insolvency, above 9, p. 
32.  
59
 Whose rights against the assets make all of them species of “owners”: see Jackson T., ‘Avoiding 
Powers in Bankruptcy’, (1984) 36 S.L.R. 725, p. 728. 
60
 Because without a collective bankruptcy proceeding, each creditor will tend to rush towards the 
debtor’s assets before other creditors: see Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, above 44, p. 183. 
61
 Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, above 44, p. 184; see also Jackson T., ‘Avoiding Powers in 
Bankruptcy’, above 59, pp. 728-229.  
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altruistic and cooperative way”62 and all the debtors’ creditors should be bound to 
it.63 Thus, according to this theory, a mandatory mechanism of debt collection 
should be in place, instead of an individual debt collection system that is in place 
outside bankruptcy law.64 In this regard, imposing a stay on creditors’ actions 
should be an integral part of the compulsory mechanism of debt collection.65 As will 
be show in Chapter Three,66 the concept of collectivity cannot achieve its aim 
unless creditors are prohibited from pursuing their claims.  
     Further, the creditors’ bargain theory is in contradiction with the idea that 
bankruptcy law should take into account all of the interests of the substantial 
numbers of public rights.67 Baird and Jackson argued that it is not within the policy 
                                                          
62
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 17. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Jackson T., ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (thereinafter 
‘Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement’), (1991) Y.L.J. 857, p. 862. 
65
 See Bhandari J. & Weiss L., Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 42; Jackson T., ‘Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement’, above 64, p. 
867. 
66
 See below section 3.4.2. 
67
 Keay argued that there is little consistency in defining the public interest and, as a result, there is 
no general consensus as to what the public interest involves: see Keay A., ‘Public Interest’, above 
2, pp. 522 & 533.; Veach stated that public interests are defined by scholars ‘as the interests of 
those, beside the debtor, who have not invested capital in whatever business is in bankruptcy’. 
However, he argued that this definition is too narrow. He argued that secured and unsecured 
creditors are members of the public, and their financial wealth is essential to the stability of the 
national economy and, hence, their interests cannot be excluded from the ‘public interest’. He 
argued that the interests of debtors need also to be taken into consideration as part of the public 
interest since preserving the business might lead to the growth of the national economy: see Veach 
J., ‘On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy: Looking to the Railroad for Answers’, (1997) 
72 (4) Indian L.J. 1711, p. 1214; for Keay’s criticisms of Veach’s definition: see Keay A, ‘Public 
interest’, above 2, pp. 524-525.; moreover, for the purposes of insolvency law, Keay stated that it is 
preferable ‘rather than formulating a comprehensive definition which may well be unworkable, to 
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of bankruptcy law to take into consideration the interests of others who have no 
claims against the assets68 of the insolvent company.69 Baird, in addition, stated 
that “legal rights should turn as little as possible on the forum in which one person 
or another seeks to vindicate them”.70 “Whenever we must have a legal rule to 
distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule that distributes the 
same loss outside of bankruptcy.”71 Baird,72 in addition, questioned why bankrupt 
company should have a special obligation to protect their employees if the 
company outside bankruptcy does not have any obligation of this sort. If, according 
to Baird, social policy rationally favours workers, employee protection legislations 
could favour workers in all businesses not just those that are unable to meet their 
debt obligation or find themselves bankrupt for some other reason.73 As a 
consequence, Baird argued that there is no satisfactory reason why it is legitimate 
to tackle only the outside effects of business failure within bankruptcy law.74 If 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
say that the public interest involves taking into account interests which society has regard for and 
which are wider than the interests of those parties directly involved in any given insolvency 
situation, that is, the debtor and the creditors’: see Keay A., ‘Public Interest’, above 2, p. 525. 
68
 Baird and Jackson stated that workers, for example, have no substantive rights against the 
assets. Thus, the owners (with substantives rights- e.g. secured creditors, shareholders) are free to 
close the business without considering the interests of workers if doing so brings the owners more 
money: see Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, above 44, p. 186; Jackson T., Logic and Limits, 
above 10, p. 25; Mooney also stated that “to take any other interests of those constituencies into 
account would constitute prima facie theft”: Mooney C., ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: 
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure’, (2004) 61 W.L.L.R. 931, p. 964.   
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Baird D., ‘Reply to Warrant’, above 38, p. 822. 
71
 Ibid, p. 822. 
72
 Ibid; Bhandari J., Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 28.  
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 Baird D., ‘Reply to Warren’, above 38, p. 822. 
74
 Ibid. 
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some interests are in need of such protection, it is better to tackle this problem and 
provide protection within the whole legal system in order to provide a uniform and 
certain protection.75 Thus, according to this theory, accommodating these rights,76 
such as employees (with regard to job preservation claims), local suppliers (with 
regard to the impact on their business of the insolvent company’s failure), 
environmental (in regard to payment of clean-up costs and pollution) and 
community rights (with regard to cessation of trading), under bankruptcy law is 
mistaken and inappropriate.77  
     Moreover, the creditors’ bargain theory viewed bankruptcy as a system 
designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to reach among 
themselves (ex ante) were they have the opportunity to negotiate such agreement 
before entering into a transaction with the debtor.78 It is claimed, by Jackson,79 that 
this theory is an application of the famous Rawalsian80 notion of bargaining from 
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 For further details see: Baird D. & Jackson T., ‘Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of 
Divers Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy’, (1984) U.C.L.R. 97, pp. 102-103. 
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 See Goode R., above 2, pp. 72-73. 
77
 For criticising this view: see below pp. 57-60.  
78
 Jackson T., ‘Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement’, above 64, p. 860; However, it is difficult to envisage 
how agreements cab be reached ex ante between various creditors: for further discussion: see 
below pp. 55-57. 
79
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 17. 
80
 Jackson claimed that he bases his theory on Rawls concepts of ‘original position’ behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’:  Jackson T., ibid: in summarising Rawls’ theory, Bose stated that Rawls presents a 
theory of the principles of justice in which he establishes a suitable connection between a particular 
conception of the person and principles of justice. His fundamental claim is that ‘justice as fairness’. 
‘Fairness to Rawls means reciprocity. All people are treated as worthy of equal consideration.’ In his 
view, co-operation between persons is central in order to come to an agreement and at the same 
time further their own good. ‘Rawls’ thought experiment imagines an ‘original position’ where people 
are subject to a ‘veil of ignorance’. Under these conditions, since people are stripped of any 
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behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. Accordingly, this theory reflects the hypothetical 
agreement that creditors would reach if they had the chance before (ex ante) 
extending credit to the insolvent debtor.81 Although the bargain is hypothetical, the 
creditors have the attributes that creditors in real world transactions possess, as it 
is claimed, that “the hypothetical bargain analysis provides indirect evidence of 
what real world parties would, in fact, agree to”.82 
2.2.2 The Possible Advantages of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
     According to this theory, the main role and objective of bankruptcy law is to 
maximise the collective return to creditors through a compulsory collective debt-
collection system and to solve the ‘common pool’83 of assets problem arising from 
diverse claims to limited assets.84 Jackson argued that having such a compulsory 
system will help to reduce the cost of debt collection, and help to maximise the 
aggregate pool of assets and it is thus argued to be administratively effective.85 In 
illustrating the advantages of a compulsory collective debt-collection system, 
Jackson86 provided the following simple hypothetical case: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge about themselves they decide what is just independently of any vested interests, bias or 
partiality so their reasoning is impartial.’: see Bose T., above 4, p. 242; see Rawls J., ‘Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory’, (1980) 77 J.P. 515, p. 516.     
81
 Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 17. 
82
 Jackson T. & Scott R., ‘The Nature of Bankruptcy’, above 10, p. 160. 
83
 This problem is discussed in the work of Baird D. & Jackson T., above 75. 
84
 Baird D., ‘World without Bankruptcy’, above 44, p. 183; Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 10, p. 
17. 
85
 Jackson T., ‘Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement’, above 64, p. 861; Jackson T., Logic and Limits, above 
10, p 14. 
86
 Jackson T., ‘Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement’, above 64, p. 861. 
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“D has a small printing business. Potential creditors estimate that there is a 
twenty percent chance that D will become insolvent. At the point of insolvency, 
the business is expected to be worth $80,000 as an operating entity and 
$60,000 if sold piecemeal. D borrows $50,000 from each of two creditors, Cl 
and C2. CI and C2 expect to spend $2,000 each in pursuit of individual creditor 
remedies should D become insolvent and fail to repay them. Are there any 
reasons to believe that under these circumstances D, C1 and C2 would jointly 
agree to contract for a collective liquidation system to deal with the twenty 
percent chance that D will not be able to pay CI and C2 in full? From the 
creditors' point of view (and ultimately from D's, since inefficiencies in a non-
collective system will be charged back to D- either wholly or in part- in the form 
of higher credit costs), three reasons suggest themselves: reduction of strategic 
costs; increased aggregate pool of assets; and administrative efficiencies.” 
     Baird also stressed the importance of having in place a legal mechanism to 
ensure that the self-interest of individuals does not run counter to the interests of 
the group.87 The aim of this part of this chapter is to summarise the benefits of 
adopting a compulsory collective debt-collection system as it is viewed by the 
supporters of the creditors’ bargain theory. 
A- Reduction of Strategic Costs 
     Jackson88 claimed that a collective debt-collection system would reduce the 
‘first in time, first in priority’ race which is a ‘race to the court-house’ between 
creditors. Without having such a compulsory system, creditors will have to spend 
time and money monitoring each of their debtors’ assets; and once bankruptcy is 
suspected, they will run to the court to take action to win the race to enforce their 
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debt more quickly than other creditors.89 According to Jackson,90 mandatory 
bankruptcy procedures will help in avoiding ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’91 for creditors. 
He stated that the fundamental feature of a prisoner’s dilemma is rational individual 
behaviour that, in absence of cooperation with other individuals, leads to a sub-
optimal decision when viewed collectively.92 In the absence of a collective process, 
each creditor has an incentive to take advantage of individual collection remedies, 
and to do so before the other creditor acts.93 According to Jackson, besides 
creating costs on individual creditors, this race also may leads to a premature 
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termination of a debtor’s business since each creditor will consider only that 
creditor’s own gain from racing, instead of the disadvantage imposed on creditors 
collectively.94 Hence, having in place a compulsory debt collection scheme will 
prohibit this kind of race between creditors and, accordingly, will overcome 
creditors’ co-ordination problems regarding the common pool of assets.95 
B- Aggregate Pool of Assets will be Increased 
     In the absence of a compulsory collective debt-collection system, creditors will 
waste assets in order to be first to seize their security or to obtain a judgment 
against the debtor.96 However, such behaviours may lead to the dismantlement of 
the debtor’s assets and to a loss of value for all creditors if the debtor’s assets are 
worth more as a whole than as a collection of pieces.97 This is derived, according 
to Jackson, “from a commonplace notion that a collection of assets is sometimes 
more valuable together than the same assets would be if spread to the winds. It is 
often referred to as the surplus of a going-concern value over a liquidation value”.98 
Therefore, the most obvious reason for a collective process is that, in pursuing 
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their individual remedies, creditors may decrease the aggregate value of the assets 
that will be used to repay them.99 
C- Administrative Efficiencies 
     Jackson100 sees the collectivist compulsory system as administratively efficient. 
Issues such as the detailed amount of the debtor’s assets and the nature and 
quantity of secured claims must be solved in almost every collection procedure.101 
Also, a single inquiry into frequent collection questions is likely to be less 
expensive than the multiple inquiries necessary in an individualistic remedies 
scheme.102 Hence, based on this theory, a single compulsory collective debt 
system may be administratively efficient in avoiding these kinds of unnecessary 
procedures.103 However, Jackson acknowledged that even though it would be in 
the interest of all creditors, no single creditor would accept to be bound to a 
collective process unless it was a compulsory system binding all other creditors.104 
Therefore, he argued that in order to tackle this problem, it is necessary to 
establish a bankruptcy rule by making available a mandatory collective system 
after bankruptcy has occurred.105 It could most obviously be implemented through 
a formal stay of claims, under the ‘automatic stay’ of the US Bankruptcy Law.106 A 
similar effect is had upon the claims of unsecured creditors by the commencement 
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of winding-up proceedings in England,107 or on all those creditors by the bringing of 
a successful petition for administration.108 In this regard, a ‘stay on creditors’ 
actions plays a vital role in achieving the aim of such a compulsory debt collection 
scheme. 
2.2.3 Criticisms of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
     Under the creditors’ bargain theory all policies and rules must be designed, 
through the compulsory collective system, to ensure that the return to creditors as 
a group, is maximised.109 However, this theory which has been developed into very 
well-designed and sophisticated theories of bankruptcy law has not been passed 
without criticisms.110 
     The creditors’ bargain theory developed the notion that bankruptcy law should 
be seen as a system designed to mirror the contract one would expect creditors to 
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reach were they able to negotiate such agreement ex ante from behind the veil of 
ignorance.111 However, it has been argued that to presume that creditors in the 
bargain are capable of reaching a united agreement is to stand against reality, 
since in practice real parties are diverse in their legal perception and power.112 This 
theory treats creditors as if they are all equal in terms of their knowledge, 
experience and power, and focuses, merely, on voluntary creditors who are able to 
bargain freely in their contracts with the insolvent debtor.113 Carlson and Finch 
argued that creditors normally differ in their leverage and knowledge, their skills in 
obtaining payment or liens, and their costs of litigating.114 Finch argued that the 
assumption that powerful creditors would agree to a collective process is highly 
questionable.115 In addition, secured creditors who are powerful vis-à-vis other 
unsecured creditors would not agree to give up power to ‘weaklings’ unless proper 
compensation has been provided.116 In her article,117 Finch stated that ‘employee’ 
creditors who face displacement costs separate from their claims for back wages 
might not agree to creditor equality because they consider such costs should be 
reflected in a higher priority for their back wages claims’.118 Therefore, what 
creditors would agree if they had a chance to bargain ex ante might reflect the 
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inequalities in rights, authority and practical benefit that shape their 
perspectives.119  
     Further, the idea that a race between various creditors is costly and, as a 
consequence, a compulsory debt collection system will help in reducing such 
costs, is subject to criticism. In response to this assertion, Carlson stated that 
“rights are always ‘costly’ to enforce, but if an investment in enforcement promises 
a gigantic return, mere costliness will not persuade a creditor to give up profitable 
rights. All gains come at the expense of some investment. You cannot plead the 
fact that investment requires capital in support of the view that investors would 
prefer not to invest.”120 Also, McCormack stated that in the real world, creditors do 
not always act cooperatively in taking decisions and as a result, we have no 
accurate knowledge of how they would proceed or the sorts of factors that they 
would bring to bear on the decision-making process.121 
     The argument that the interests of non-creditors122 should be protected outside 
bankruptcy law also faced critiques from a number of scholars. Goode123 and 
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Gross124, for example, stated that there are other values to be safeguarded that go 
beyond the interests of existing creditors.125 Among these interests, according to 
them, are the interests of shareholders in the preservation of their future 
expectations, as well as the interests of the community at large, for instance in the 
continuation of the business.126 Goode,127 further, claimed that to focus solely on 
maximising returns to debtor’s creditors, is to ignore the fact that there may be 
different means of protecting creditors, some of which will also benefit other 
interests such as those of employees, suppliers, shareholders and the local 
community, and in so doing may even advance creditors' interests.128 In other 
words, it is suggested that rehabilitation may benefit all creditors, secured and 
unsecured, in the long term as well. The supporters of the creditors’ bargain theory, 
nevertheless, have asserted that the aim of bankruptcy law should be, merely, to 
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maximise the interests of the debtors’ creditors.129 However, Goode130 has 
described such an assertion as ‘neat but ultimately unpersuasive’ for a number of 
reasons. First, the creditors’ bargain theory never takes into account that there are 
certain confronting claimants131 outside the common pool creditors arise 
specifically due to the debtor’s bankruptcy, and as a result, need to be 
recognised.132 He stated,133 for example, that Labour Law in England already gives 
rights and remedies to employees who are wrongly or unfairly dismissed or are 
made redundant.134 However, in pursuit of these remedies against a solvent firm 
the former employees are not competing with other creditors because there are 
enough assets to meet employees’ claims due to the debtor’s solvency.135 
According to Goode, there is no scope for the general law to prescribe priority for 
employees or tort claimants; as a result, such a priority rule would make no sense 
except in the context of bankruptcy law.136 Secondly, he continued by stating that 
to treat bankruptcy law as exclusively for creditors’ confronting the common pool 
problem is prejudging the very question at issue, it being incompatible with 
bankruptcy laws around the world which incorporate provisions for claimants 
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outside the common pool creditors.137 However, it is stated that simply because a 
concern can arise in bankruptcy does not by itself mean that it should be dealt with 
by bankruptcy law.138 Mokal, for example, stated that there is no reason why 
bankruptcy law should concern itself with other issues, such as job saving and 
community interests, if the general law deals with identical issues in the same way 
regardless of whether the company in question is insolvent or not, thus bankruptcy 
law is not playing any role at all.139 
     As shown above, the creditors’ bargain theory highlights the importance of 
establishing a compulsory debt collection system140 which may lead141 to the 
maximisation of the aggregate pool of assets142 since the assets of the debtor 
might be sold as a going concern basis and not as a piecemeal sale.143 It is rightly 
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argued that the debtor’s assets are worth more as a whole than as a collection of 
pieces.144 Hence, it is important to establish a collective debt-collection system in 
order to encourage bankruptcy practitioners/ liquidators to sell the assets of the 
distressed traders on a going-concern basis not on a piecemeal basis. It is 
stated145 that the recovery rate for creditors depends on whether the distressed 
company emerges from the proceedings as a going-concern basis or its assets are 
sold piecemeal. As will be discussed in Chapter Four,146 according to the latest 
World Bank doing business report,147 most bankruptcy cases in Oman end up with 
selling the assets of the company piecemeal which, as result, leads to the 
reduction of the recovery rate of creditors.148 
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     The concept of collectivity is widely employed by bankruptcy laws worldwide.149 
For instance, the US,150 France,151 and England152 adopted the notion of 
moratorium153 and, as a result, creditors’ actions are stayed during bankruptcy 
processes. The aim of such moratorium is to enhance the collective returns of all 
creditors.154 However, as will be shown below,155 the concept of collectivity is not 
adopted in Oman since during both bankruptcy and liquidation procedures secured 
creditors are not prevented from enforcing their securities.156 
     The aim of the concept of collectivity and the concept of automatic stay, as 
viewed by the creditors’ bargain theory, is to solve merely the collective problem 
that is created by the presence of several claimants.157 So, the aim of such concept 
is to maximise merely the interests of creditors and not to take into account other 
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interests.158 However, bankruptcy laws should not merely be designed to maximise 
the interests of the creditors, rather it should be articulated to deal with wider 
issues.159 As stated above,160 there are also other means of maximising the return 
of the creditors, some of which will also benefit other interests.161 For instance, 
rehabilitating the firm may benefit all creditors, whether secured or unsecured, in 
the long term. In this regard, an empirical study has revealed that post-Enterprise 
administrations deliver more returns to secured creditors than pre-Enterprise Act 
administrations.162 
2.3 The Bankruptcy Choice Theory 
     In contrast to the creditors’ bargain theory, Korobkin established his theory for 
bankruptcy law which he described as the ‘bankruptcy choice model’.163 Korobkin 
claimed that the bankruptcy choice theory diverged radically from Jackson’s 
creditors’ bargain theory.164 His theory, as he affirmed, follows the paradigm of the 
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hypothetical choice situation as originally developed by John Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice.165 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the creditors’ bargain theory and the 
bankruptcy choice theory are both forms of ex ante analysis and they presume a 
hypothetical bargain between stakeholders. 
2.3.1 The Principles of this Theory 
     According to this theory, all interested parties are involved at the bargaining 
table.166 It is unlike the creditors’ bargain theory in which bankruptcy law is justified 
with reference to the rules which creditors would agree to from behind the veil of 
ignorance.167 On this theory, all potentially affected parties have the right to choose 
ex ante the principles that would determine their legal status in the event of 
bankruptcy.168 All bargainers are aware of the fact that they may be affected by the 
bankruptcy of their debtor, but none of them knows if he or she will be a debtor, an 
unsecured creditor (whether contractual or involuntary), a creditor with a valid 
security interest in assets critical to the debtor’s survival, a manager, an unskilled 
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worker, a member of the community that is otherwise unconnected to the debtor, or 
the occupier of any other particular relationship.169 
     The parties in the bankruptcy choice theory are charged with the task of opting 
for principles to govern their relationship in the case of the debtor’s financial 
distress.170 Since the problem of financial distress has an impact on all individuals 
in society, all parties should have representation in the choice of these 
principles.171 However, Korobkin maintained that the parties in such a position of 
choice would normally opt for two principles to govern their relationship in the 
occurrence of bankruptcy.172 The first principle is the ‘principle of inclusion’ in which 
all parties affected by the financial distress would be eligible to press their 
demands by themselves or through their representatives.173 The principle of 
inclusion provides that no individual should be excluded from pursuing their aims 
merely by virtue of the position that they occupy.174 The second is the principle of 
‘rational planning’175 in which a determination of whether, and to what extent, 
individuals are allowed to enforce their legal rights, to retain and use their positions 
of authority, and to exercise their practical leverage.176 According to Korobkin,177 
the principle of rational planning must have two vital components. First, it must be 
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broadly effective, promoting as many aims as possible.178 Second, when it is not 
possible to achieve all the aims, it must work to achieve the aims that are most 
essential.179 Thus, the principle of rational planning would lead to the formulation of 
a rational long-term plan by subjecting persons180 in financial distress to rational 
guidelines.181 The purpose of this long-term plan is to coordinate “the diverse 
efforts of persons occupying the various positions so as to promote most fully as 
many aims as possible”.182 However, Korobkin argued that since it might be 
impossible rationally to coordinate these efforts without frustrating specific aims, 
the principle of rational planning should demand that the aims of persons who have 
the most to lose be promoted over those who have relatively less to lose.183  
     This inclusive hypothetical bargaining approach has been developed by 
Rizwaan Mokal into an authentic consent theory which also aims to investigate and 
justify the principles of bankruptcy law.184 This theory is based on authentic 
consent185 of the ‘true and genuine person’ which is ‘based on asking what the 
                                                          
178
 Ibid. 
179
 Korobkin stated that these components suggest that ‘the preferred approach to financial distress 
would be the adoption of a maximizing strategy –a principle that promotes most fully and effectively 
the greatest part of the most important aims’: ibid. 
180
 Who hold differing combinations of legal rights, authority, and practical leverage and thus occupy 
distinct positions: ibid, p. 582. 
181
 Ibid, p. 684. 
182
 Ibid. 
183
 Ibid. 
184
 See Mokal R., ‘The Authentic Consent Model’, above 11, pp. 414-443; Mokal R., Corporate 
Insolvency, above 23, pp. 61-91. 
185
 In explaining the nature of this consent, Mokal stated that this consent is a hypothetical consent. 
Thus, the consent is not of ‘real world parties’, nor are the parties permitted to use ‘actual 
endowment of skill and energy’ in the bargaining process, nor are they in ‘Natural Ignorance’. 
“Rather, hypothetical consent is given by all the relevant parties, conceived of as free, equal, and 
67 
 
relevant parties would agree to, if given the chance to bargain under the 
appropriate conditions about how their claims should be dealt with’ in the event of 
their debtor’s insolvency.186 As is the case under the creditor’s bargain theory, the 
authentic consent theory presupposes a hypothetical ex ante bargain between 
various parties. However, Mokal has argued that his theory differs from the 
creditors’ bargain theory in three main aspects.187 First, whereas the creditors’ 
bargain theory promotes creditors’ individual and collective self-interest, his theory 
is concerned with ‘the moral equality of all those subject to insolvency laws by 
showing equal respect and concern for their interests.’188 Second, the creditor’s 
bargain theory takes only creditors’ preferences into account, whereas his theory 
respects other interests as well.189 Third, unlike Jackson’s theory, Mokal’s theory is 
founded on the idea of ‘dramatic ignorance’.190 Mokal’s theory which extends 
participation to parties other than creditors, is based on the concept of ‘dramatic 
ignorance’191 in which the parties to the creditors’ bargain are unaware not only of 
the bankruptcy outcome and of how other creditors would act but also of their own 
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attributes, such as whether they are voluntary or involuntary creditors, whether 
they are in a dominant or subordinate position.192 Thus, according to Mokal, ex 
ante agreement must not be extracted under conditions of ‘Natural Ignorance’,193 
but should be made on the assumption that all parties are free and equal to enter 
into a bargain that is fair and just.194 
2.3.2 Criticisms of this Theory 
     In supporting his theory, Korobkin claimed that his bankruptcy choice theory 
corresponds in fundamental ways to the kind of insolvency system encountered in 
the United States, since one purpose of the current Bankruptcy Code is to prevent 
individual creditors from forcing an immediate piecemeal sale of the business if the 
survival or a more orderly liquidation of the business would bring in a better 
return.195 However, this theory is open to criticism on a number of fronts. First, a 
‘risk- averse and risk-neutral individual’196 may create very diverse principles of 
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justice.197 So, it is unclear why an uninformed individual may not opt for a regime 
marked by low-cost credit and low protection for vulnerable parties to one with high 
costs of credit and high levels of protection.198 Secondly, Korobkin claimed that his 
bankruptcy choice theory corresponds with the major features of the US 
bankruptcy law.199 However, Mooney and McCormack stated that even though ex 
ante hypothetical theories of bankruptcy law, elegantly dressed up, are open to the 
objection that they seem little more than an argument that thoughtful, interested, 
objective and neutral lawmakers’ would come to the supporters’ conclusions about 
bankruptcy.200 In addition, such an approach tends to suppose an original position 
in which the various players act in an economically rational manner according to a 
single set of criteria.201 Nonetheless, individuals tend to adopt decisions not merely 
on economic consideration grounds.202 Thus, it is rather difficult to envisage how 
any single set of ex ante assumptions can be expected to match the complexity of 
real life business or even to accommodate the many categories of decision makers 
and the variety of circumstances in which their decisions may have to be made.203 
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     Moreover, it might be argued that the bankruptcy choice theory fails to explain 
how agreements can be reached ex ante between various participants and who in 
a potential bankruptcy is most at risk204 and thus, based on this theory, should 
enjoy priority of protection over those occupying a strong position.205 In this regard, 
Korobkin freely admitted the difficulties of comparing positions in terms of 
vulnerability and he suggested that weakness can be measured in terms of the 
product of the potential loss to, and the degree of influence exercised by, an 
individual.206 Thus, he claimed that individuals with more influence in the context of 
financial distress usually are better able to protect their own interests than 
individuals with less power.207 Nevertheless, Finch argued that there is no reason 
why such an approach would be accepted by all parties behind the veil of 
ignorance.208 This theory, further, regards all participants of the imaginary ex ante 
bargain as being free and equal as well as being reasonable and rational.209 Thus 
the principles chosen would be fair and just. However, McCormack argued that 
individual conceptions of fairness or justice might vary very significantly depending 
on one’s political, philosophical or religious beliefs.210 Thus, unlike the creditors’ 
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bargain theory, the bankruptcy choice theory expands the participation of all 
affected parties who can choose, ex ante, the principles that would govern their 
relationship in the event of insolvency. However, as discussed above, the 
bankruptcy choice theory has not escaped criticisms. 
     The bankruptcy choice theory is in agreement with the creditors’ bargain theory 
in that bankruptcy law should impose a stay on creditors’ actions211 in order to 
prevent individual creditors from forcing an immediate piecemeal sale. However, 
unlike the case under the creditors’ bargain theory, the bankruptcy choice theory 
broaden its scope212 by including people who have no formal legal rights213 or who 
derive their rights from non-contractual relationships.214 Thus, according to this 
theory, all these people are affected by the financial distress of the debtor and, as 
a consequence, they should participate in the bargaining table.215 However, even 
though this theory recognises the impact of financial distress on various parties,216 
it is difficult to predict how these parties, who differ in their knowledge, experience 
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and power, would be able to negotiate ex ante217 and choose the principles that 
would determine their position in the event of bankruptcy. 
2.4 The Communitarian Theory 
     In response to the perceived problems with the creditors’ bargain and the 
bankruptcy choice theories, other perspectives have been presented. One of these 
perspectives is the communitarian theory of bankruptcy law. Instead of focusing 
merely on the private rights of creditors such as under the creditors’ bargain theory, 
the communitarian theory seeks to balance a wide range of different interests in 
the bankruptcy of the debtor and take into account the welfare of the community at 
large.218 
2.4.1 The Principles of this Theory 
     According to this theory, not only should the interests of creditors of the debtor 
be taken into account in the case of bankruptcy, but the interests of other 
stakeholders, who are also affected by the bankruptcy of the debtor, should be 
considered.219 The list of these stakeholders is long and it may include employees, 
suppliers, customers, government and the local community in which an enterprise 
operates.220 What communitarianists want is that the interests of these parties 
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should be considered in bankruptcy law.221 For instance, Gross222 argued that 
some interests, besides those of creditors, might be worth considering. Even 
though he acknowledged the fact that interests such as community interests are 
extremely difficult to quantify,223 difficulty alone is not justification of exclusion from 
an economic model of bankruptcy.224 Based on his view, in the bankruptcy of the 
debtor, the interests of the community at large should be taken into account.225 
     However, there is no explicit definition of what is meant by “community” or what 
amounts to public interests.226 In approaching such a question, Keay, for example, 
stated that when it comes to the question of public interest, it is extremely 
challenging, if not impossible to come, to any consensus.227 Nonetheless, he 
advocated that instead of trying to formulate an inclusive definition of the public 
interest which may well be unworkable, it is appropriate to say, for the purposes of 
bankruptcy law, that the public interest involves taking into consideration interests 
for which society has regard and which are broader than the interests of those 
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parties directly involved in any given bankruptcy situation, that is, the debtor and 
the creditors.228 
     In order that bankruptcy law acts to benefit the community at large, 
communitarianism appears to favour the survival of companies where there it is 
viable, as well as orderly winding up when reorganisation is not a viable option.229 
In this regard, the Cork Report230 (United Kingdom) in 1982 seemed to endorse 
implicitly some of the communitarian concepts.231 This Report refers to the law of 
bankruptcy as embodying a “compact to which there are three parties: the debtor, 
his creditors and society”.232 Thus, it is argued that any system designed to deal 
with the consequences of a bankruptcy should take into account the interests of 
these three parties.233 In affirming that, the Cork Report states that “we believe that 
a concern from the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an 
enterprise which may well be the lifeblood of a whole town or even a region, is a 
legitimate factor to which a modern law of insolvency must have regard. The chain 
reaction consequent upon any given failure can potentially be as disastrous to 
creditors, employees and the community that it must not be overlooked.”234 Also, in 
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Australia, for example, the Harmer Report235 in 1988 affirmed that bankruptcy law 
should concern itself with the impact of bankruptcy on employees, family, 
customers, and government agencies such as those concerned with the revenue 
and administration of law.236 Thus, both the United Kingdom and Australian Law 
Reforms Commissions have made it clear that the bankruptcy law is not merely 
about creditors’ interests, rather there are other interests which should be taken 
into account as well.237 
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2.4.2 Criticisms of this Theory 
     In criticising the communitarian theory, Finch argued that the breadth of 
interests encompassed within communitarianism gives rise in itself to problems of 
indeterminacy.238 The problem is not just that community interest is difficult to 
identify but that there are so many expected interests in any bankruptcy and the 
selection of interests worthy of legal protection is likely to give rise to substantial 
disagreement.239 Further, it is claimed that it is impossible to define community in 
geographical boundaries since in each bankruptcy there may be many community 
interests at stake outside geographical boundary.240 For example, Schermer rightly 
stated that “if the community interests were defined as that portion of the citizenry 
that is affected by a debtor’s business, the breadth of the community could reach a 
potentially infinite number, since almost anyone, from local employee to distant 
supplier, can claim some remote loss due to the failure of a once-viable local 
business.”241 Hence, the problem is not just that community interest cannot be 
articulated, but there are many potential interests in each bankruptcy case.  
     Further, Schermer argued that even though some community interests could be 
defined, there is a problem with application.242 As there are so many community 
interests in each bankruptcy case, there will inevitably be conflicts between those 
interests that would need to be considered.243 Nonetheless, it might be argued that 
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it is the role of the court to undertake a balancing exercise in order to resolve such 
conflict,244 or at least alleviate the impact of such conflict. However, in response to 
this assertion, Schermer stated that a bankruptcy court should not be the decision 
maker for any community interest investigation.245 According to him, a bankruptcy 
court cannot weigh, for example, a local community’s interests in maintaining its 
employment base against possible long term environmental damage.246 Further, a 
bankruptcy court is not necessarily qualified to decide what should, or what should 
not, be considered a community problem, or what should be in society’s 
interests.247 Thus, based on Schermer’s view, bankruptcy judges should not be 
involved in investigating so many community interests since it is difficult to quantify 
such interests. However, it might be asserted by the communitarians that courts 
usually and in all sectors of the law take into account public and community interest 
and, as a result, that should be the case of bankruptcy law.248 
     Unlike the case under the creditors’ bargain theory, the communitarian theory, 
partly in line with the bankruptcy choice theory,249 takes on board the interests of 
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other stakeholders250 who are also affected by the financial distress. The 
communitarian theory supports the concept of rehabilitation of distressed debtors 
where these would generate a better result for the community in protecting jobs 
even at the expense of some other rights.251 This is in contrast with the creditors’ 
bargain theory where rehabilitation of the distressed enterprise is not viewed as a 
legitimate goal of bankruptcy law unless it leads to maximise returns to creditors.252 
Thus, rehabilitation should not lead to favour denying secured creditors the time 
value of their claims during bankruptcy proceedings.253 
2.5 The Forum Theory 
     Unlike the creditors’ bargain, the bankruptcy choice and the communitarian 
theories, the forum theory looks at bankruptcy law in terms of procedural 
objectives.254 In this part, the principles and critiques of this theory will be dealt 
with.  
2.5.1 The Principles of this Theory 
     According to this approach, bankruptcy law should be viewed in procedural 
terms instead of viewing it in terms of substantive objectives.255 Based on this 
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theory, a forum should be established in which all interests affected by the failure 
of the business can be heard.256 Thus, the function of the bankruptcy process is to 
establish a forum where all interests, whether directly in monetary terms or not, 
should be taken into account.257 
     It is maintained, by Flessner, 258 that modern economies are constituted from 
various enterprises, and that each of these enterprises is seen as encompassing 
not merely the interests of its owners and creditors but also other interests such as 
the employees and customers. Thus, in the event of business failure, workers, 
suppliers, customers, neighbours, and the local community can be as much 
affected by the destiny of the business as creditors and shareholders.259 Therefore, 
Flessner argued that the interests of all those stakeholders might not be ‘directly 
translatable into monetary claims’ but they are nonetheless ‘very real’, and those 
who hold them might be ready to offer ‘money or money’s worth to protect them’.260 
According to this theory, the function of bankruptcy procedures is seen as 
establishing space in which all participants, whether they have financial claims or 
not, are involved.261 This kind of space, therefore, would allow the stakeholders 
either to ‘adjust gradually and more easily’ to the unavoidable closure of the 
enterprise, or, if it is viable, to approve a rescue plan and agree on the 
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contributions necessary to support such a rescue.262 Further, Walton asserted that 
even though those with no monetary claims have no decisive say eventually in the 
fate of the failed enterprise, there should be some mechanism in which unsecured 
creditors, such as employees, suppliers and customers, have some effective say in 
the future of the firm.263 This can be implemented through providing a means of 
representation of the various interested parties.264 Such a mechanism, as a result, 
would shift the focus beyond creditors to all stakeholders in the financial distress of 
the firm.265 
2.5.2 Criticisms of this Theory 
     Unlike the case in the creditors’ bargain theory, the forum theory suggests that 
bankruptcy law should create a forum where all participants are recognised.266 
However, it is argued, by Finch, that even though the forum theory does address 
and highlight an important role to be played by bankruptcy law267 in the financial 
distress of the enterprise, it remains ambiguous since it does not provide 
guidelines for implementing its concepts in reality.268 In addition, the concept of 
representation proposed by Flessner under this theory gives rise to a number of 
difficult questions relating to the quantity of representation to be offered to different 
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participants; how to strike the ‘right’ balance between provisions for representation 
and efficiency in decision and policy-making; and the scope to which 
representation should be reinforced with legal rights.269 
     Further, Finch stated that if the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) 
procedure270 is viewed in wider terms, it can be said to be based on a forum theory 
of bankruptcy in which all creditors will reach mutually acceptable solutions if all 
prospects can be discussed openly and at low cost.271 Nonetheless, she argued 
that CVA is ‘unlikely ever to offer the most popular or effective route to rescue’ 
because in most areas of firm distress creditors, secured and unsecured, tend to 
have such conflicting interests.272 Thus, it is not clear how the concept of such a 
theory would be implemented in reality. 
     The forum theory does not view bankruptcy laws as a response to common pool 
problems arising when diverse co-owners273 affirms rights against a common pool 
of assets.274 But it considers bankruptcy laws as procedural laws in which special 
procedures are designed to enable all affected parties to voice their concerns 
through their representatives.275 Further, the forum theory is similar to both the 
bankruptcy choice and the communitarian theories because it recognises the 
interests of other parties who are affected by the failure of the business. Thus, 
according to this theory, the objective of bankruptcy procedures should be to 
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establish a forum in which all parties are heard. However, as shown above,276 this 
theory fails to explain how should this forum be established? And how should it be 
implemented in reality? 
2.6 The Multiple Values Theory 
     Elizabeth Warren, supported by Donald Korobkin,277 has offered her theory 
which contradicts with the creditors’ bargain theory. Unlike the case under the 
creditors’ bargain theory, the multiple values theory sees that the effects of 
corporate decline are broader that just creditor’s interests.278 
2.6.1 The Principles of this Theory 
     The approach taken by Warren overlaps, to some extent, with the 
communitarian theory discussed above,279 in asserting that besides considering 
creditor interests there is a need to take into consideration other values that are 
also affected by the bankruptcy of the debtor.280 In summarising her theory, Warren 
stated that:281 
     ‘I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtor’s multiple defaults and 
to distribute the consequences among a number of different actors. Bankruptcy 
encompasses a number of competing - and sometimes conflicting- values in this 
distribution. As I see it, no one value dominates, so that bankruptcy policy 
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becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the question, how 
shall the losses be distributed?’ 
     The multiple values theory is in stark contrast with the creditors’ bargain theory, 
which provides a “narrow”282 justification and denies a realistic283 evaluation of the 
bankruptcy system;284  Warren’s view is that bankruptcy law serves a series of 
values that cannot be organised into “neat priorities”.285 She claimed that the 
creditors’ bargain theory cannot sufficiently explain the purpose of bankruptcy 
law286 because economic value enhancement is only part of the goal of insolvency 
law.287 Thus, Warren accepted the fact that collectivism288 offers a useful means to 
examine some bankruptcy problems because having a compulsory collective debt 
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system will help in reducing the cost of debt collection and prevent multiple 
individual actions.289 Nonetheless, she argued that this collectivism cannot be used 
to justify the whole bankruptcy system.290 As a consequence, Warren advanced a 
case for consideration of broader interests that include employees, customers, and 
suppliers. She stated that bankruptcy law is “a more complex and ultimately less 
confined process” than supporters of the creditors’ bargain theory such as 
Jackson, Scott and Baird might view it.291 
     In addition, Warren utilised Congressional comments on the United States of 
America’s Bankruptcy Code to support concerns wider than the immediate 
problems of debtors and their creditors.292 She asserted that in articulating 
bankruptcy policy Congress stated that bankruptcy law should take into account 
public interest beyond the debtor and creditor.293 Also, Congress indicates an 
evident recognition of the large effects of a debtor’s wide-spread default and the 
consequences of allowing a few creditors to force a firm to close.294 Thus, it is not 
the intention of Congress to focus merely in maximising the interests of the 
creditors.295    
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     In an attempt to formulate the aims of bankruptcy law, Warren296 has identified 
four principal goals of the bankruptcy system. In this regard, she stated that as a 
system to deal with failing firms, the bankruptcy system297 offers a number of 
potential advantages. First, “it fosters substantial enhancement of the value of the 
debtor”,298 so the stakeholders obtain more than they would have under an 
alternative collective debt system.299 Secondly, such a collective system will help in 
distributing the assets of the debtor “according to a deliberate scheme”,300 so it will 
secure protection to a number of deserving parties who would otherwise, without 
having this system, receive little or nothing.301 In addition, one of the principal goals 
of the bankruptcy system is to “force parties who deal with the debtor to bear the 
burden of their losses without externalizing them to others”.302 Finally, one of the 
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most crucial features of the bankruptcy system is to have in place an effective 
mechanism in order to “bring the system into play at the appropriate time”.303  
     According to Warren,304 a bankruptcy policy that concentrates on the values to 
be protected in a bankruptcy distribution system and on the effective 
implementation of these values supports “the decision-making process even if it 
does not dictate specific answers”. She argued that such an approach illuminates 
the critical, normative and essential empirical questions.305 In addition, she stated 
that the distributional objectives of the bankruptcy process cannot be considered 
unless a number of critical questions about the business failure are being asked,306 
such as: who might be hurt by an enterprise failure? How might they be hurt? 
Whether the hurt can be avoided and at what cost? Who is helped by the business 
failure? Whether aid to those helped offsets the injury to those hurt? Who can 
efficiently assess the risks of business failure? Who may have contributed to the 
business failure and how? Whether the contribution to failure serves other useful 
goals? Who can best bear the costs of business failure and who is expected to 
bear those costs?307 Hence, such an approach is claimed to highlight the empirical 
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assumptions underlying bankruptcy decisions308 to ask difficult and direct 
questions.309 Even though such answers might be incomplete, they are normally 
reasoned answers which render them better instead of relying on a single rational 
theory.310 
     In supporting the notion of the multiple values theory, Korobkin asserted that 
bankruptcy law is not merely a response to the problem of debt collection rather it 
is a distinct system for responding to the problem of financial distress.311 Thus, he 
argued that in dealing with financial distress, bankruptcy law should and must 
modify rights recognised under substantive non-bankruptcy law.312 Further, he 
stated that bankruptcy law is distinct exactly because it permits for a discourse in 
which the question of how the financial distress of the business should affect non-
bankruptcy rights may be asked and eventually answered.313 Thus, according to 
Korobkin, the goal of bankruptcy law should be to address the problem of financial 
distress and to create “conditions for a discourse in which values of participants 
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may be rehabilitated into a coherent and informed vision of what the enterprise 
shall exist to do”.314 
     Finch315 stated that multiple values theory viewed the bankruptcy process as 
attempting to achieve a number of ends. Such ends include distributing the effects 
of financial distress among a broad range of actors; establishing priorities between 
creditors; offering opportunities for continuation of the business and serving the 
interests of those who have no formal rights but who have an interest in the 
continuation of the business.316 Thus, the multiple values theory seeks recognition 
of the interests of those who are not directly creditors such as employees who 
would struggle to retrain for other jobs, customers who would have to resort to less 
attractive suppliers of goods or services, suppliers who would lose current 
customers, nearby property owners who suffer declining property values and tax 
authorities suffering a reduction in taxation revenue.317 Hence, it is said that this 
theory has much in common with the communitarian theory and the forum theory 
however this theory goes further and it is broad enough318 to incorporate these 
theories.319 In affirming this, Korobkin argued that the value-based theory 
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recognises bankruptcy law’s “economic and noneconomic dimensions, and the 
principles of fairness as a moral, political, personal, and social value”.320 
2.6.2 Criticisms of the Multiple Values Theory 
     The multiple values theory of bankruptcy law has not escaped criticisms, 
particularly from the proponents of the creditors’ bargain theory.321 The main 
criticism of such a theory is that it is so broadly expressed and does not offer clear 
and straightforward guidance to the decision- makers on the controlling of tensions 
and conflicts between the numerous values being affected by the debtor’s 
insolvency.322 Since there are no central principles developed to guide judges to 
determine trade-off or to establish weightings, this theory is accused of being 
ambiguous leading to uncertainty and indeterminacy, and as a consequence it 
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might lead to lacking and confusion results.323 Thus, it is difficult to employ 
bankruptcy law to offer protection to various values since it is difficult to identify the 
value of the interests held by the community and it is even unclear which kind of 
community interests should be protected.324 
     Further, Warren asserted that one of the central concerns of bankruptcy law 
should be to distribute losses that flow from the failure of businesses and in doing 
so bankruptcy law should contain wealth redistribution provisions and favour those 
who are least able to bear the costs of such a failure.325 Nonetheless, Baird 
challenged such assertion by stating that “such a conception of bankruptcy would 
be so foreign that it would be hard to call it bankruptcy”.326 He argued that the 
failure of the business is not necessarily linked with default and “default itself is not 
necessarily connected with bankruptcy”.327 Baird, in addition, argued that 
redistributing losses in bankruptcy is the same as outside bankruptcy and as a 
result distribution of losses is not a bankruptcy concern rather it is a non-
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bankruptcy problem.328 Thus, if there is a need to protect some values, he argued, 
it is adequate to protect them within the context of the whole legal system instead 
of within bankruptcy law.329 However, as a response to this claim, Goode330 argued 
that there is no scope for the non-bankruptcy law to prescribe priorities for other 
values, including employees and tort claimants since such issues arise specifically 
because of the business failure. As a result, inserting such a priority rule makes no 
sense except in the context of bankruptcy law. 
     It is worth noting that while both the forum theory and the communitarian theory 
recognise the interests of all interested parties who might be affected by the failure 
of the business,331 the multiple values theory adds that bankruptcy law should 
focus also on the values to be protected through having in place an effective 
bankruptcy distribution scheme.332 To clarify, whereas the supporters of the 
creditors’ bargain theory argue that it is not within the objectives of the bankruptcy 
laws to redistribute losses in bankruptcy,333 the supporters of the multiple values 
theory argue that one of the main objectives of the bankruptcy law is to allocate 
losses that arise by virtue of the bankruptcy law.334 Thus, the view of the multiple 
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values theory is that bankruptcy law should contain wealth redistribution 
provisions335 in which preference should be granted to certain claimants who are 
least able to bear the cost of bankruptcy.336 In supporting the multiple values 
theory’s view, Goode argues that since some claimants arise by virtue of the 
bankruptcy of trader,337 it is necessary to prescribe priority for those claimants in 
the context of bankruptcy law.338 Further, Cantlie rightly argued that in the event of 
bankruptcy, there is a need to relieve certain claimants because a number of 
claimants are normally competing for a share of a limited pool of assets which 
means there will not be enough assets to satisfy all claims.339 In this regard, it can 
be argued that bankruptcy laws should be designed in a way that allows pre-
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bankruptcy entitlements to be modified in order to pursue a legitimate objective340 
and in a way that provides protection to pre-bankruptcy creditors.341 As will be 
shown below,342 this thesis proposes that the future bankruptcy law in Oman 
should contain a clear priority rule in which pre-bankruptcy entitlements are 
adjusted. However, adjusting pre-bankruptcy entitlements does not mean to 
prejudice the rights of creditors established prior to the bankruptcy of the debtor.343 
     In addition, the supporters of the multiple values theory agree with the 
promoters of the creditors’ bargain theory in that having in place a compulsory debt 
collection system will help in reducing the cost of debt collection and prevent 
multiple individual actions from a few anxious creditors.344 However, unlike the 
creditors’ bargain theory, the promoters of the multiple values theory do not accept 
the fact that collectivism alone can be used to justify the whole bankruptcy 
system.345 According to them, regulating the rules of the collectivism system is only 
one function amongst others to be played by bankruptcy laws.346 Thus, based on 
the multiple values theory, bankruptcy law should be designed to perform a 
number of functions.347 Nevertheless, despite the fact that both the communitarian 
theory and the multiple values theory shed light on the importance of taking into 
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account the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, customers and 
local community, they are both criticised for being too broad and give rise to the 
problems of indeterminacy.348 So, it is not easy to determine the interests that 
worthy of legal protection since there are many potential interests in each 
bankruptcy cases and no guidelines are given to manage the tensions between 
various interests.  
2.7 The Explicit Value Theory 
     Having examined and critiqued various theories of bankruptcy law, Finch349 
suggested a further model of bankruptcy law. She termed her model the ‘Explicit 
Value Approach’350 which, according to her, offers an alternative approach to the 
existing theories.351 She asserted that even though various theories of bankruptcy 
law highlight different aspects of corporate bankruptcy law role, they did not 
provide the full picture of the appropriate measures of bankruptcy law.352 
2.7.1 The Principles of the Explicit Value Theory 
     Finch contended that to promote the search for ‘measures’353 in the light of such 
conflicting and diverse theories, it is important to investigate further ‘the purpose of 
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a quest for benchmarks’354 for bankruptcy law.355 In doing so two questions should 
be asked, namely: what specifically is being measured by previous theories and 
whether it is possible to justify bankruptcy law and its procedures given present 
approaches? According to her, in order to approach these issues reference should 
be made to the fundamental rules of company law, particularly in regard to the 
question of how corporate managerial power is legitimated.356 
     Since company law was said357 to be about “the legitimation of managerial 
power in the hands of directors”, Finch stated that the bankruptcy process is more 
complicated since power is always taken out of the hands of management358 and 
given to different parties, according to various circumstances, such as creditors, 
bankruptcy practitioners and the courts themselves.359 Further, she argued that an 
insolvency regime needs this kind of legitimation since bankruptcy processes affect 
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both public and private interests.360 It affects public interest because decisions are 
made about the future of the firms and such decisions have an impact on 
livelihoods and communities.361 Bankruptcy processes also impact private rights in 
that securities can be frozen and individual attempts to impose other legal rights 
are, usually,362 stayed.363 She, therefore, argued that “the broad bankruptcy 
process in all its dimensions and with its variety of actors requires legitimation”364 
and such legitimation should take into account both public and private interests.365 
Accordingly, Finch expressed the view that “the attribution of legitimacy” should not 
be based merely on communitarian theory or the creditors’ bargain theory. In her 
view “the powers involved” in bankruptcy processes “can be seen as calling for 
strong justification”.366 However, in searching for the measures367 of bankruptcy 
law, various theories368 of bankruptcy law can be seen as incorporating a number 
of important legitimating rationales for bankruptcy processes.369 Thus, relying on 
some of the concepts underpinning these theories, Finch attempted370 to suggest 
an approach in which a balance between different legitimating rationales, public 
and private, can be achieved. 
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     In Finch’s view, assessing the legitimacy of a bankruptcy process differs from 
merely expressing political opinion on the topic.371 However such an assessment 
which “involves a stepping back and reference, not to personal preferences or 
visions, but to values enjoying broad acceptance”372 is relevant.373 Accordingly, 
Finch argued that the legitimacy of the processes and principles of bankruptcy law 
can be established by reference to four values or ‘benchmarks’.374 These 
benchmarks are Efficiency which “looks to the securing of democratically 
mandated ends at lowest cost”;375 Expertise which “refers to the allocation of 
decision and policy functions to properly competent persons”;376 Accountability 
which “looks to the control of insolvency participants by democratic bodies or 
courts or through the openness of processes and their amenability to 
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 Finch stated that persons of opposing political views might differ radically in their views on 
dealing with a trouble enterprise. One person might favour immediate closure, payment of creditors 
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representations”;377 and Fairness which “considers issues of justice and 
propensities to respect the interests of affected parties by allowing such parties 
access to, and respect, within decision and policy processes”.378 Hence, according 
to Finch, in measuring the legitimacy of such rules or procedures under these 
legitimating headings reference to a number of questions should be made.379 
Examples of such questions are whether this is a process that permits Parliament’s 
(Congress) desires to be effectively implemented? Are levels of accountability 
satisfactory? Can the proposed procedures be considered fair380 as giving due 
access to and respect for the interests of affected parties? 
     Further, Finch argued that transparency in relation to measures of bankruptcy 
law can be seen as clarity regarding values to be served by such laws.381 
Nonetheless, she indicated that such clarity does not offer complete answers on 
whether a particular balance between, for example, protection for secured creditors 
and for employees is desirable or not.382 In addition, she stated that “the rightness 
and wrongness of particular trade-offs can only be argued for by giving weightings 
or priorities to the protection of different values or interests”.383 Such weightings 
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and priorities presume “substantive visions of the just society” and, therefore, 
individuals of diverse “political persuasions” might be expected to vary on the “right 
balancing” of different interests in bankruptcy.384 Nevertheless, she asserted that 
such disagreement in striking the right balance between various conflicting values 
would disappear by final political judgments.385 
     In addition, the efficiency of a statutory mandate is one of the benchmarks of 
bankruptcy processes or decisions.386 Finch argued that having a clear mandate 
on the ground, therefore, offers a very compelling yardstick for measuring a 
bankruptcy process or decision.387 However, Finch argued that statutory mandates 
in bankruptcy laws are often unclear or even lacking.388 In this case, she stated 
that in order to legitimate such processes or decisions a reference should be made 
to the expertise, accountability and fairness justifications.389 
     In describing her theory, Finch acknowledged that the “explicit value approach” 
provides no ultimate vision aimed at worldwide subscription however “a means of 
bringing a degree of clarity to evaluate discussions” while accepting that we may all 
be different in our notions of “the just society’ or ‘the just distribution of rights” in 
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bankruptcy.390 Nonetheless, she claimed that unlike the multiple values and 
communitarian theories, her theory is limited in so far as relevant legitimating 
arguments are established under the four benchmarks headings, namely 
efficiency, expertise, accountability and fairness, and arguments outside of such 
headings are consequently not to be considered as relevant for purposes of 
legitimation.391 Thus, judges and decision-makers are invited to reason with 
reference to these benchmarks instead of relying on a single theory of bankruptcy 
law.392 
2.7.2 Criticisms of this Theory 
     The above explicit value theory has been criticised by Mokal,393 one of the 
supporters of the bankruptcy choice theory. In his article ‘On Fairness and 
Efficiency’, Mokal examined Finch’s explicit value theory and whether her theory 
has some sort of consistency in reasoning or not.394  Having examined the 
benchmarks underpinning the explicit value theory, he stated that Finch’s argument 
fails to make a distinction between the “diverse natures of her benchmarks” and 
she does not reveal the principles governing them, nor the factors which 
differentiates between them.395 First, Mokal argued that even though Finch stated 
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that the efficiency benchmark employs different notions of efficiency,396 what Finch 
does not explain is why she simply picks one of them and rejects the others.397 In 
examining the efficiency benchmark, Finch stated that “technical efficiency” is 
concerned “with achieving the objectives being pursued by Parliament” with the 
minimal use of resources and costs and with the minimal waste of effort.398 
However, Mokal argued that Finch did not state exactly what sort of costs are 
desired to be avoided here and how effort may be wasted.399 Further, Mokal raised 
a number of other concerns.400 For example, since legitimacy is considered to be a 
moral concept, do the results that efficiency wishes to achieve at the lowest cost 
also need to satisfy certain moral obligations.401 As a consequence, he argued that 
ignoring such concerns causes the explicit value approach to be “both incomplete 
and internally inconsistent”.402 
     In addition, based on Finch’s view, the justification of insolvency processes 
cannot be merely dependent on the efficient pursuit of mandates but it should also 
be dependent on the degree of expertise exercised by relevant parties, the 
adequacy of control and accountability schemes and the procedural fairness that is 
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shown in dealing with the affected parties’ interests.403 However, this 
benchmarking theory has been critiqued because it arguably fails in making a 
distinction between substantive and procedural goals.404 Substantive goals are 
those “which justify the existence of this part of the law by showing it in its best 
light, by demonstrating why it is worth having it” whereas, procedural goals are 
“about how the law goes about attaining its substantive goals”.405 To simplify, a 
distinction should be made between the ultimate ends of the law, and the methods 
that the law adopts in order to achieve those aims.406 “Once a set of substantive 
goals has been exogenously specified (e.g. using a theory of justice) efficiency can 
be used to judge between various proposed schemes for implementing it.”407 
Nevertheless, Mokal argued that efficiency can neither be a substantive goal of any 
area of the law nor confer justification on any part of it.408 However, it can be used 
to judge between various proposed schemes in order to implement only a specific 
substantive goal by choosing the method which is less costly to implement.409 
Mokal continued his argument by stating that efficiency in itself does not provide a 
goal that any area of the law should aim at, since it creates no sufficient reason for 
the law to be one way rather than another.410 Furthermore, in regard to fairness 
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benchmark,411 which is utilised throughout Finch’s book to analyse the legitimacy 
of various parts of the law,412 Mokal argued that “there is no general or abstract 
statement or theory of what Finch understands by ‘fairness”.413 As a way of 
example, Mokal stated that Finch appears to condom the institution as ‘unfair’ 
because, among other things, the floating charge holder does not have an 
obligation to take into account the interests of any other parties, and could take 
decisions affecting their interests without their consent.414 However, even though 
we assume that fairness requires the consent of those affected by a decision or a 
process, Finch did not explain how such consent might appropriately be 
obtained.415 
     The explicit value theory recognises the importance of taking into account the 
interests of creditors416 and employees (in retaining their jobs), local government 
(in gaining future tax revenue) and the community at large (in benefiting from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
operationalised and implemented costlessly. Some resources will inevitably be consumed simply in 
putting in place any such proposal, and in maintaining it in operation. So the more resources that 
are consumed in implementing a particular scheme, the fewer that will be available for other 
worthwhile objectives. It follows that if there are two methods of bringing about a certain goal in 
these circumstances, we must choose the method which is less costly to implement, other things 
being equal. Any other decision would amount to wasting resources, since the same objective could 
have been attained and in addition, a surplus would be available for application towards other 
valued goals”: see Ibid. 
411
 As mentioned above, according to Finch, Fairness “considers issues of justice and propensities 
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goods and services of the distressed enterprise).417 So, unlike the creditors’ 
bargain theory, which focuses merely on the interests of creditors and pre-
insolvency entitlements, this theory takes into consideration the preference to 
further communitarian interests and to protect creditors’ interests. However, unlike 
the case under both the communitarian and the multiple values theories, under this 
theory the list of community interests is not open ended. This list is limited as far as 
the relevant justifying arguments are arranged under four benchmarks described 
by Finch, namely: efficiency, expertise, accountability and fairness.418 
2.8 Evaluating Remarks 
     The above-discussed theories debate the theoretical foundations of bankruptcy 
law based on their promoters’ views. However, as will be noticed,419 in criticising 
the current bankruptcy regime in Oman and in calling for a bankruptcy reform, this 
thesis is in favour of a combination of various theories. This is due to the fact that 
the theories already discussed highlight the different roles that might be played by 
bankruptcy law and, as a result, each of them has its own merits. For instance, 
while the creditors’ bargain theory highlights the importance of establishing a 
compulsory debt collection system,420 the multiple values theory stresses the 
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significance of a redistributional role of bankruptcy laws.421 Hence, it is useful for 
the decision-makers422 to have recourse423 to these normative theories when 
considering further development of particular bankruptcy laws because these 
various theories incorporate a number of important justifications for bankruptcy law 
and its processes. For instance, even though the main deficiency of the creditors’ 
bargain theory is that it merely focuses on the interests of secured creditors, this 
theory underscores the importance of having in place a mechanism whereby all 
creditors’ claims are stayed during the process.424 As will be shown below,425 
staying creditors’ action426 during reorganisation or liquidation proceedings is the 
main feature of the regimes in the US and England. However, as will be shown in 
Chapter Four,427 one of the main issues with the current bankruptcy regime in 
Oman is that secured creditors are not prevented from pursuing their claims during 
bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. Furthermore, while the communitarian428 
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and multiple values theories429 take the view that, besides protecting the interests 
of secured creditors, bankruptcy law should take into account other interests, 
Finch, through her explicit value theory, argues that bankruptcy law should strike a 
balance between various stakeholders.430 For instance, as will be shown below,431 
in order to strike such a balance, in the US the rescue plan will not be imposed 
over the wishes of objecting creditors unless they are sufficiently protected.432 This 
is similar to the case in England.433 However, whereas in England the court is 
given total discretion in determining whether dissenting creditors are crammed-
down or not, in the US there are statutory provisions that should be met before 
imposing the rescue plan over the wishes of dissenting creditors.434 As will be seen 
in the next chapter,435 bankruptcy regimes in the US and England tend to take into 
account the interests of various participants, although the scope of protection 
offered to creditors varies under these regimes.436 Moreover, the forum theory 
underscores the important role that should be played by bankruptcy law, namely its 
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role in establishing a forum437 in which all interests affected by the failure of the 
business can be heard.438 Hence, all the above-discussed theories have their own 
advantages which can be used by policy-makers in developing and designing 
bankruptcy laws. 
     Based on the above discussion, this thesis argues that bankruptcy law should 
be designed in a way that leads to the achievement of a number of ends.439 In this 
regard, it is important to acknowledge the fact that in the event of bankruptcy, 
besides creditors’ interests, there are other interests that need to be taken into 
account, since they might also be affected by the bankruptcy of debtors.440 Thus, 
maximising the welfare of debtors and all creditors, secured and unsecured,441 
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 As will be discussed below, under both England and US insolvency regimes, creditors, secured 
or unsecured, are entitled to vote ‘for’ or ‘against’ the proposed plan: see below section 3.4.4; 
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through encouraging the rehabilitation442 of viable businesses and liquidating the 
unviable businesses443 should be some of the objectives of bankruptcy law. This is 
due to that fact that including the possibility of rehabilitation of distressed debtors 
as an alternative to liquidation might mean that jobs will be preserved,444 secured 
creditors might receive better returns445 and suppliers may opt for continuing their 
relationship with the distressed debtor.446 Thus, immediately liquidating viable 
businesses without giving them a chance to be rehabilitated means that jobs will 
not be preserved, and shareholders might receive little or nothing.447 Further, one 
of the aims of bankruptcy law should be to establish a collective debt-collection 
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system448 in which all claims must be stayed during bankruptcy proceedings. As 
shown above,449 the aim of this system is to reduce the cost of debt collection in 
order to maximise the aggregate pool of assets.450 Establishing a collective debt-
collection system means that all creditors’ actions are stayed to protect the assets 
of the debtor from hostile and damaging actions by creditors.451 However, as will 
be discussed below,452 since secured creditors are most particularly burdened by 
the imposition of such a stay, there should be a mechanism whereby secured 
creditors are given the necessary legal right to seek the lifting of the stay.453 
Moreover, one of the objectives of bankruptcy law should be to readjust and modify 
pre-bankruptcy entitlements by containing wealth redistribution provisions.454 Such 
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readjustment and modification is necessary to promote the concept of rescue 
culture. For instance, as will be shown below,455 in order to encourage existing 
lenders or new lenders to provide the necessary funding to the distressed debtor, it 
is important for bankruptcy laws to offer them sufficient guarantee that they will be 
paid. This might include adjusting pre-bankruptcy entitlements by granting a post-
petition lender a super priority status over pre-petition secured creditors.456 
However, this does not mean to leave secured creditors unprotected.457 As will be 
suggested below,458 such a super priority status should not be granted unless it is 
proven that there is adequate value in the collateral to protect pre-petition secured 
creditors. 
2.9 Conclusion 
     In the event of bankruptcy, one of the concerns raised is whose interests should 
be protected by bankruptcy law. Should bankruptcy law be designed merely to 
maximise the interests of creditors or should other interests be taken into account 
by policy makers, such as the interest of employees, customers, and local 
community? In determining the aims and policies underpinning bankruptcy law, a 
number of theories offering different views have been developed. This chapter 
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explored some theories which may underpin bankruptcy law, namely the creditors’ 
bargain theory, the bankruptcy choice theory, the communitarian theory, the forum 
theory, the multiple values theory and the explicit value theory. In designing and 
developing bankruptcy laws, it is essential for policy makers to have recourse to 
these theories because each of them explained the roles that should be played by 
bankruptcy laws. Examples of the suggested roles are maximising the collective 
returns of the creditors’ of the insolvent debtor as a whole through establishing a 
compulsory debt collection system,459 establishing a compulsory mechanism to 
safeguard the assets of debtors and prevent creditors from enforcing their 
securities during bankruptcy proceedings,460 readjusting pre-bankruptcy 
entitlements,461 taking into account the interests of all parties affected by the 
bankruptcy of distressed debtors,462 providing for the possibility of rehabilitating 
distressed debtors for the benefit of all affected parties,463 and striking a balance 
between creditors’ interests (seen as private interests) and other interests (seen as 
public interests).464 
     The next chapter will show how the roles that were proposed by the above-
discussed theories are within the provisions of the US and England bankruptcy 
laws. For instance, as will be shown in the next chapter, it is similar to the view of 
some of the above discussed theories, Chapter 11 of the US and the first purpose 
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of the new administration regime in England are to rescue the business of the 
debtor as a going concern.465 In this regard, rescuing the business would normally 
maximise the returns of all secured and unsecured creditors, customers and 
employees.466 Further, as will be shown in the next chapter,467 the concept of 
collectivity is promoted by bankruptcy laws in the US and England. For instance, 
under the US Chapter 11 and the administration regime, secured and unsecured 
creditors are not allowed to pursue their action during the process unless prior 
permission is granted by the court.468 In addition, Chapter Four will demonstrate 
that even though the current bankruptcy regime in Oman tends to be in line with 
the creditors’ bargain theory, not all principles proposed by such a theory are 
recognised by the Omani legislator.469 For instance, although unsecured creditors 
actions’ are stayed, secured creditors are allowed to pursue their claims during 
bankruptcy proceedings and, as a consequence, the notion of collectivity is not 
recognised under the current bankruptcy regime in Oman. 
                                                          
465
 The new Schedule B1 of IA1986, Para 3 (1) (a), (b) and (c); Dahl H., ‘USA: Bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11’, (1992) 5 I.B.L.J. 555; McCormack G., ‘Control and Corporate Rescue: An Anglo- 
American Evaluation’, (2007) 56 (3) I.C.L.Q. 505. 
466
 For an empirical evidence see below p. 121. 
467
 See below section 3.4.2. 
468
 See below section 3.4.2. 
469
 See below section 4.8.4. 
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Chapter Three: Bankruptcy Proceedings in England and the US 
3.1 Introduction 
     Reforming bankruptcy laws in order to promote the rescue of distressed debtors 
has been a common tendency around the world.1 Examples of such countries are 
the UK in enacting the Enterprise Act 2002 to reform the administration 
proceedings, France in enacting the Business Safeguard Act of 2006, Germany in 
enacting the Company Restructuring Facilitation Act of 2012 and others.2 However, 
the scope and the structure of these laws differ in a number of aspects.3 For 
example, unlike the case in England, several bankruptcy laws contain the 
possibility to reorganise the company by giving it new finance and allowing the 
management to maintain their position.4 
                                                          
1
 Azar Z., ‘Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and Practices in Fifty 
Countries Worldwide’, (2008) 16 C.J.I.C.L. 279, pp. 282-283. 
2
 Ibid; as will be shown below (section 3.2.1), the Enterprise Act 2002 promoted the rescue culture 
in England by modernising the administration proceeding and limiting administrative receivership. 
3
 In regulating a number of issues, bankruptcy laws worldwide differ. These issues include: does 
management retain control during liquidation or bankruptcy procedures? Is there a stay 
(moratorium) at the start of insolvency procedures? Is it possible to obtain new financing during 
reorganisation processes? What power do creditors have in accepting or rejecting a rescue plan? 
As will be shown below (section 3.4), in dealing with these issues, England and the US have 
adopted different approaches; for the position in Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia: see O’kane D. & Bawlf P., ‘Global Guide to 
Corporate Bankruptcy: A Comprehensive Guide to Corporate Bankruptcy and a Survey of Global 
Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes’, (Nomura International, July 2010), pp. 53-145, available at: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/59845050/Bankruptcy-Guide. accessed on 20/03/2014. 
4
 This is the case in the US Chapter 11, during Conciliation proceedings in France, and during 
restructuring proceedings in Japan: see O’kane D. & Bawlf P., above 3, pp. 46-47, p. 75 & pp. 115-
116. 
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     The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief analysis of insolvency proceedings 
that are available in both England and the United States. Mainly, great emphasis 
will be placed on the administration procedure, administrative receivership, 
company voluntary arrangement (CVA) and scheme of arrangement under the 
Insolvency Act and Chapter 11 procedures under the US Bankruptcy Act. 
Discussing these proceedings will highlight the advantages of applying for a 
particular procedure and the main challenges that might be faced. Exploring the 
main merits and the main deficits of each procedure will help in proposing a 
bankruptcy regime to be followed by the Omani legislator. Hence, the next chapter 
will be based on the discussion and the outcome of this chapter. To clarify, the next 
chapter will examine whether the current Omani bankruptcy proceedings promote 
the concept of rescue culture and also examine the availability of bankruptcy 
principles that are found in both England and the US.  
     However, it is not within the scope of this chapter to study in great detail the 
bankruptcy procedures in England and the US, nor to examine the effectiveness of 
the entire bankruptcy proceedings in these jurisdictions. Rather, the purpose of 
comparing bankruptcy laws of these jurisdictions is to provide an understanding of 
bankruptcy laws in both England and the US in order to propose a bankruptcy 
regime to be considered by the Omani legislator. Thus, this chapter will start by 
highlighting briefly various available insolvency proceedings in England and the 
US. In this regard, administration, administrative receivership, CVA, and scheme of 
arrangement proceedings under the Insolvency Act of 1986 and the Enterprise Act 
of 2002; and Chapter 11 under the US Bankruptcy Act of 1979 will be highlighted 
briefly. Then, this chapter will proceed by examining a number of issues to see how 
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such issues are dealt with under both English and the US jurisdiction. These issues 
are the allocation of control rights during insolvency processes, stay on creditors’ 
actions, the possibility of post- petition financing and the availability of the notion of 
‘cram-down’ under both jurisdictions. It is worth noting that, wherever it is 
appropriate, reference to some of the theories discussed in the previous chapter 
will be made. 
3.2 Insolvency Proceedings in England 
     Although the UK insolvency proceedings have traditionally been known as a 
creditor oriented scheme, the enactment of the Enterprise Act of 20025 was a 
desire to encourage a more collective scheme towards the rescue of distressed 
debtors, whereby it is intended “to facilitate company rescue and to produce better 
returns for creditors as a whole”.6 This Act came into effect in the UK on 15 
September 2003 for the purpose of making rescue proceedings administratively 
quicker and cheaper to operate.7 Nevertheless, it is argued that the Enterprise Act 
of 2002 “offers no indication of a movement towards the development of a ‘US 
                                                          
5
 The 2002 Enterprise Act introduced new provisions into the 1986 Insolvency Act. 
6
 Hansard, HC Deb 10 April 2002, 53 (Ms. Patricia Hewitt MP, Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry); see also Armour J. & Mokal R., ‘Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act 2002’, (2005) 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 28, pp. 29-30. 
7
 The new administration procedure was intended to reduce the costs of entry by abolishing the 
need for a court hearing in every case and the requirement of submitting a report explaining the 
background to the company’s position. However, an empirical study demonstrated that the new 
administration regime is costly because of a number of regulatory burdens: see Armour J., Hus A. & 
Walters A., ‘The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations and Costs in Corporate Rescue 
Proceedings’, p. 26, A Report Prepared for the Insolvency Service, December 2006, available at:  
www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/corpdocs/ImpactofEAReport.p
df. accessed on 25/12/2013. 
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Chapter 11’- style rescue procedure” which is considered to be a debtor- friendly 
regime.8 
     There are five distinct formal insolvency proceedings in England: (1) 
administration; (2) receivership; (3) company voluntary arrangements (CVAs); (4) 
schemes of arrangement under the Companies legislation; and (5) winding-up or 
“liquidation”. A comprehensive account of the insolvency proceedings in England is 
not within the scope of this part of the thesis. However, the aim of this section is to 
provide a brief discussion of some of these proceedings, namely: administration, 
receivership, CVA and scheme of arrangement proceedings. The liquidation 
proceedings in England are out of the scope of this part. The reason for discussing 
administration proceedings is that it enhances, as discussed below, the nature of 
collectivity in insolvency procedures and promotes the rescue culture.9 Further, 
since administration procedures are measures that might lead to either CVA or 
scheme of arrangement, both of these proceedings will be examined. Moreover, 
the reason for including administrative receivership proceedings is to affirm the fact 
that it is not considered a true collective insolvency procedure; rather it is a method 
by which a floating charge holder, normally a bank, can enforce his security by 
appointing a receiver who must be a qualified insolvency practitioner.10 
                                                          
8
 Fletcher F., ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Development- Changes to Administrative 
Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements- the Insolvency Act 2000, the 
White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’, (2004) 5 (1) E.B.O.L.R. 120, p. 151. 
9
 See below pp. 118-119. 
10
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 230 (2); Goode R., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (4
th
 
edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), p. 320. 
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3.2.1 Administration proceedings11 
     Based upon the recommendations on the Report of the Review Committee on 
Insolvency Law and Practice (1982),12 the administration procedure was first 
introduced in England by the 1986 Insolvency Act in order to give companies a 
temporary breathing space through a statutory moratorium and to promote the 
concept of collectivity. Although the aim of the administration procedure under this 
                                                          
11
 It is worth noting that the concept that is known as a pre-pack administration has been described 
as “a planned insolvency procedure in which the sale of all or part of a company’s business or 
assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an insolvency practitioner as 
administrator”. This concept is not regulated in either the Insolvency Act 1986 or in the Insolvency 
Rules 1986. However, following a Statement of Insolvency Practice (SIP 16) which was issued in 
January 2009, in July 2013 the Government announced the establishment of an independent 
review of the pre-pack procedure (Graham Review into Pre-Pack Administration). On 16 June 2014 
the review was published alongside “Pre-Pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and Outcome 
Analysis of Pre-Pack Administration” by the University of Wolverhampton: for a detailed highlight of 
the recommendation of the Graham Review and the practice of pre-pack administration in the UK 
under SIP 16: see Conway L., ‘Pre-Pack Administration Procedure’, (20 January 2015) Home 
affairs Section at House of Commons, Standard Note: SN05035, available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN05035/prepack-
administration-procedure, accessed on 09/03/2015; see also Finch V., ‘Pre-Packaged 
Administrations: Bargains in the shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy Bargains’, (2006) J.B.L. 568; 
Walton P., ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations- Trick or Treat’, (2006), 19 (8) I.I. 113; Frisby S., ‘The 
Pre-Pack Progression: latest empirical findings’, (2008) I.I. 154; Frisby S. ‘The Second Chance 
Culture and Beyond: Some Observations on the Pre-Pack Contribution’, (2009) Law and Financial 
Markets Review 242; Walton P., ‘Pre-Pack in the UK’, (2009) 18 INSOL International Insolvency 
Review 85 ; Haywood M., ‘Pre-Pack Administrations’, (2010), 23 (2) I.I. 17; Walton P., ‘When is Pre-
Packaged Administration Appropriate? A Theoretical Consideration’, (2011), 20 N.L.J. 13; Armour 
J., ‘The Rise pf the Pre-Pack: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform’, in 
Austin P. & Fady J., Restructuring Companies in Troubled Times: Directors and Creditor 
Perspectives, (Ross Parsons Centre, Sydney Law School, 2012).     
12
 Review Committee on Insolvency Law, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd. 8558, 1982). This 
report is generally known as the “Cork Report” since it was chaired by Kenneth Cork and was 
commissioned by the labour government in 1977. This report was followed by a White Paper in 
1984, A revised Framework for Insolvency Law (1984), and these led to the enactment of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
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Act was also to adopt a ‘rescue culture’ capable of preserving the value of 
potentially viable businesses, it is argued that this regime “was quickly perceived to 
suffer from a number of inherent flaws which were detrimental to its prospects of 
serving as a user-friendly vehicle for the attainment of its intended purpose”.13 As a 
result, administration proceedings have been streamlined by the enactment of the 
Enterprise Act of 200214 in order to overcome the deficiencies of the old 
proceedings.15 However, the old administration proceedings under Part II of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 still applies, with various appropriate modifications, to a 
number of specific types of organisations.16 In England, for instance, there are 
special administration proceedings for water and sewerage undertakers, protected 
railway companies, air traffic service companies, public private partnership 
companies and building societies. All of these organisations are excluded from the 
new administration regime.17 
     It is believed that the primary purpose of the new administration regime is to 
enhance the nature of collectivity in insolvency procedures and to promote the 
                                                          
13
 The old administration procedures were considered costly and inflexible. Discussing the principal 
deficiencies of the old administration procedures is not within the scope of this chapter: see Fletcher 
F., above 8, p. 125; Armour J., Hus A. & Walters A., above 7, p. iv; Campbell A., ‘Company Rescue: 
The Legal Response to the Potential Rescue of Insolvent Companies’, (1994) 5 (1) I.C.C.L.R. 16, 
pp. 22-23.  
14
 Under the new procedure, Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 has been replaced and a new Part II 
inserted in its place. 
15
 Some of deficiencies of the old administration proceedings are the barriers to entry to the 
process, displacement of the directors and lack of a clear exit form administration: see Fletcher F., 
above 8, p. 125; Campbell Andrew, above 13, pp. 22-23. 
16
 Fletcher F., above 8, p. 134. 
17
 As a result of such exclusion, the holder of floating charge has the right to appoint an 
administrative receiver in order to enforce his security: see section 249 of the 2002 Enterprise Act. 
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“rescue culture”.18 As discussed in the previous chapter,19 according to Jackson 
the major benefit of having a collectivity system in place is that a collective system 
would reduce the “first in time, first in priority” which is considered to be a “race to 
the court-house” between creditors.20 This has been emphasised by the White 
Paper where it has been stated that “there are many other important interests 
involved in the fate of such a company, including unsecured creditors, 
shareholders and employees. We propose to create a streamlined administration 
procedure which will ensure that all interest groups get a fair say and have an 
opportunity to influence the outcome.”21 Thus, according to the view of the Cork 
Committee, a modern system of corporate insolvency adopts a rescue culture in 
which the interests of all parties affected by companies’ insolvencies should be 
taken into account.22 
     Even though one of the aims of the Enterprise Act 2002 is to foster a rescue 
culture, it is claimed that the remodeled administration proceedings appear to 
provide “a more generous outcome, in a commercial sense”, to the secured 
                                                          
18
 Goode R., above 10, p. 34; In proposing the new administration proceedings, the United Kingdom 
took lessons from the United States’ Chapter 11 experience. In giving evidence at Standing 
Committee stage, Mr. Douglas Alexander stated that “the Bill has been informed not just by looking 
at the United States and finding out what lessons can be learned from its approach to enterprise 
and its entrepreneurial culture, but by looking around the world”: HC May 9, 2002 House of 
Commons Standing Committee B (pt 3) at Columns 547, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmstand/b/st020509/am/20509s03.htm, 
accessed on 08/03/ 2015.  
19
 See above section 2.2.2. 
20
 See Jackson T., ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement, and the Creditors’ Bargain’, (1982) 91 
Y.L.J. 857 , pp. 861-864.  
21
 The White Paper, above 12, para. 4. 
22
 Ibid. 
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creditors than it intended to be under the original terms of the Enterprise Bill.23 This 
leads some to argue that the administration procedure, as modernised by the 
Enterprise Act 2002, “appears to have creditor wealth maximisation at its core, 
although this core is well disguised since corporate rescue is ostensibly placed at 
the top of the legislative tree”.24 Further, Finch criticised the whole English 
insolvency regime by stating that “present English rescue procedures might be 
portrayed as giving strong priority to the protection of creditors’ interests and 
limited priority to rescue”.25 There are a number of rationales behind such 
criticism.26 First, even though it is within the legislative intention to give primacy of 
purpose to the rescue of the company as a going concern, Fletcher argued that 
“the use of such inexact, and possibly subjective, expressions as ‘thinks’, 
‘reasonably practicable’, and ‘a better result’ are likely to become the focus of 
future challenges to an office holder’s exercise of judgment in electing to pursue 
one of the alternative objectives”.27 In supporting Fletcher’s argument, interviews 
with insolvency practitioners revealed the fact that based on their experience 
                                                          
23
 Fletcher F., above 8, p. 129. 
24
 McCormack G., ‘Apples & Oranges? Corporate Rescue and Functional Convergence in the US 
and UK’, (2009) 18 (2) I.I.R. 109, p. 115. 
25
 Finch V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (2
nd
 edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 278; in this regard, Goode also stated that “the general experience has 
been that the Enterprise Act 2002 has had little effect in restoring insolvent businesses to profitable 
trading. The most common outcome of insolvency proceedings, of whatever kind, is cessation or 
disposal of the company’s business and the winding up of the company”: Goode R., above 10, p. 
60.   
26
 Ibid; Fletcher F., above 8, p. 136; Armour J., Hus A. & Walters A., above 7, pp. 22-23. 
27
 Fletcher F., above 8, p. 136; it is argued that even though the Insolvency Act 1986 contains 
reference to what the administrator “think”, the test to be applied by the administrator or the 
standard to be imposed by him is in his thought process: Simmons M., ‘Enterprise Act and Plain 
English’, (2004), 17 (5) I.I. 76, p. 76. 
121 
 
“administrations with a view to ‘rescuing the company as a going concern’ were 
rare”.28 Secondly, in the “purpose of administration section’ there is no reference to 
the wider interests of shareholders (nor the continuation of employment) which 
implies, as argued by Fletcher, the fact that ‘the traditional disposition of English 
insolvency law to elevate the interests of creditors above the possible benefits of a 
corporate rescue” still preserved.29 Moreover, insolvency practitioners vary in their 
views in relation to the Enterprise Act.30 “Some stated that it simply enacted what 
they had always considered to be best practice; others indicated that the new 
duties encouraged them to take steps to promote the interests of unsecured 
creditors which they would not previously have taken”.31 However, it is argued that 
it is the Government’s desire to make clear that the rescue of the company should 
not be pursued at the expense of the company’s creditors.32 
     Notwithstanding the insufficiency underpinning the modernised administration 
procedure, since the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002 the level of 
administration cases has increased as an alternative to administrative receivership 
and company voluntary arrangement.33 Further, despite such flaws, this thesis 
argues that the primary objective of the administration, as stated in the legislation, 
                                                          
28
 Armour J., Hus A. & Walters A., above 7, pp. 22-23. 
29
 Fletcher F., above 8, p. 137. 
30
 Armour J., Hus A. & Walters A., above 7, p. iv. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Armour J. & Mokal R., above 6, p. 43. 
33
 In their empirical study, A. Katz and M. Mumford traced the impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on 
administration, receivership and company voluntary arrangement cases: ‘Study of Administration 
Cases’, (2007) 20 (7) Insolvency Intelligence 97. Their analysis showed that administration has 
continued to increase as a proportion of all corporate insolvencies since the implementation of the 
EA 2002 in September 2013. Thus, administration has continued to substitute both the 
administrative receivership and creditors’ voluntary liquidation: see in particular pp. 97-98.  
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is still to rescue the business of the company as a going concern and rescuing the 
business would normally maximise the returns of all secured and unsecured 
creditors, customers and employees.34 This was evidenced, for instance, by the 
success of the administration proceeding of Game’s British Operations Company 
which went into administration in March 2012 due to financial difficulties. Having 
sold Game Group shops to OpCapita firm, nearly 3,200 jobs35 have been 
safeguarded and customers will not be affected since Games’ shops will remain on 
the High Streets. On the other hand, secured and unsecured creditors will be paid 
sooner or later. Thus, rescuing the business of the distressed company usually 
does not prejudice the interests of secured creditors. In this case, an empirical 
study conducted by Frisby demonstrated that post-Enterprise Act administrations 
deliver more returns to secured creditors than pre-Enterprise Act administrations.36 
     Under the new administration proceedings, the purpose of administration has 
been clearly articulated in a single hierarchy of objectives.37 Thus, under the new 
proceedings,38 the overriding objective of an administrator is that of rescuing the 
company as a going concern.39 However, if this is not, as he “thinks”, “reasonably 
practical” and/or it is not in the interests of the creditors (as a whole) for the 
                                                          
34
 The new Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, Para 3 (1) (a), (b) and (c). 
35
 A report in BBC website at this link http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17578451, as viewed in 
1
st
 April 2012. 
36
 Frisby S., ‘Interim Report to the Insolvency Service on Returns to Creditors from Pre-and-Post 
Enterprise Act Insolvency Procedures’, p. 14, Baker & Mckenzie Lecturers in Company and 
Commercial Law, 24 July 2007; available at:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandl
egislation/research/returntocreditors.pdf. accessed on 29/03/2014. 
37
 Goode R., above 10, pp. 400-401. 
38
 See the new Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, Para 3 (1) (a), (b) and (c). 
39
 Ibid, Para 3 (1) (a). 
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company to be restored to profitable trading, the second objective is to achieve a 
better result for the company’s creditors (as a whole) than would be likely if the 
company were wound up.40 If neither of the above objectives can be achieved, 
then the final objective is to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.41 In performing his duty, an administrator must perform his 
function “in the interests of all the company’s creditors as a whole”42 and as 
“quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable”.43 In addition, the administrator 
is considered to be an agent of the company; and, as a result, he will not bear any 
personal liability in respect of contracts he may enter into on behalf of the 
company.44 
     As will be discussed below,45 similar to the position under the US Chapter 11, 
administration gives the company a breathing space for a limited period of time 
since all creditors’ claims are stayed during the process. However, unlike the case 
under the US Chapter 11, upon the appointment of an administrator, the 
management will be displaced at the administrator’s request and the administrator 
will take control over any property belonging to the company.46 Thus, the notion of 
debtor-in-possession is not a feature of the administration procedure in England. 
Further, it is worth noting that the administration proceeding is available to all 
companies irrespective of their size.  
                                                          
40
 Ibid, Para 3 (1) (b). 
41
 Ibid, Para 3 (1) (c). 
42
 Ibid, Para 3 (2). 
43
 Ibid, Para 4. 
44
 Ibid, Section 14 (4). 
45
 See below section 3.4.2. 
46
 Sections 13 & 14 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. 
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     It is worth mentioning that administration is not in itself a reorganisation 
procedure at all, rather it is a temporary measure which either lays the foundations 
for the rescue of the company, for example, by the approval of the creditors’ 
voluntary arrangement, or for the winding up on a more favourable basis than 
would be achieved by an immediate winding up.47 Although administration is 
merely a temporary procedure (of finding the best exit route) rather than a 
destination in itself, it is argued that “administration is often initiated with a rescue 
possibility in mind”, and, should in general be included under reorganisation.48 
3.2.2 Administrative Receivership 
     The administrative receiver which is partially abolished by the enactment of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, is not a true collective insolvency procedure, rather it is a 
method by which a floating charge holder, normally a bank, can enforce his 
security by appointing a receiver who must be a qualified insolvency practitioner.49 
Thus, the receiver owes his primary obligation to the person appointing him. 
However, Goode argued that even though the duty of the administrative receiver is, 
in principle, owed only to his appointor, not the general body of creditors, 
administrative receivership is considered by statute as an insolvency proceeding.50 
It is worth noting that following the Cork recommendation, the Enterprise Act 2002 
restricted the floating charge holders from appointing an administrative receiver by 
                                                          
47
 Keay A. & Walton P., Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, (Longman, 2003), p. 92; Roy 
Goode stated that “the main effect of the administration is to impose a moratorium on the 
enforcement of creditors”: above 10, p. 393. 
48
 Okoli P., ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for a Delicate Balancing 
Act’, (2012) 23 (2) I.C.C.L.R. 61, p. 62  
49
 Section 230 (2) of the Insolvency Act 1986; Goode R., above 10, p. 320 
50
 Goode R., above 10, p. 320. 
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a way of replacing, with some certain exceptions, the receivership with 
administration procedure. Nonetheless, even though the 2002 Enterprise Act 
replaced receivership with administration, it is still going to be one of the options 
available at least for the foreseeable future.51 This is due to the fact that creditors 
with ‘qualifying’ floating charges52 that were created before the 2002 Act,53 or those 
with charges which, although created after that date, fall within one of the specified 
exceptions,54 may still appoint administrative receivers. 
     Under this regime, an administrative receiver could be appointed by a creditor 
of a company who had taken security over “the whole or substantially the whole of 
a company’s property” by a package of security interests that must include a 
floating charge.55 Once appointed, a receiver is deemed to be an agent acting for 
the interest of his principal.56 This leads Goode to describe the receiver as “an 
independent contractor whose primary responsibility is to protect the interests of 
his appointor but also owes a duty to his deemed principal, the company, to refrain 
from conduct which needlessly damages its business or goodwill, and a separate 
                                                          
51
 Finch V., above 25, p. 327; Fletcher F., above 8, p. 150. 
52
 Sch. B1, Para. 14 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
53
 It is stated that “numerous banks rushed to take out floating charges before the 2002 Act came 
into effect on 15 September 2003 and ended the qualifying floating charge holder’s right to veto 
administration and curtailed the right of such floating charge holders to appoint an administrative 
receiver”: Finch V., above 25, p. 328. 
54
 See Enterprise Act 2002 where a new section 72A was inserted into the Insolvency Act 1986 
listing the exceptions. 
55
 The administrative receiver is defined by section 29 (2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
56
 Goode R., above 10, p. 332. 
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duty, by statute, to observe the priority given to preferential creditors over claims 
secured by a floating charge”.57 
     Since the primary purpose of the receivership is to maximise the returns of the 
floating charge holder, the concept of ‘corporate rescue’ does not form part of the 
administrative receivership regime. It is argued that if the company’s assets are 
worth more than the floating charge holder is owed, nothing obliges the 
administrative receiver to do anything to save the business.58 For instance, if the 
company files petition for administration or Company Voluntary Arrangements, the 
floating charge holder can block such a petition by appointing an administrative 
receiver. Thus, it is claimed that the replacement of administrative receivership with 
administration procedure by the Enterprise Act 2002 signals the end of a regime 
under which a single creditor’s proprietary rights could administer the resolution of 
insolvency proceedings.59 
3.2.3 Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) 
     As stated above, administration procedure is not in itself reorganisation 
procedures at all, rather it is a temporary measure which either lays the 
foundations for the rescue of the company, for example, by the approval of the 
creditors’ voluntary arrangement, or for the winding up on a more favourable basis 
than would be achieved by an immediate winding up.60 However, it is worth noting 
that the CVA procedure can be a stand-alone rescue mechanism since the 
                                                          
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Armour J. & Mokal R., above 6, pp. 28- 29. 
59
 Ibid, p. 32. 
60
 Keay A. & Walton P., above 47, p. 92; Goode R., above 10, p. 394. 
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company’s directors can initiate a formal proposal for a voluntary arrangement 
unless a winding-up and administration order is made.61 However, proposing a 
CVA without first putting the company into administration suffers from the 
weakness that there is no moratorium, except for small companies,62 on actions 
against the company, and as a result secured creditors may frustrate a possible 
CVA by enforcing their securities prior to the meetings called to approve the 
proposal.63 This leads some commentators to argue that a voluntary arrangement 
will be much more likely to succeed if it is put forward by an administrator after an 
administration order has been made since the suspension of creditors’ rights 
during the administration process will give the administrator a better chance to put 
together a fully considered scheme.64 However, recent research by Walters and 
Frisby has shown that the vast majority of insolvent companies surveyed had 
resort to a stand-alone CVA rather than a CVA within administration.65 According to 
                                                          
61
 Goode R., above 10, pp. 499-500. 
62
 The criteria of “small companies” can be taken from the definition contained within section 382 (3) 
of the Companies Act 2006. According to this section, a company is considered to be small if it 
meets two of the following three criteria: (1) its annual turnover is not greater than £6.5m, (2) its 
balance sheet total is not more that £3.26m and (3) its employees is not more than 50. 
63
 Keay A. & Walton P., above 47, p. 142; This lack of a moratorium may mean that even although 
the CVA proposal is supported by a majority of creditors, there is no guarantee that other creditors 
will not take action which could lead them gaining access to company assets: Campbell A., ‘The 
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them, “the reasonably ‘simple’ capital structures of these companies, having only a 
single secured lender and relatively few major creditors, and perhaps having 
access to ‘insider’ funding’, will facilitate a standstill pending consideration of a 
CVA”.66 
     A CVA is an agreement between a company and its creditors for the satisfaction 
of the company’s debts67 by which, for instance, in discharge of their claims 
creditors accept, in a single sum or by installments, an amount less than that which 
is due to them.68 However, in England there are two types of CVA: firstly, there are 
the CVAs without a moratorium, which are governed by Part I of the Insolvency Act 
1986 and the Insolvency Act 2000. Secondly, there are CVAs with a moratorium, 
which are governed by the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Insolvency Act 2000, 
which introduced a new Schedule into the Insolvency Act 1986.69 Subject to a 
number of criteria which have to be met,70 the former type is restricted to small 
companies, whereas the later type is open to medium, large companies and small 
companies if they wish. Thus, medium and large companies have to use the 
administration procedure route in order to undertake a CVA with the benefit of a 
moratorium available during administration processes. However, narrowing the 
entry criteria for CVAs with moratoria to small companies, as argued by Fletcher, 
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would “greatly diminish its practical value”.71 Lack of the moratorium will open the 
door for secured creditors to enforce their securities without having regard to the 
interest of other creditors.  
     Although there are no statutory guidelines determining the purpose of a CVA, 
there are a number of reported cases that illustrate the purposes of such a 
regime.72 For instance, in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v The Wimbledon 
Football Club Ltd and others, Neuberger, LJ stated that “… the CVA regime is 
intended to be an additional, and particularly flexible, option in the case of 
corporate insolvency, in addition to liquidation, administration and administrative 
receivership.”73 Also, enabling the company to continue trading is another purpose 
of a CVA as affirmed by Roger Kaye QC, in Re Arthur Rathbone Kitchen Ltd where 
he stated that “the purpose of the CVA was to enable the company to trade out of 
its insolvency and make provision for creditors by stage payments whilst it did.”74 
     Unlike the case under the administration proceeding where the management is 
displaced upon the administrator’s request, in a CVA directors will remain in control 
of the company. Thus, the notion of the ‘debtor in possession’ which is embodied in 
the US Chapter 11 is opted for under CVA proceedings in England. However, 
under the US Chapter 11 the existing management runs the troubled business 
without any kind of supervision, whereas in the CVA the existing management runs 
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the business under the supervision of the licensed insolvency practitioner.75  Also, 
as it will be discussed further below,76 CVA procedure follows the US Chapter 11 
approach in the sense that it recognises the notion of ‘cram-down’, in which a 
dissenting class of creditors could be bound77 by the will of the majority (75%) 
voting to adopt the terms of a proposed arrangement.78 However, unlike the case 
under the US Chapter 11, Fletcher stated that “the CVA opted for simplicity by 
treating all creditors as a single class for voting purposes, with individual voting 
power measured by the financial value of each creditor’s claim”.79 Thus, it can be 
argued that the CVA provides more flexibility than the US Chapter 11 in the sense 
that under Chapter 11 the voting process takes place in classes while under the 
CVA all creditors constitute a single class. 
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3.2.4 Scheme of Arrangement  
     A scheme of arrangement is a statutory procedure pursuant to Part 26 of the 
Companies Act 2006 whereby a ‘compromise’ or ‘arrangement’80 concluded by a 
company with its members or creditors or any class of its creditors or any class of 
its members has submitted such an arrangement or compromise to the court for 
approval.81 Such a scheme is not regarded as a rescue procedure rather it is 
considered “as a flexible restructuring tool in UK company law”.82 Further, since 
administration proceedings are merely temporary measures, the administrator, 
besides considering the CVA, can use the scheme of arrangement as an 
alternative restructuring procedure in order to achieve the stated purposes of 
administration.83 
     Even though the scheme of arrangement is similar to the CVA in the sense that 
it adopts the concept of ‘debtor in possession’, the existing management remains 
in control of the company and runs the business without the supervision of the 
licensed insolvency practitioner.84 This is considered to be one of the potential 
benefits of using the scheme of arrangement over the CVA since it represents an 
“in-house” restructuring tool that does not require external intervention and 
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management by an insolvency practitioner.85 However, unlike the case under CVA, 
a scheme of arrangement has a different voting process whereby creditors are 
divided into classes86 and a scheme should be approved by a majority in number in 
each class, representing three-fourths in value.87 Hence, it is argued that having 
such a structure in place creates a persistent problem in ascertaining what is a 
“class” of creditors since the more classes that are recognised, the more 
challenging it becomes to get the scheme approved by the requisite majorities in 
each class.88 
     Further, unlike the CVA, the scheme of arrangement requires the support of a 
court sanction and once it is approved by the court, it cannot be challenged by the 
company’s creditors or its members.89 However, it is worth noting that even though 
the CVA does not require the approval of the court, an arrangement under the CVA 
can be challenged on a number of grounds (e.g. unfair prejudices).90 Nonetheless, 
in comparing it with the CVA, the scheme is considered to be both burdensome 
and costly, “involving the presentation of a scheme proposal by the board on behalf 
of the company, the approval of the court to the convening of a meeting of the 
various classes of creditors and members involved so far as they have an 
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economic interest and, if the scheme is adopted by the requisite majority, the 
court’s approval”.91 
     The notion of ‘cram-down’ is also embodied under the scheme of arrangement. 
However, in contrast with the CVA, under the scheme of arrangement secured 
creditors will be bound by the scheme, if it is adopted by the requisite majority and 
approved by the court, even without their express consent.92 Thus, in order to 
avoid the implementation of such a concept, dissenters normally seek to contend 
that they represent a separate class, whereas the company that proposes the 
scheme tries “to reduce the classes to an absolute minimum”.93 
3.3 Bankruptcy Proceedings in the United States 
     Unlike the case in England where there are several insolvency proceedings, in 
the US there are two bankruptcy proceedings: Chapter 11, known as a 
reorganisation chapter and Chapter 7 liquidation. This section will examine the US 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings since it promotes the rescue culture and it is 
necessary for the Omani legislator to take it into account. 
3.3.1 The US Chapter 11 
     The US is committed to the ‘rescue culture’ through introducing a whole 
Chapter in the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. The aim of the US Chapter 11 is to save a 
company from closing down through rehabilitating the debtor’s business and the 
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restructuring of its indebtedness.94 It is argued that Chapter 11 is founded on 
certain fundamental assumptions.95 For instance, Dahl argued that the underlying 
philosophy of such a Chapter is that “the creditors are investing their equity into the 
business, in the hope of being paid later on”.96 In his view, rehabilitating the 
debtor’s business will achieve a number of goals, one of which is to repay the 
creditors through negotiating a payment plan.97 Also, McCormack stated that the 
notion of a ‘going concern’ is one of the key assumptions of Chapter 11 in the 
sense that companies in financial distress are worth more as going concerns than 
they are if liquidated piecemeal;98 and, as a result, any financial trouble must be 
settled through alteration of contractual relations with creditors, shareholders etc.99 
Thus, preservation of employees’ jobs and the local economy, which may be 
dependent on the continued existence of the business,100 falls within the primary 
objectives of the US Chapter 11. 
     One of the main features of the US Chapter 11 is that, unlike the case under 
administration proceedings in England,  the management of the company remains 
in place,101 under the doctrine known as ‘debtor-in-possession (DIP)’. Under the 
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notion of DIP, the management of the company acts as a ‘trustee’ having a 
fiduciary duty to the creditors, shareholders and all other parties, including 
employees, having interests in the debtor company imposed on them.102 This leads 
a commentator to argue that Chapter 11 offers debtors a number of incentives to 
file for Chapter 11 proceedings, including the ability of management to stay in 
place.103 However, it is worth noting that management displacement in favour of an 
outside trustee could be one of the options available in the US but only in 
exceptional cases such as fraud.104 
     Further, another basic feature of Chapter 11 is the moratorium or automatic stay 
on creditor enforcement actions in which a company will be given a breathing 
space for a limited period of time since all creditors’ claims are suspended during 
this process.105 During this period, the DIP should review its affairs and must 
prepare a rescue plan through a process of bargaining and negotiation with 
creditors.106 Once the plan is prepared, the court plays a central role in evaluating it 
and approving it. In this regard, creditors are divided into classes and the plan must 
be approved by a majority of 75 per cent in each class.107 Once it is accepted by 
the majority, the dissenting minority will be bound by the plan in what is termed the 
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notion of ‘cram-down’.108 In general, a dissented class of creditors may be 
crammed-down if it is demonstrated that they would receive the value of its 
collateral, plus interest according to the reorganisation plan.109 Further, as will be 
discussed below,110 dissenting creditors are protected by the “best interest” test- in 
which each opposing creditor must receive at least as much under the plan as it 
would in liquidation- and a “feasibility test”- whereby the debtor company must be 
able to implement the promises it makes in the plan.111 However, it is argued that 
the danger of such a concept is that “the approval of the reorganisation plan can be 
prevented indefinitely if creditors holding more than one-third of the value of the 
relevant debt withhold their consent”.112 Nonetheless, it is argued that even though 
the cram-down procedure is used as a threat to persuade dissenting classes to 
accept a plan, it is rarely necessary to carry it out.113 
     Originally, Chapter 11 adopted the ‘one size fits all’ approach to business 
reorganisation since all businesses regardless of their size -small, medium or 
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large- are subject to Chapter 11.114 However, since Chapter 11 is a court- driven 
process which involves many court hearings, it is argued that “its use in small 
business cases has long been criticised as being too cumbersome, expensive and 
slow”.115 In this regard, it has been stated that: 
     “The current [Bankruptcy] Code is required to handle both the corporate 
reorganizations of a multibillion dollar international company and that of the small, 
rural grocery store. Trying to make the same set of laws apply to vastly different 
corporate enterprises have created problems and inefficiencies in the handling of 
individual bankruptcy cases.”116 
Hence, in order to overcome such drawbacks, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 introduced an accelerated procedure that 
allows qualified small business117 debtors to get through Chapter 11 faster and less 
expensively. 
     Unlike the view of the creditors’ bargain theory,118 the aim of Chapter 11 is not 
merely to maximise the interests of the creditors, rather it is to preserve the value 
of a distressed company for the welfare of all parties.119 Also, it is not similar to the 
view of the communitarian theory,120 since Chapter 11 tries to strike a balance 
between the interests of the creditors and the interests of other stakeholders.121 
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For instance, as will be shown below,122 even though in approving a reorganisation 
plan Chapter 11 adopts the notion of ‘cram-down’, dissenting creditors are still 
protected by the ‘best interest test’ and ‘feasibility test’. In this sense, it can be said 
that the view expressed by the explicit value theory123 promoted by Finch is to 
some extent compatible with the aim of Chapter 11, since she proposed an 
approach in which the rights of different legitimating interests, public and private, 
should be balanced.124 As a result, this leads some to argue that the US Chapter 
11 restructuring process is not only debtor friendly but also creditor friendly.125 
“It is debtor friendly because it allows management to remain in place to develop 
and implement a restructuring plan. It is creditor friendly because of the degree of 
oversight and control, and the participation in the process allowed to creditors, both 
secured and unsecured. It is also highly pragmatic as it seeks to maximise the 
chances of the company re-emerging as a going concern. At the same time it 
attempts to treat all creditors fairly and to preserve economic value”.126 
3.4 A Comparative Analysis of Rescue Proceedings in England and the 
United States 
     As stated above, England and the US insolvency/ bankruptcy laws adopted the 
concept of rescue culture. However, both jurisdictions differ in regard to the types 
of rescue proceedings provided.127 As highlighted above,128 whereas in the US 
there is only a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy for all companies irrespective of their size, 
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there are administration proceedings, CVA without moratorium, CVA with 
moratorium for small companies and scheme of arrangement in England. Hence, 
even though both jurisdictions acknowledge the importance of establishing rescue 
proceedings, the approach used in each of them diverges. 
     It is stated129 that there are a number of requirements for having a successful 
rescue regime. The ease and speed of access to the process, the ability to request 
new funding during the reconstruction, the availability of a moratorium (stay on 
creditors), and providing incentives for directors in order to encourage them to file 
for the process as early as possible, are all examples of such requirements.130 In 
this regard, even though both England and the US embodied, to some extent, 
these concepts in their insolvency/ bankruptcy laws, there are a number of 
divergences between the legal frameworks governing distressed debtors 
restructuring in the two jurisdictions.131 Some divergences emerge from the fact 
that each jurisdiction has its own institutional characteristics132 and from the fact 
that in England, culturally, shareholders’ interests are generally regarded as of little 
or no account while in the US they are considered to have a stake in the 
outcome.133 Moss summarised the fundamental differences of approaches 
between the two jurisdictions by affirming that: 
                                                          
129
 In his article, Hunter provided a summary of 10 principles of a rescue culture, ‘The Nature and 
Function of a Rescue Culture’, (1999) J.B.L. 491; also see Tolmie F., Introduction to Corporate and 
Personal Insolvency Law, (London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 64.   
130
 Ibid. 
131
 See Moss G., ‘Chapter 11- An English Lawyer Critique’, (1998) 11 Insolvency International 17; 
McCormack G., above 24; Franks J. & Torous W., above 113; Westbrook J., above 111, pp. 86-87. 
132
 Goode R., above 10, p. 399. 
133
 Moss G., above 131 p. 18; Goode R., above 10, p. 398. 
140 
 
     “In England, insolvency, including corporate insolvency, is regarded as a 
disgrace. The stigma has to some extent worn off but is nevertheless still there as 
a reality. In the United States, business failure is very often thought of as the result 
of misfortune rather than wrongdoing. In England, the judicial bias towards 
creditors reflects a general social attitude which is inclined to punish risk takers 
when the risks go wrong and side with creditors who lose out. The United States is 
still in spirit a pioneering country where the taking of risks is thought to be good 
thing and creditors are perceived as being greedy”.134 
     One of the important differences between England and the US is the allocation 
of control rights during reorganisation.135 Whereas in England the managers are 
displaced during the proceedings, in the US they maintain their position without 
any kind of supervision. Hence, this leads some136 to argue that the US law tends 
to be pro-debtor while the UK law is pro-creditor.137 In this regard, a commentator 
reasoned such a difference by stating that: 
     “In the US a variety of factors, including a deep emotional commitment to the 
entrepreneurial ethic, make the owners of the corporation central to a salvage 
proceeding. In the UK, the prevailing view seems to be that the prior owners were 
the ones whose venality or incompetence created the problem and their interests 
disappear from moral or legal consideration once a formal proceeding has begun. 
Americans are much more willing to believe that financial difficulty is the result of 
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external forces and that preservation of the company, not just the business, is a 
crucial social concern”.138 
     Since it is acknowledged that there are a number of divergences between the 
laws of both England and US, the aim of this section is to examine a number of 
issues and see how such issues are dealt with under both jurisdictions. First, this 
section will start by questioning whether management should be displaced in 
reorganisation or not. In this regard, argument against and in favour of debtor-in-
possession will be highlighted. Secondly, issues with respect to the stay on 
creditors during bankruptcy proceedings will be examined. Thirdly, this section will 
examine whether it is advisable to allow post-petition financing or not and what the 
advantages and drawbacks of such provisions are. Finally, the voting system and 
the notion of ‘cram-down’ and its impact on the success of the reorganisation plan 
will be discussed. It is worth noting that the outcome of this section will be utilised 
in the following chapters in order to propose an insolvency regime to be adopted by 
the Omani legislator. 
3.4.1 The Allocation of Control Right 
     One of the unique features of the US rescue regime is the fact that the debtor 
company remains under the control of its existing management139 without any kind 
of supervision and that management is entitled to file for Chapter 11 without the 
need to prove the insolvency of the company.140 However, in England, once 
administration procedures are filed for, the management of the company will be 
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displaced and control will be handed over to a qualified insolvency practitioner.141 
Thus, the US Chapter 11 is based on Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) while 
administration proceedings are based on Practitioner-in-Possession (PIP).142 
However, the concept of DIP is a feature of both CVA and scheme of arrangement 
procedures in England.143 
     It is worth noting that countries worldwide adopted diverse approaches with 
respect to the fate of the management during the reorganisation process.144 
Azar145 conducted a review of the bankruptcy policy in fifty countries worldwide. 
Within his review, he identified four approaches with respect to the management’s 
fate. The first is the approach of England where management is completely 
displaced with a receiver who manages the company during administration 
proceedings.146 The second is keeping management in place with an administrator 
appointed by the court to supervise the process.147 The third approach, which is 
German, is that management remains in control unless the majority of creditors 
vote against their remaining in place.148 The fourth is the US approach where 
management remains in place without any kind of supervision.149 
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     Whether it is preferable to displace the management of the company or to leave 
them in control is controversial. In this regard, while there are a number of 
arguments in favour of management displacement,150 there are some arguments 
against such displacement.151 Hence, in order to propose a specific approach to be 
adopted by the Omani legislator, it is essential to identify these arguments.  
3.4.1.1 Arguments in Favour of Management Displacement 
     It is argued that the insolvency of the company is usually attributed to the failure 
of the management in practicing their duties and it is unacceptable to keep them in 
control during the process.152 This is the case in England in which directors are 
deemed responsible for the failure of the company and as a result they must be 
displaced.153 It is, moreover, thought that the concept of debtor in possession 
encourages wasteful strategic behaviour from the company directors.154 This is 
because “they have nothing to lose and possibly a lot to gain by speculative 
investment of the company’s resources”.155 LoPucki claimed that the problem with 
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the US Chapter 11 is that, in small cases, it leaves the management to run the 
company until it runs out of cash and in large cases, it gives them the exclusive 
right to file a plan of reorganisation.156 Hence, in order to reduce debtor control in 
Chapter 11, it is suggested that a trustee should be appointed or elected in every 
case to supervise the process.157 In this regard, it is worth noting that even though 
the Insolvency Act 1986 adopted the concept of debtor in possession during CVA 
proceedings, directors’ control is subject to overseeing by a qualified insolvency 
practitioner.158 This, as this thesis believes, will assure the creditors that directors 
will not prejudice their interests and will act appropriately otherwise they will be 
liable for their misconduct. Also, it is argued that having an administrator, other 
than the directors, run the business of the company provides a greater assurance 
of independence and also “meant increased integration and harmonization of 
procedure if liquidation of the company was the eventual outcome”.159 
     In criticising the US Chapter 11, Moss argued that a debtor in possession 
regime could be equated with “leaving an alcoholic in charge of a pub”.160 He is of 
the view that management should be punished by displacing them and the control 
of the company should be handed over to a professional person and not given to 
the persons who might be responsible for such a failure.161 This is despite the fact 
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that a number of external factors might have led to the failure of the company, 
including financial recession, or internal factors, such as poor management-.162 
Hence, it might be argued that it is against the interests of both creditors and 
stakeholders to maintain a poor management.163 Nonetheless, it is argued that 
such an argument can be exaggerated since creditors pressure in the US can 
result in the replacement of the old managers and the introduction of new 
managers at an early stage of the reorganisation process.164 In addition, it is stated 
that in the US while management usually remains in control, in most cases 
management is changed during the process of Chapter 11 because the directors 
may have acted unwisely or because of creditors’ pressure.165 In this regard, an 
empirical study conducted by Gilson found that mostly half of Chief Executive 
Officers and incumbent directors lose their positions during the restructuring 
period.166 Thus, it can be argued that adopting the concept of debtor in possession 
does not, in reality, mean that poor directors will preserve their position since there 
are a number of factors which might lead to their displacement.  
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     Further, Finch claimed that leaving managers in control may create a “lack of 
trust between creditors and management” and as a consequence the level of 
litigation will rise and the expenses of such litigations will be paid from the 
company’s resources.167 In addition, it is claimed that if management knows in 
advance that they will be displaced during bankruptcy proceedings, they might 
engage in “morally hazardous activities”168 and this might result in preventing the 
liquidation of non-viable companies at an early stage. For example, they might 
gamble with other people’s money without having to worry about their jobs.169 In 
this regard, McCormack stated that in Germany, for instance, “it was feared that 
adopting the concept of DIP could lead companies to seek insolvency protection 
with a view to making creditors wait for years for payment” which is the perceived 
flaw of the US Chapter 11.170 
3.4.1.2 Arguments against Management Displacement 
     While there are a number of arguments in favour of management displacement, 
there are a number of arguments against such a displacement. It is argued that 
adopting the DIP concept could lead to the displacement of talented directors who 
are not to blame for the company’s financial difficulties.171 In this regard, it is 
argued172 that external factors, such as financial recession might be one of the 
reasons for business failure, thus it is not always a management fault. Further, 
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allowing the management to stay in office would encourage them to apply for court 
protection at an early stage and before it becomes too late to save the company 
and its business.173 Since directors are the first to notice the financial problem of 
the company, this will give them an incentive to seek reorganisation of the 
business at an early stage.174 Thus, it can be argued that the timing of seeking 
court protection is a key factor of a successful reorganisation.175 In this regard, the 
management of companies in the US knows that filing for Chapter 11 protection 
will safeguard their position and, as a result, they have an incentive to file for it.  
     However, it is argued that even though in the US early filing is encouraged by 
securing DIP status, there is no single statutory analogy in England law on 
wrongful trading and company director disqualification.176 Thus, in the US there is 
no statutory provision to punish the company’s directors who fail to apply, at an 
early stage, for Chapter 11.177 Unlike the US Bankruptcy Law, Armour and Mokal 
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argued that England insolvency law provides company’s directors with incentives –
‘sticks and carrots’ in order for them to take action once they sense a future 
crisis.178 On the one hand, the so called ‘wrongful trading’ and ‘director 
disqualification’ provisions contain statutory sticks to encourage directors to file for 
administration proceedings as soon as they notice the problem.179 On the other 
hand, if directors acted at the “earliest appropriate moment”, they “would have 
some hope of regaining control” since the administrator may opt for them to stay.180 
In criticising Chapter 11, Moss stated that “whereas in the US early filing is 
encouraged by the carrot of becoming a Debtor-In-Possession, in England we do 
at least have the stick of wrongful trading and disqualification proceedings if the 
management leaves it too late”.181 However, in reality, as stated above, in the US 
directors might lose their position during the Chapter 11 process.182 
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     In addition, it is claimed that new managers do not have the necessary 
knowledge to run the company and as a consequence they are not familiar with the 
debtor’s business.183 In this regard, a commentator stated that: 
     “The reason for giving the right to continue operation of the firm to management 
is that only management, and not a committee of creditors or a trustee, auctioneer, 
or venture capitalist or other acquirer has the knowledge to continue the firm in 
operation, as distinct from reviving it after an interruption for a change in control”.184 
Thus, it is argued that the existing management, although they are weak, will run 
the company and preserve its value better than a court-appointed trustee who 
knows nothing about it.185 The reason behind such argument is that the concern of 
the trustee will be to investigate past wrongdoing, such as questionable 
transactions with lenders and other creditors, while the focus of the management 
will be on “practical steps and practical negotiations”.186 
3.4.2 Stay on Creditors (Moratorium) 
     As discussed in the previous chapter,187 according to Jackson bankruptcy 
creates a ‘common pool problem’ which bankruptcy law addresses by replacing a 
mandatory mechanism of debt collection instead of the individual debt collection 
scheme that is in place outside bankruptcy law.188 However, the concept of 
‘collectivity’ cannot achieve its purpose unless creditors are prevented from 
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pursuing their claims.189 In this regard, the notion of ‘moratorium’ (as it is called in 
the US) or ‘automatic stay’ (as it is called in England), plays a vital role in achieving 
the aim of such a concept. In recognising the importance of its existence, Goode, 
for example, pointed out that if secured/ unsecured creditors were left free to 
pursue their rights against the company’s assets, the assets of the company would 
be destroyed and the purpose of the rescue regime would be frustrated.190 Also, 
Tolmie mentioned a number of the main requirements for a successful rescue 
regime one of which is to stay creditors’ rights during the process.191 Hence, it can 
be argued that staying creditors’ claims during the process is essential to any 
insolvency law since it provides a collectivity nature to the rescue process and 
without it, as Finch said “the creditors would take enforcement action before 
negotiations could be undertaken”.192 It has been described as: 
 “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It 
gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all 
harassment and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a 
repayment or reorganisation plan or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures 
that drove him into bankruptcy”.193 
Thus, the moratorium is designed to protect the assets of the company for a 
specific period of time in which the company is enabled to sort out its financial 
difficulties by preparing a plan of reorganisation. It is a ‘safe burrow’ for the 
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company.194 Its effect starts from the day of filing.195 As a result, it prohibits, for 
instance, creditors from taking any step to enforce security over the company’s 
property, no step may be taken to repossess goods in the company’s possession 
under a hire purchase agreement and no legal process may be instituted or 
continued against the company or the company’s property.196 The lack of a 
moratorium will encourage secured creditors to enforce their security against the 
company and will lead to landlords repossessing their property.197 This is 
considered to be one of weaknesses in the CVA procedure in England.198 Even 
though a CVA with moratorium was introduced for small companies, medium and 
large businesses do not benefit from such a moratorium.  
     Both England and the US adopt the concept of a moratorium in their insolvency/ 
bankruptcy laws. In this regard, both jurisdictions allow a financially troubled 
business a breathing space in which to review its financial affairs in order to 
propose, by its management or by an appointed administrator, a plan to reorganise 
and settle its liabilities to the creditors.199 However, the scope of such moratorium 
differs between the two jurisdictions.200 For instance, bringing criminal proceedings 
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against the debtor company is within the scope of the moratorium in England 
whereas in the US it is not.201 Also, one of the material differences between the US 
and England is that while the Chapter 11 moratorium prevents suppliers and 
customers terminating their contracts with a company on grounds of insolvency 
alone, the procedures in England allow suppliers and customers to exercise 
contractual termination rights in insolvency, so they are permitted to do so 
irrespective of the moratorium.202 In this regard, Finch stated that “where credit is 
obtained contractually through hire purchase or retention of title agreement the 
English courts tend to approach rights issues with a high respect for the sanctity of 
contract, whereas US courts look more directly to the need to protect parties 
collectively in a rescue scenario”.203 
     Since some creditors might be burdened by the imposition of moratorium, they 
may apply to the court in order to have the stay lifted.204 This is the case both in 
England and in the US.205 However, in the US there is a particular requirement of 
“adequate protection” for the holder of property rights.206 Even though the concept 
of “adequate protection” is not defined in the US Bankruptcy Code, examples of 
this concept are provided under this Act.207 Such “adequate protection” may be 
provided by requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash 
payment to such entity or providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien 
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equal to the decrease in the value of the entity’s interest in the property.208 
Westbrook indicated that the onus of proven “adequate protection” falls on the 
debtor whereby he has to show that the creditor is comfortably over-secured (it is 
called “equity cushion”) or by showing that one of the criteria mentioned in the 
statute is met.209 Sometimes the secured creditor applies to the court to lift the stay 
on a property which is necessary for the purposes of a reorganisation plan.210 In 
such a case, the issue then becomes whether the creditor is “adequately 
protected” or not. If he is adequately protected, then the company may retain the 
property for the purpose of its restructuring. Where the creditor is not “adequately 
protected” the creditor will be granted relief from the stay whereby he is allowed to 
enforce his security.211 In this regard, it can be argued that even though the US 
Bankruptcy Code imposed a stay on creditors’ actions, secured creditors will not be 
bound by such a stay unless the court demonstrates the fact that they are 
adequately protected. 
     In England, there is no such explicit requirement of adequate protection and it is 
left to the discretion of the court to decide based on the facts of each case.212 
However, it is stated that in deciding whether to grant leave or not, “the court must 
balance the interests of the secured creditor against those of the other creditors, 
and in the light of what the administrator’s proposals, and any progress made 
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towards their implementation seems destined to achieve”.213 In England, a number 
of factors play a role in determining whether a stay has to be lifted or not,214 such 
as the length of the stay, the impact of lifting the stay on other creditors and the 
conduct of the parties may also be a material consideration in a particular case, as 
it was in Re Paramount Airways.215 Thus, it can be argued that secured creditors in 
the US are given strong statutory protection whereas in England courts have wide 
discretion in determining the level of such protection. 
     During the moratorium, the debtor company may continue its business without 
having to pay its pre-petition debt and most creditors are not allowed to enforce 
their securities. Thus, in comparing the cost of operation with its industry 
competitors, the debtor company’s operating costs are reduced.216 This leads 
some to argue that operating under Chapter 11 gives the debtor company a 
competitive advantage, e.g. attracting customers through reducing its prices, and, 
as a consequence, this will lead to the collapse of other industries since they will 
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have to reduce their prices as well.217 However, Broude218 opposed such an 
argument by providing examples showing how customers are usually willing to pay 
more to avoid entering contracts with the bankrupt firm.219 In IP world, for example, 
software needs to be regularly updated. In this regard, he raised a number of 
questions, such as who would want to buy a product with a warranty from a firm 
that might not be around very much longer since it is in Chapter 11?220 Thus, it can 
be argued that granting a debtor company a breathing space does not mean that 
its competitors will be affected. 
     Further, it is argued that the length of the automatic stay221 often results in the 
company seeking protection under Chapter 11 to lengthen its business life, without 
there being any real prospect of the debtor company rehabilitating itself.222 This 
protracted period creates a period of unaccountability since creditors are not 
allowed to pursue their claims and they also cannot propose a reorganisation 
plan.223 This leads a commentator to argue that Chapter 11 is mainly a ‘debtor 
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relief’ provision rather than a creditor remedy.224 However, Coleman and Kirschner 
disagree with this statement and they stated that even though creditors are 
prevented from enforcing their securities, “the Bankruptcy Code imposes strict 
limitations and burdens on a debtor operation in Chapter 11”.225 For example, the 
Bankruptcy Code, Section 1113, imposes strict requirements on a debtor seeking 
to reject a collective bargaining agreement.226 
     It is obvious that achieving the aim of bankruptcy law in preserving the going 
concern value of the debtor will be hindered by giving secured creditors the right to 
block the proceedings by enforcing his rights,227 particularly if his property right is 
necessary to achieve this aim. Hence, it can be argued that the position in England 
is better than the position in the US. Staying all claims and giving courts the 
discretion to decide whether to lift the stay or not, after balancing the interests of all 
creditors, have an impact on the success of the rescue process. However, this 
does not mean to ignore the fact that adopting the experience of both England 
(given discretion to courts) and the US (having statutory requirement of adequate 
protection) provides more protection to secured creditors.  
3.4.3 Post-Petition Financing 
     As discussed above,228 in order to alleviate the impact of financial distress on 
companies, bankruptcy laws both in England and in the US impose a stay on 
creditors’ actions. The purpose of such a stay is to give the debtor company a 
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breathing space whereby it is able to continue its operation as a going concern and 
to sort out its financial difficulties by preparing a plan of reorganisation.229 However, 
during financial crisis, the distressed company would not be able to continue its 
operation unless sufficient liquidity is available.230 If, for example, the debtor 
business is manufacturing, a lack of cash to pay for wages and supplies can shut 
down operations, “which may be the fatal blow to an already wounded” 
company.231 Further, lack of an unencumbered asset to offer for security and the 
reluctance of pre-petition lenders to supply further finance render it difficult to 
obtain new finance unless a sufficient guarantee is in place.232 Nonetheless, since 
funding an insolvent firm is a risky business, a number of incentives, e.g. granting a 
lender super priority status, should be built into the system to encourage post- 
petition financing.233 Hence, bankruptcy laws of some countries contain a number 
of provisions governing the post-petition financing (it is also called DIP financing). 
Examples of countries that legalise post- petition financing are the US, France, 
Germany and Australia, although the incentives provided by each law differ.234 The 
focus of this section will be on the position under both the US and England 
insolvency laws. 
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     One of the key elements of Chapter 11 is the presence of provisions permitting 
the financing of the DIP’s operation.235 It is a court-approved funding for a bankrupt 
firm under the protection of Chapter 11.236 It is argued that the purpose of allowing 
post-petition financing in the US Bankruptcy Code is to make sure that the debtor 
has a fighting chance to survive.237 The survival of the company is beneficial not 
only to the distressed company, but to its creditors as well, because the value of 
the going concern of a corporation may exceed the liquidation value by a large 
margin.238 Further, it is stated that even though offering funding to a firm that has 
just filed for bankruptcy protection may seem to be risky, with a proper court 
protection, it can be an excellent deal for a lender.239 This is due to the fact that the 
lender is expected to enjoy further safeguards that it cannot be obtained outside a 
bankruptcy context.240 For example, subject to a number of conditions being 
met,241 lenders who provide funds to the company during the restructuring process 
might be paid before existing secured creditors (super priority status) if the 
company eventually goes into liquidation. 
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     The potential lenders to a DIP can be divided into three categories: fully 
secured prepetition lenders, unsecured prepetition lenders, and new lenders.242 
Each of them has its own reasons for wanting to provide financing to the debtor.243 
However, if the DIP lender is not prepetition secured creditors, a number of 
safeguards for affected pre-petition secured creditors should be in place. 
Sometimes a DIP lender can obtain a lien, commonly known as a “priming” lien, on 
property of the company that is senior in priority to existing liens on such 
property.244 However, in such a case, the debtor must, first of all, prove that it 
cannot obtain the loan without granting such a security and showing that a 
prepetition secured creditor is adequately protected against loss.245 In this regard, 
the US Senate Judiciary Committee stated that:246 
     “Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain. There 
may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured creditor an absolute right 
to his bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the policy of the 
bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section recognises the availability of alternative means 
of protecting a secured creditor's interest where such steps are a necessary part of 
the rehabilitative process. Though the creditor might not be able to retain his lien 
upon the specific collateral held at the time of filing, the purpose of the section is to 
insure that the secured creditor receives the value for which he bargained.” 
This means that the financial position of the pre-petition secured creditor at the 
time of bankruptcy filing, its prospect of being paid, will not be affected or harmed 
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by granting a super priority to the new lender.247 Thus, generally, the status of 
super priority will not be granted unless the court establishes that there is an 
adequate value in the collateral to protect fully both old and new lender.248 Also, 
since the onus of proving the necessity of such a new fund and the test of 
‘adequate protection’ is on the debtor company, it is stated that many proposed 
debtor-in -possession lien-priming loans are rejected by the bankruptcy courts than 
are authorised.249 
     In England, the Insolvency Law contains no specific provisions for super priority 
new financing, although in the Department of Trade and Industry report on the 
business rescue mechanism, it was proposed that the provision of additional 
finance to distressed companies could be value enhancing for the business 
provided that it was necessary to rescue the business.250 It is worth noting that 
under the administration procedure, the administrator may exercise his powers in 
borrowing money and granting security on behalf of the company.251 However, any 
new security will not take priority over pre-existing secured debt, unless expressly 
permitted under the terms of that indebtedness.252 In acknowledging the 
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importance of such finance, in David Cameron’s proposals253 for reform in July 
2008, it was declared that the Conservative Party would provide a priority status for 
a financier willing to provide ongoing funding post-petition.254 However, at present 
granting a super priority status for a new lender is not within the existing England 
legal framework. 
     Even though DIP financing increases the chance of the debtor’s survival, it has 
a number of undesirable side features.255 First, it is argued that in the US access to 
super priority financing increases the possibility of overinvestment.256 For instance, 
Eastern Airlines257 was able to raise large amounts of cash to finance the 
continued operation of the airline. It declared, in public, that it had sufficient funds 
($3.7 billion) to fully repay its liabilities ($3.4 billion). A year later, Eastern proposed 
to repay its creditors $1.6 billion, while Eastern’s final plan of reorganisation, 
rejected by creditors, proposed a repayment of only $0.85 billion. When the firm 
was eventually liquidated, the creditors received only about $0.34 billion.258 Hence, 
it is argued that such financing provides strong incentives for the debtor company 
to overinvest and a new lender will be happy to finance any venture, even a losing 
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one, since he/she will be granted a super priority status.259 However, a study of 
more than five hundred firms that filed for Chapter 11 showed that there is little 
evidence of systematic overinvestment.260 Researchers of this study reached the 
conclusion that companies obtaining DIP financing are more likely to emerge from 
Chapter 11 than non-DIP financed firms, they have a shorter reorganisation period, 
they are quicker to emerge and also quicker to liquidate.261 Further, since providing 
new finance may incur prejudice to the prepetition secured creditors, Triantis262 
stated that a distinction should be made between desirable and undesirable 
financing arrangements. According to him, desirable financing is one in which the 
lender’s expected return comes from the profitable use of the moneys;263 while 
undesirable financing simply effects a transfer from existing debt holders to the DIP 
lender and the shareholders.264 He suggested that in order to promote optimal 
investment and asset deployment decisions, the regulation of DIP lending should 
aim to permit only desirable financing arrangements.265 
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     Secondly, it is argued that the DIP financing is doing more than simply providing 
finance since, at present, it is, also, used as a mechanism to transfer control to the 
DIP lender itself.266 In this regard, Skeel claimed that:  
     “Creditors have converted two existing contractual tools into important 
governance levers. The first is debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. Before they 
even file for bankruptcy, corporate debtors must arrange an infusion of cash to 
finance their operations in Chapter 11. To an increasing extent, lenders are using 
these loan contracts to influence corporate governance in bankruptcy … The 
second is that key executives are increasingly given performance-based 
compensation packages in Chapter 11. The most common strategy is to promise 
the executives a large bonus if they complete the reorganisation quickly; likewise, 
executives face ever-smaller bonuses if the case takes longer”.267 
Despite this criticism, it is maintained that such shift of control through a DIP loan 
might be useful because the DIP lender usually has knowledge of the company’s 
operation and restructuring procedure.268 
3.4.4 Creditors Voting and the Notion of Cram-Down 
     A debtor company is given a breathing space in order to restructure its affairs 
and prepare a plan of reorganisation to be accepted by its creditors and approved 
by the court. Under both England and the US insolvency proceedings, creditors, 
whether secured or unsecured, are entitled to vote “for” or “against” the plan and 
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give the reasons for their objections to the court.269 However, if each creditor sticks 
to his pre-bankruptcy bargain, it would be impossible for any rescue attempt to be 
achieved, particularly if substantial parts of the company’s assets are encumbered. 
Therefore, there should be a legal mechanism in place to govern the process of 
such voting and to deal with such objection. In this regard, the laws of both 
England and the US give bankruptcy courts the authority to approve such a rescue 
plan despite its rejection by few creditors.270 This legal mechanism is referred to as 
“cram- down” whereby a bankruptcy court, in certain circumstances, can impose 
the plan over the wishes of a particular class of creditors who object to it. 
     A plan of reorganisation divides creditors into classes, usually based on the 
ranking of claims.271 In the US, for instance, equity is always placed in a separate 
class, and each secured creditor usually placed in a single class.272 In contrast, 
under a scheme of arrangement in England, for instance, the test of determining 
the number of classes is that a class must be limited to individuals whose rights are 
not so different as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to 
their common interests.273 Since it is impossible for creditors to agree on a specific 
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rescue plan, the laws of both England and the US have a process in which a vote 
in favour of the plan by a specific majority of creditors within a class is treated as 
binding on the dissenting voters in the class.274 However, the required majority and 
the classification of classes differ between the two jurisdictions.275 In the US 
Chapter 11, creditors are divided into classes and the plan must be approved by a 
majority of two-thirds (measured by their value of claims) in each.276 However, 
under CVA proceedings in England, all creditors are treated as a single class for 
voting purposes277 and the will of the majority (75%) will prevail.278 However, the 
process under a scheme of arrangement is similar to that of the US Chapter 11 
where creditors might be divided into classes279 and a scheme should be approved 
by a majority (representing ¾ in value) in each class.280 
     Further, it is worth noting that unlike the case under insolvency proceedings in 
England, in the US Chapter 11, shareholders are given some role in the rescue 
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process so their interests and voices are more recognised.281 This has been 
criticised by Moss when he stated that “where in reality there is nothing properly 
left for shareholders this seems to enable them to use blocking tactics so as to 
extract value from the situation in which equitably they should receive none”.282 
However, in order to overcome this obstacle, Finch proposed that in the case of a 
Chapter 11 filing, the bankruptcy court should be allowed to diminish the role of the 
shareholders.283 This is the case in England where courts tend, in some 
circumstances, to disregard the objections of shareholders. For instance, in Re Tea 
Corpn Ltd in 1904284 the court held that shareholders’ dissent could be disregarded 
when sanctioning the scheme.285 When dealing with the argument that the scheme 
was rendered defective by the ordinary shareholders’ dissent, Vaughan Williams 
LJ held that “if you have the assent to the scheme of all those classes who have an 
interest in the matter, you ought not to consider the votes of those classes who 
really have no interest at all”.286 
     Once the rescue plan is accepted by the majority, the dissenting minority will be 
bound by the plan. In general, a dissented class of creditors may be crammed 
down if it is demonstrated that in the approval of the reorganisation plan they would 
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receive the value of its collateral plus interest.287 Thus, pre-bankruptcy creditors 
would not be left uncompensated. Section 1129 (b) of the US Bankruptcy Code 
provides details of a number of conditions in which a plan may be approved by the 
court despite the objections of a particular class of creditors. In this regard, 
dissenting creditors are protected by the ‘best interest’ test- in which the opposing 
creditor must receive at least as much under the plan as it would be if the company 
was sent into liquidation- and a ‘feasibility test’- whereby the debtor company must 
be able to implement its commitments as stated in the plan-.288 Further, each 
priority claim must receive special treatment unless the claim holder accepts 
otherwise and at least one class of creditors must accept the plan.289 It is worth 
noting that it is not easy to cram-down the dissenting class of creditors since all the 
above conditions must be met. This leads an American commentator to state that 
“the cram-down standards appear to be simple, but the appearance is 
deceiving”.290 
     However, in England, there are no specific conditions for approving a 
reorganisation plan and the court is given the discretion to determine whether a 
plan should be approved or not. For instance, in approving a scheme of 
                                                          
287
 As stated above, under US Bankruptcy Code a strong protection given to a secured creditor in 
which a plan may be confirmed over the dissented secured creditor as long as the creditor is given 
“adequate protection”. 
288
 Sections 1129 (a) (7) (A) (ii) & 1129 (a) (11) of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
289
 Ibid, sections 1129 (a) (9) & 1129 (a) (10). 
290
 Klee K., ‘All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code’, 
(1979) 53 A.B.L.J. 133, p. 156. In this article, Klee examined the provisions of cram down under the 
US Bankruptcy Code by providing fourteen examples which demonstrate the complexity of such 
concept in reality. 
168 
 
arrangement, the court normally takes into account three factors.291 First, the court 
must establish that the procedural requirements, e.g. the composition of classes, 
have been met.292 Secondly, the court must be satisfied that the classes were 
justly represented by those who attended the meeting,293 e.g. the majority acted 
bona fide and that there was no harassment of minorities.294 Thirdly, the court must 
be satisfied that the terms of the scheme itself are fair.295 
3.5 Evaluating Remarks 
     From the above discussion, it is shown that the US rescue regime is mainly 
focused on Chapter 11 reorganisation procedures,296 while in England there are a 
number of insolvency proceedings that can be used to rescue the distressed 
enterprises: namely, administration and company voluntary arrangement 
proceedings, with and without moratorium, under the Insolvency Act 1986 and 
scheme of arrangement proceedings under Sections 895-9 of the Companies Act 
2006.297 It is argued that Chapter 11 opted for the ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
business reorganisation since all businesses regardless of their size, small, 
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medium or large, are subject to Chapter 11.298 However, this thesis argues that 
such a description is rather exaggerated particularly after the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, whereby 
small firms are allowed to get through Chapter 11 more quickly and less 
expensively. Thus, this thesis argues that even though it is a single regime, in 
reality, Chapter 11 offers a ‘two sizes’ reorganisation rule in which special 
procedures available for small businesses differ from those designed for medium 
and large businesses. However, this is in contrast with the situation in England 
where there is a separate insolvency regime designed for small businesses, 
namely CVA with moratorium.299 Although this regime is only designed for small 
companies, they are free to opt for administration, CVA without moratorium or 
scheme of arrangement proceedings. In opting for CVA without moratorium or 
scheme of arrangement, both small and large companies will lose the benefit of 
staying creditors’ actions and, as a consequence, the door will be opened for 
secured creditors to enforce their securities without having regard for the interests 
of other creditors. Thus, in order to benefit from such a stay both small, if they 
opted not to use CVA with moratorium, and large businesses are advised to go 
through administration proceedings which might lead to either CVA or scheme of 
arrangement procedures.300 Having stated that whereas in the US there is a single 
bankruptcy regime, and in England there are various insolvency proceedings, this 
thesis asserts that the US bankruptcy system provides more consistency and 
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coherence than is the case under the English system. Having in place a single 
bankruptcy regime for both small and large companies, with special rules applying 
to small companies, is better than having in place more than three bankruptcy 
proceedings, even though each of them has its own characteristic, as explained 
above. 
     Further, as discussed above,301 the difference between Chapter 11 and 
administration proceedings is that in England once the administrator is appointed 
the management of the company will be displaced unless the administrator thinks 
otherwise.302 In the US, the notion of debtor-in-possession is adopted303 which 
provides some sort of encouragement to directors to apply for Chapter 11 once 
they sense a financial crisis.304 Such a notion is also adopted during CVA305 and 
scheme of arrangement procedures in England,306 although under CVA the 
management runs the company under the supervision of an insolvency 
practitioner. Even though leaving the previous management in control without any 
kind of supervision has its merits,307 it might lead to a number of undesirable 
consequences, such as overinvestment and losing creditors’ trust.308 In this regard, 
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it is believed309 that leaving the management in place while nominating a person to 
oversee their conduct provides a level of credibility and assurance for creditors. 
This approach is suitable to be adopted by the Omani legislator.310 As will be 
shown in the next chapter, in Oman, during bankruptcy proceedings, the 
management is displaced and the bankruptcy trustee will run the business of the 
debtor.311 However, one of the main issues with the current Omani bankruptcy 
regime is that the bankruptcy trustee need not be qualified to run the business of 
the debtor since he/she is not required to hold any certain qualifications.312 Thus, 
combining the experience of both England and the US in this particular area is 
desired, that is to say, keeping the management in place to run the business during 
bankruptcy processes while appointing a bankruptcy trustee to oversee their 
conduct and raise any concerns to a bankruptcy judge.313  
     In addition, imposing a stay on creditors’ actions is a feature of both the US 
Chapter 11 and administration proceedings in England.314 Such a stay results in 
easing the process of rescuing the company since the company’s assets are 
protected. Some of the theories discussed above, such as the creditors’ bargain,315 
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the multiple values316 and the explicit value theories,317 highlighted the importance 
of moratorium. For instance, Jackson views bankruptcy law as a response to a 
‘common pool problem’ which bankruptcy law addresses by replacing a mandatory 
mechanism of debt collection instead of the individual debt collection scheme that 
is in place outside the bankruptcy system.318 However, staying creditors’ claims is 
a prerequisite of any compulsory debt collection scheme.319 It is worth noting that 
one of the deficiencies of CVA and scheme of arrangement proceedings in 
England is lack of a moratorium.320 In order to overcome this deficiency, 
companies are encouraged to have recourse to the administration procedure which 
can be used as a bridge to conclude a CVA or scheme of arrangement. Hence, this 
thesis argues that it is crucial for any bankruptcy law worldwide to embody such a 
notion, otherwise the process of rehabilitating the debtor company will be 
frustrated. As will be shown in the next chapter,321 under the current bankruptcy 
regimes in Oman, secured creditors are able to pursue their claims during 
bankruptcy proceedings which hinders any attempt to rescue the business of the 
debtor and which results in wasting the assets of the debtor.  
     Furthermore, it is necessary for any distressed company to have sufficient 
funding to continue its operation; otherwise liquidating its affairs is inevitable.322 
However, companies in financial crisis are normally short of money, and as a 
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consequence, access to new financing is required.323 Granting a loan for a 
distressed firm is a risky business, and as a result, any lender needs to be assured 
that he/she is sufficiently protected.324 In this regard, the US Chapter 11 is 
perceived to be an example of this sort where a new lender is assured by granting 
him/her a super priority status.325 Nonetheless, granting a super priority status to 
the new lender means that the pre-bankruptcy entitlement will be affected. This is, 
as explained in the previous chapter, 326 against the view of the supporters of the 
creditors’ bargain theory.327 Even though they accept the ideas of having a 
compulsory debt collection scheme and imposing a stay on creditors’ action, they 
state that bankruptcy law must respect the pre-bankruptcy ordering of entitlements 
by translating pre-bankruptcy assets and liabilities into the bankruptcy pool.328 
However, since the supporters of the communitarian and the multiple values 
theories view bankruptcy law as having a wider goal other than maximising the 
return of the creditors, altering pre-bankruptcy entitlements is acceptable.329 This is 
the case under the US Chapter 11 where a secured creditor is taken over by the 
new lender. In England, a secured creditor will not be taken over and the new 
lender is not granted a super priority status, but rather his/her loan is considered as 
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administrator expenses.330 It is worth noting that even though in the US a new 
lender is granted super priority status, pre-bankruptcy creditors are not left 
unprotected.331 Hence, this thesis strongly supports the idea that it is necessary for 
any bankruptcy law to embody within its articles some provisions that regulate 
access to new financing.332 However, such access needs to be restricted, 
otherwise a window for abuse will be opened. While allowing access to new 
financing, pre-bankruptcy creditors need to be assured that their securities are 
protected. On the other hand, secured creditors are required not to be greedy, but 
rather to provide a sense of flexibility to facilitate a rescue process which might 
have an impact on all creditors, secured and unsecured. Nevertheless, it is of great 
importance to stress the fact that it is not sufficient to allow access to new funding.  
Instead there should also be a mechanism in place whereby the rights of secured 
creditors are not prejudiced. Hence, a balance should be struck and, in this regard, 
lessons can be learned from the experience of the US where new financing cannot 
be authorised unless it is proven that a pre-petition secured creditor is adequately 
protected against loss.333  
     Moreover, cramming-down dissenting creditors or a class of creditors is a 
feature of both the American and English bankruptcy regimes.334 However, the 
status in England differs from that of the US.335 While in England the court is given 
total discretion in determining whether dissenting creditors are crammed-down or 
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not, in the US there are a number of statutory conditions which have to be met 
before enforcing a reorganisation plan over the wishes of objecting creditors.336 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that without such a mechanism, it is hard 
to rescue the company since it is impossible to unite all the creditors. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter,337 one of the main drawbacks of the current Omani 
bankruptcy regime is that secured creditors are not allowed to participate in voting 
unless they relinquish their rights. Also, once the plan is approved by the required 
majority, secured creditors will not be bound by such a plan and they can pursue 
their claims. Hence, this thesis maintains that it is important for the Omani 
legislator to allow secured creditors to participate in voting and to adopt the notion 
of cramming-down dissenting creditors in order to ease the process of rescuing the 
business. However, it should be stressed that cramming down dissenting creditors 
does not mean prejudicing their interests, but rather their interests should be 
protected. In this regard, this thesis argues that combining the experience of both 
England and US is advisable. Granting bankruptcy courts discretion in determining 
their rulings based on the facts of each case, as well as providing the details in 
bankruptcy law of a number of conditions in which a plan may be approved by the 
court despite the objection of a particular class of creditors is justifiable.  
3.6 Conclusion 
     This chapter discussed the features of both English insolvency proceedings and 
American bankruptcy proceedings. It started by highlighting briefly the various 
available insolvency proceedings in England, namely administration, receivership, 
                                                          
336
 Ibid. 
337
 See below sections 4.6.2.5 & 4.8.3. 
176 
 
CVA and scheme of arrangement under the Insolvency Act 1986, with its 2000 and 
2002 amendments, and the Company Act 2006.338 Also, the main features of the 
US Chapter 11 were explained.339 Then, this chapter proceeded by analysing a 
number of issues to see how such issues are dealt with under both England and 
the US system.340 The issues discussed were whether management should be 
displaced or not during reorganisation processes, what the merits and drawbacks 
are of such displacement,341 the notion of staying creditors’ actions 
(moratorium),342 the issue of post-petition new financing,343 the voting system and 
the concept of cram down.344 From the above discussion, it can be concluded that 
even though there are some similarities between the two jurisdictions, there are a 
number of divergences. As stated above,345 such divergences are due to cultural 
differences and to the principles underpinning bankruptcy/ insolvency proceedings 
in each country.346 
     The outcomes of this chapter’s discussion will be used in proposing a 
bankruptcy regime to be adopted by the Omani legislator. In this regard, the Omani 
legislator should take lessons from the experience of both England and US. 
Adopting the concept of ‘rescue culture’ is of great importance in any modern 
bankruptcy system. However, adopting such a concept without taking into account 
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 See above section 3.2. 
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 See above section 3.3. 
340
 See above section 3.4. 
341
 See above section 3.4.1 
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 See above section 3.4.2 
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 See above section 3.4.3 
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 See above section 3.4.4. 
345
 See above pp. 139-141. 
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the above-discussed issues is not enough. Hence, preventing creditors from 
enforcing their securities during bankruptcy proceedings, injecting new financing in 
order to ease a rescue process and giving courts the discretion to approve the 
rescue plan over the wishes of dissenting creditors are some features of a desired 
insolvency regime. 
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Chapter Four: An Overview of the Current Bankruptcy Regime in Oman 
4.1 Introduction 
     Whether having a separate bankruptcy/ insolvency law or not, each country has 
some rules designed to deal with the insolvency of traders.1 However, the types of 
bankruptcy procedures available differ from country to country.2 While some 
                                                             
1
 Some countries have a separate bankruptcy/ insolvency law to regulate the insolvency and 
liquidation of traders. Examples of such laws are the US Bankruptcy Act of 1978, the UK Insolvency 
Act 1986 & the UK Enterprise Act of 2002, French Business Safeguard Act of 2006, German 
Company Restructuring Facilitation Act of 2012 and Enterprise Insolvency Law of the People’s 
Republic of China of 2007. However, countries, such as Oman, UAE, Egypt and Jordan, do not 
have a separate bankruptcy law. Rather, their Commercial Codes and Commercial Companies 
Laws provide a framework for the bankruptcy of traders and liquidation of companies: see, for 
example, Oman’s Commercial Code of 1990 (Articles 579-786), Oman’s Commercial Companies 
Law of 1974 (Articles 14-45), UAE Commercial Transaction Law of 1993 (Articles 645-900), UAE 
Commercial Companies Law of 1984 (Articles 281-312), Egyptian Commercial Act of 1999 (Articles 
550-772 ), Egyptian Joint Stock Companies, Partnerships Limited by Shares & Limited Liability 
Companies Law of 1998 (Articles 137-154), Jordanian Commercial Act of 1966 (Articles 290-477), 
Jordanian Companies Law of 1997 (Articles 32-40 & 252-272 & 285). 
2
 As stated above (sections 3.2 & 3.3), in England there are five insolvency proceedings and in the 
US there are two bankruptcy procedures. In Germany there are two insolvency procedures: 
insolvency proceedings leading to liquidation and insolvency proceedings leading to an insolvency 
plan. The procedures currently available in France for companies in financial distress are liquidation 
proceedings, mandate and hoc proceedings, conciliation proceedings, safeguard proceedings and 
redressement judiciaire; for more description of various insolvency proceedings in these 
jurisdictions: see O’kane D. & Bawlf P., ‘Global Guide to Corporate Bankruptcy: A Comprehensive 
Guide to Corporate Bankruptcy and a Survey of Global Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes’, (Nomura 
International, July 2010), pp. 45-79, available at: 
 http://www.scribd.com/doc/59845050/Bankruptcy-Guide. accessed on 19/02/2014; in Oman, UAE, 
Egypt and Jordan there are three types of bankruptcy proceedings: bankruptcy proceedings, 
liquidation procedures for companies and preventive composition procedures; for discussion of 
common features of some Arab countries’ bankruptcy laws: see Uttamchandani M., ‘No Way Out: 
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countries have limited insolvency proceedings, others have various insolvency 
proceedings.3 As discussed in the previous chapter,4 for instance, in England there 
are five insolvency proceedings: administration, administrative receivership, CVA, 
scheme of arrangement and liquidation proceedings, whereas in the US there are 
two bankruptcy proceedings, Chapter 11 reorganisation and Chapter 7 liquidation. 
However, as shown in the previous chapter,5 the features of each of these 
proceedings differ from the others. For instance, whereas under the US Chapter 11 
directors retain their position,6 they are displaced during administration procedures 
in England.7 Also, whereas the purpose of the receivership proceeding in England 
is to protect the interests of a floating charge holder by appointing a receiver,8 the 
purpose of both the administration regime9 and the US Chapter 1110 are, generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
The Lack of Efficient Insolvency Regimes in the MENA Region’, (March 2011), Policy Research 
Working Paper 5609, the World Bank, available at: 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-5609. accessed on 19/02/2014; Also,  
McNally R., ‘Insolvency Regimes in the MENA Region’, available at: 
 http://www.menacitylawyers.com/uploaded/publication_5feb3dd1-39ef-47bc-ad7d-
4716d880dce5_.pdf. accessed on 19/02/2014. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 See above section 3.2 & 3.3. 
5
 See above section 3.4. 
6
 See above section 3.4.1.2. 
7
 See above section 3.4.1.1. 
8
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 230 (2); Goode R., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (4
th
 
edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), p. 320; see above section 3.2.2. 
9
 Keay A. & Walton P., Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, (Longman, 2003), p. 92; Goode 
R., above 8, p. 394; Okoli P., ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for a 
Delicate Balancing Act’, (2012) 23 (2) I.C.C.L.R. 61-65, p. 62. 
10
 Dahl H., ‘USA: Bankruptcy under Chapter 11’, (1992) 5 I.B.L.J. 555, p. 555; McCormack G., 
‘Control and Corporate Rescue: An Anglo- American Evaluation’, (2007) 56 (3) I.C.L.Q. 505, p. 517; 
Coleman M. & Kirschner M., ‘The Case in Favour of the US Chapter 11 Reorganisation System: 
Debunking the Myths and Mischaracterisations, (1993) 4 I.C.C.L.R. 363, p. 363. 
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speaking, to rehabilitate the business of the company in order to protect the 
interest of all creditors.    
     At present, Oman does not have a separate bankruptcy law and in dealing with 
the bankruptcy of traders11 both the Omani Commercial Code of 1990 and Omani 
Commercial Companies Law of 1974 incorporate some articles.12 Even though 
these laws regulate the bankruptcy of companies, the more modern corporate 
restructuring or reorganisation regimes which appear, for example, in the 
bankruptcy/ insolvency laws of England and US are not alternatives under current 
Omani Law.13 As will be shown below,14 although the composition (arrangement) 
scheme with creditors is one of the alternatives available under Omani law, a 
number of factors lead to its inefficiency.15 As stated in the previous chapter,16 in 
judging the efficiency of any bankruptcy regime, a number of criteria should be 
taken into account. The ease and speed of the proceedings, staying creditors' 
actions, the availability of new financing and adopting the notion of cram-down are 
all examples of such factors.17 As will be discussed below,18 most of these criteria 
are lacking under the current Omani bankruptcy regime. 
                                                             
11
 Refers to individual merchants and companies: see Article 16 of the Omani Commercial Code of 
1990. 
12
 Articles 579-786 of the Commercial Code & Articles 14-45 of the Commercial Companies Law. 
13
 See below section 4.3. 
14
 See below section 4.5.2.2. 
15
 See below section 4.6.2 & section 4.8.3. 
16
 See above section 3.4. 
17
 Tolmie F., Corporate and Personal Insolvency Law, (2
nd
 edition, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 64. 
18
 See below section 4.6.2. & section 4.8.3. 
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     The aim of this chapter is to assess the efficiency of Oman's bankruptcy system 
by identifying the reasons for its inadequacy in order to offer a particular proposal 
for future bankruptcy reform. However, this chapter will start by outlining Oman's 
current statutory framework for bankruptcy, then highlighting the bankruptcy 
regimes available for distressed traders; namely, bankruptcy proceedings, 
composition with creditors’ scheme, liquidation proceedings. The aim of this 
chapter is also to explore whether or not the composition with creditors’ scheme 
provides incentives for both debtor and creditor to opt for this particular regime.19 It 
is worth noting that in illustrating the strengths and weaknesses of Oman's 
bankruptcy regime, reference will be made to the experience of both England and 
the US as discussed in the previous chapter.   
4.2 Statutory Framework for Bankruptcy 
     As discussed in the first chapter,20 at present, Oman does not have a separate 
bankruptcy law. However, the Commercial Code of 1990 contains one chapter on 
the bankruptcy of traders and the Commercial Companies Law of 1974 governs 
companies’ liquidation procedures. Although the Omani Commercial Code has a 
detailed chapter on the bankruptcy of traders, a number of crucial issues are not 
regulated, which renders it incomplete.21 
     Further, although Oman is an Islamic country, Sharia law applies only in the 
absence of specific legislative provisions and of local or general bankruptcy 
                                                             
19
 See below section 4.8.3. 
20
 See above pp. 5-6. 
21
 See below sections 4.3 & 4.4. 
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customs.22 However, it is worth mentioning that before the issuance of the 
Commercial Law of 1990, reliance was on the principles of Sharia Law.23 Thus, 
bankruptcy declaration of trader was based on the concepts of Sharia.24 Under 
Sharia rules, once the debtor ceases paying his debts, he is normally given respite 
as recommended by the Holy Quran: ‘If the debtor is in difficulty grant him a time till 
it is easy for him to repay’.25 Nonetheless, if the debtor refuses to pay, despite his 
solvency, the judge may order to put him in jail until he changes his attitude and 
the judge may order the sale of the debtor’s properties to the extent of the debts 
which have already fallen due.26 
     However, it is important to note that bankruptcy provisions in the Commercial 
Code may not apply to companies that are incorporated or shared by the 
government or other public bodies and institutions,27 even though they engaged in 
commercial activities.28 Article 19 of the Commercial Code states that “companies 
incorporated or shared by the government or other public bodies and institutions 
and which are essentially engaged in commercial activity are, apart from 
                                                             
22
 Article 5 “If no legislative provisions exist, the rules of custom shall apply and local custom take 
precedence over general custom. In the absence of custom, the provisions of the noble Islamic 
Sharia shall apply and thereafter the rules of justice’’: ibid. 
23
 Nabil S., The General Principles of Saudi Arabian and Oman Company Laws: Statutes and 
Sharia, (Namara Publications, 1981), p. 108.  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 The Holy Quran: 2:280; AL-Salimi A., Jawhar AL-Nizam, (Qatar House Publisher, 2002), p. 399. 
26
 AL-Salimi A., above 25, p. 399; Nabil S., above 23, p. 110.  
27
 Article 19 of the CC. 
28
 Also, this was the case in Egypt where public companies are excluded. However, after the 
issuance of Egyptian Public Companies Law in 1991 such exclusion was abolished: see Darmaki 
S., Bankruptcy Procedures under Commercial Code in Oman, (Sultan Qaboos University Press, 
2013), pp. 3-5. 
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bankruptcy, governed by the provisions related to a trader under this Act”. It is 
argued that the reason for such exclusion is that the bankruptcy of these 
companies would diminish the esteem of the public authority.29 In addition, it is 
claimed that usually the reason for setting up government companies is not to gain 
profits, but rather the implementation of national development plans might lead to 
the establishment of such companies.30 For instance, in partnership with private 
sectors, the involvement of the public sector in Oman is mainly in infrastructure 
projects, such as  communications, power, transportation and water supply.31 
Hence, even though these companies carry out commercial activities, they are 
excluded from bankruptcy provisions contained in the Commercial Code since the 
government has shares in these companies. However, in this regard, this thesis 
argues that excluding such companies from bankruptcy may harm the interests of 
secured and unsecured creditors. In this case, creditors are unable to initiate 
bankruptcy proceedings if these companies do not pay their due commercial debts. 
This means that these companies will pursue their business, even though the 
financial affairs of these companies are so disturbed as to lead to a suspension of 
payments. Thus, it is crucial to regulate the bankruptcy of such companies or at 
least to establish some rules whereby these companies, subject to viability, can be 
reconstructed or reorganised in the event of financial distress. 
                                                             
29
 Ibid, p. 5.  
30
 Ali J., ‘The Legal Concepts of Public Companies’, (1963) E.J.P.S. 90, p. 91. 
31
 See, Oman Investment and Business Guide: Strategic and Practical Information, published by 
(Ibpus.com, International Business Publication, USA, 2012), p. 108. 
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4.3 Available Bankruptcy Proceedings 
     In Oman, the formal available bankruptcy procedures for traders under financial 
distress are bankruptcy proceedings,32 preventive composition with creditors33 and 
liquidation procedures34 which are designed merely for companies. Unless a debtor 
is able to propose a composition or scheme acceptable to its creditors, the debtor 
will be declared bankrupt and, as a result, the debtor company will be liquidated. 
     The aims of these bankruptcy proceedings differ. While the objective of the 
liquidation proceedings is the dissolution of the company, the ultimate objective of 
the bankruptcy proceedings is to release the bankrupt from his debts and liabilities 
so that the trader can begin a new business with a ‘clean slate’, free from the 
burden of the debts.35 However, such a release normally begins after five years 
have elapsed from the day of the bankruptcy declaration or earlier if it is proven 
that the debtor has paid his debts.36 On the other hand, the main aim of the 
scheme of arrangement, as it stands today, is to allow the trader to escape the 
consequences of an adjudication of its bankruptcy.37 As will be shown below, the 
scheme of arrangement is far from the concept of rescue culture since the main 
aim of this regime is not to rescue the business of the company.38 Instead, its aim 
is to give the trader the opportunity to escape the consequences of being bankrupt.  
                                                             
32
 Articles 579-752 of the CC. 
33
 Ibid, Articles 753-783. 
34
 Articles 14-27 of the Commercial Companies Law 1974. 
35
 For the aim of bankruptcy procedures under Omani Law see: Al-Hinai S., ‘Preventive 
Composition Scheme’, (Master Degree Dissertation, Sultan Qaboos University, 2010), pp. 7-11. 
36
 Article 752 of the CC.  
37
 See Al-Hinai S., above 35, pp. 13-16; Article 753 of the CC. 
38
 See below section 4.5.3. 
186 
 
4.4 General Features of the Current Bankruptcy Regime 
     This thesis believes that before embarking on the assessment of bankruptcy 
procedures in Oman, it is important to highlight the main characteristics of the 
current Omani bankruptcy regime. Thus, the aim of this section is to explore a 
number of features under the current bankruptcy system in Oman. First, an 
identification of the bankruptcy test that is currently recognised by the Commercial 
Code will be dealt with. Then, the position of the bankrupt trader upon the 
bankruptcy declaration will be examined. Also, the issues of creditors’ ranking and 
staying creditors’ claims will be explored. In addition, this section will demonstrate 
that one of the main issues of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is that 
officers administering bankruptcy processes are not required to be qualified 
bankruptcy practitioners. Finally, the treatment of small bankruptcies and the 
position of employees will be analysed. 
A- Definition of Bankruptcy 
     The Commercial Code does not have an explicit definition of the word 
bankruptcy. However, the circumstances in which a trader might be regarded as a 
bankrupt are stated. Article 579 of the Commercial Code states that any merchant 
whose financial affairs are in difficulty and who ceases to pay due debts might be 
bankrupt. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the nature of the debt that the 
trader fails to pay must be a commercial debt.39 
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 Article 579 of the CC; see ‘A Set of the Supreme Court Judgments in Oman: 1999’, Commercial 
Department, case number 44/99. 
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     In some jurisdictions,40 the notion of ‘inability to pay debt’ is examined by 
making reference to two principles tests of bankruptcy.41 For instance, in England, 
the cash flow and balance sheet of insolvency are tests of inability to pay debts.42 
“A company is insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due (‘cash flow’ 
insolvency); it is also insolvent if its liabilities exceed its assets (‘balance sheet’ 
insolvency).”43 Both cash flow and balance sheet tests are clearly stated in Section 
123 (definition of inability to pay debts) of the Insolvency Act 1986 where it is 
stated that: 
(1) A company is deemed unable to pay its debts… (e) if it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due. 
(2) A company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that the value of the company’s assets is less than 
the amount of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent and 
prospective liabilities.  
     In Oman, it is unclear what sort of tests are relied on, since both the 
Commercial Code and the Commercial Companies Law are silent in explaining 
what is meant by the ‘inability to pay debt’.44 Even though cessation of payment is 
                                                             
40
 For Example, section 123 (1) (e) & 2 of the Insolvency Act 1986; Germany (Section 17 of the 
Insolvency Act 1999 ‘Insolvenzordung’); the UK (section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986). 
41
 Day W., ‘Taking Balance-Sheet Insolvency Beyond the Point of No Return’, (2013) 72 (3) C.L.J. 
515; Nyombi C., ‘Employees’ Rights during Insolvency’, (2013) I.J.L.M. 417, p. 418; Henderson D., 
‘Inability to Pay Debts: Where Are We Now’, (2011) 24 (4) I.I. 54, pp. 54-55. 
42
 Birds J. & Boyle A., Boyle & Birds’ Company Law, (Bristol, Jordans, 2004), p. 687; 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 See Al-Hinai S., above 35, p. 122.  
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used as a crucial element in determining the state of bankruptcy, the Commercial 
Code does not include an objective definition of the word cessation.45 Thus, this 
thesis argues that this ‘inability to pay due debts’ test is ambiguous and gives rise 
to a number of crucial questions. First, is a single default of payment of a due 
commercial debt to a single creditor sufficient to provoke the bankruptcy of the 
debtor ‘cash flow test’ or is an assessment of the debtor’s assets required for the 
‘balance sheet test’? Second, in the absence of such a specific definition, what 
factors should be taken into account by the court in determining the cessation of 
payment? In Oman, in one of its judgments the high court stated that “regardless of 
the amount of unpaid debt, the court has the right to declare the bankruptcy of any 
trader even though he ceases to pay a single commercial debt”.46 Similarly, in 2008 
a Dubai Supreme Court ruled that a single unpaid commercial debt is enough to 
provoke the insolvency of a company.47 Nonetheless, this thesis is of the opinion 
that the main deficiencies of these rulings are that they do not make a distinction 
between an honest and dishonest trader. Also, these rulings might create 
uncertainty in commercial life. Sometimes the company experiences a temporary 
financial difficulty that causes the cessation of payment. Thus, provoking the 
bankruptcy of the trader due to a single unpaid commercial debt without taking into 
account the temporary nature of the crisis could lead to uncertainty. As a result, 
viable businesses might be declared bankrupt due to the non-payment of a single 
                                                             
45
 This is the case also in the UAE: see, ‘Legal and Practical Issues for Restructuring and 
Insolvency in the UAE’, Q.J.INSOL.I, (1
st
 Quarter 2010).  
46
 ‘A Set of the Supreme Court Judgments in Oman: 1992’, Commercial Department, case number 
14/92. 
47
 See Boustany M., ‘UAE Insolvency Law Exists’, (2010) 180 the In-House Lawyer 63, p. 63.  
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transaction. Further, these kinds of judgments would open the door for many 
bankruptcy applications to be filed and this, as a result, would over-load the courts.  
     Further, the Commercial Code states that “the company may be declared 
bankrupt even if it does not cease payment of its commercial debts”.48 Thus, if the 
court senses instability in the business of the company, it has the discretion to 
declare the company bankrupt. However, a state of bankruptcy exists only on a 
court judgment declaring the bankruptcy of the trader, and failure to pay debts 
before the issue of such decision shall have no legal effect on the trader unless the 
law provides otherwise.49 
     It should be noted that the onus of proving the debtor’s failure to pay a due 
commercial debt lies on the creditor who submits a bankruptcy application.50 Article 
582 of the Commercial Code states that “any creditor may apply for his trading 
debtor to be declared bankrupt if the debtor fails to pay a due commercial debt… 
provided that the creditor proves that the debtor has failed to pay a due commercial 
debt”. Nonetheless, it is not easy to prove such a failure, unless the creditor has 
knowledge of the debtor’s overall financial situation. In this regard, it can be 
asserted that such a requirement has the effect of closing the door on any 
aggressive creditor who submits a bankruptcy application of his debtor without 
having clear evidence. However, the court has full discretion in determining 
whether the state of bankruptcy of the trader is declared or not. In affirming this 
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 Article 682 of the CC. 
49
 Ibid, Article 580. 
50
 Ibid, Article 582. 
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discretion, the court51 has stated that even though the trader fails to pay a due 
commercial debt to the appealing bank, the court has freedom of choice in 
determining the state of bankruptcy. The facts of each case play a central role in 
guiding the court to the appropriate decision.52 In this regard, this thesis argues 
that giving the court such discretion is important since it is not satisfactory to 
declare the bankruptcy of an honest trader who fails to pay a single cheque.  
B- Handcuffing of the Debtor in Bankruptcy 
     Oman’s bankruptcy system puts pressure on debtors to prevent them from 
harming the rights of their creditors.53 The handcuffing of a bankrupt is immediately 
effective from the day in which the judgment of declaration of bankruptcy is 
issued.54 In this regard, the debtor may not leave Oman until court permission is 
sought and the court is given the power to place him under supervision and bar 
him from leaving Oman.55 However, courts in Oman are not allowed to seize the 
bankrupt debtor.56 This is a departure from Sharia principles where the Sharia 
judge is given the right to send the debtor to prison if certain conditions have been 
met.57 
                                                             
51
 ‘A Set of the Supreme Court Judgments in Oman: 1997’, Commercial Department, case number 
173/97. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Darmaki S., above 28, p. 93. 
54
 Article 604 of the CC. 
55
 Ibid, Article 603. 
56
 This is the case also under Bahraini and Kuwaiti law. However, this is in contrast to the case in 
Egypt, UAE and Jordan where the court has the right to seize the bankrupt: see Ghanayem H., 
‘Handcuffing of a Bankrupt’, (1993) 7 J.S.L. 375.  
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     Moreover, the Commercial Code imposes upon the bankrupt various civil 
disabilities58 including prohibition, for not less than a year, from becoming a director 
or a member of the management board of any company. Also, the bankrupt is 
forbidden from applying for a public job or position; however, seeking a private job 
is allowed.59 It is worth noting that, unlike the case in Egypt60 and UAE,61 in Oman 
the bankrupt is not deprived from practising his/her political rights.62 Thus, he/she 
can vote and elect him/herself in the consultancy councils and municipal councils.63 
The bankrupt is also banned from administering, litigating or disposing of property 
and assigning it to a trustee (administrator of bankruptcy).64 
     This thesis takes the view that the rationale for this restriction is that the debtor 
is considered as a wrongdoer who deserves to be punished. The debtor is not 
viewed as an economic actor that might be affected by any financial crisis. 
Whether the failure of the debtor’s business is attributed to external or internal 
factors, deliberately or unintentionally, the above-mentioned restrictions will take 
place.  
     The bankrupt, except in cases of fraudulent or negligent bankruptcy, will retain 
the freedom to practise the above-mentioned restrictions after five years have 
elapsed from the termination of the bankruptcy.65 Furthermore, according to Article 
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 Article 602 of the CC. 
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60
 Article 588 of the Egyptian Commercial Code of 1999. 
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 Article 683 of the UAE Commercial Transaction Law of 1993. 
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 Article 602 of the CC. 
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 Darmaki S., above 28, p. 94. 
64
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192 
 
743 of the Commercial Code, the bankrupt may retain his rights before the elapse 
of this period if one of the following circumstances applies: (i) where the bankrupt 
secures a composition with the creditors and implements the conditions thereof. 
Such provision also applies to a general liability partner in a company that is 
declared bankrupt where the said partner obtains composition with the company’s 
creditors and implements the conditions thereof; and (ii) where the debtor proves 
that the creditors have fully released him/ her from all debts.66 
C- Ranking of Creditors 
     The notion of ‘absolute priority’- whereby secured creditors are paid first, 
followed by general creditors and then shareholders if any residuals remain- is not 
preserved in the current Oman’s bankruptcy regime. In distributing the assets of a 
bankrupt company, all expenses of the trustee or liquidator, including 
remuneration, must be paid from the assets of the bankrupt company before any 
distribution is made to creditors.67 Then, according to the Law on Recovery of 
Government Debts of 1994, any debt owed to the government, even if it is not 
secured and arises late, has top priority and must be paid before the secured 
creditors are compensated.68 Also, employees’ salaries or wages enjoy a priority 
and have to be settled before paying the debt of secured creditors.69 Article 628 of 
the CC states that: 
     “Having asked permission from the judge in bankruptcy, the receiver is, within 
the ten days following issue of the adjudication of bankruptcy, to pay out of such 
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 Ibid, Article 743. 
67
 Ibid, Article 678 and article 734; Article 24 of the Commercial Companies Law 1974.  
68
 Article 3 of Recovery of Government Debts Act 1994. 
69
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monies available to him and irrespective of there being any other debt the wages 
and salaries for fifteen days for workers, thirty days for staff and servants, and 
ninety days for seamen due prior to the issue of the adjudication of bankruptcy… if 
the receiver does not hold the necessary monies therefore, payment must be made 
from the first monies incoming, even if there are other debts that have precedence 
since they amount to a lien.”  
     As discussed in the previous chapter,70 in the US in order to facilitate the 
continuing operation of the business, the court is given discretion to sanction post- 
petition debt financing, usually with super priority status over existing claims.71 
However, this kind of discretion is not given to courts in Oman. The judges are not 
allowed to grant a super priority status to any lender after the commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings. Pre-bankruptcy secured creditors will have precedence 
over any creditors, except the debt owed to the government and the salaries or 
wages of employees. Hence, as will be discussed further,72 this thesis argues that 
pre-bankruptcy rights of secured creditors are not well protected in Oman since 
priority is given to government debts73 and to employees’ and servants’ 
salaries/wages.74 
D- Stay on Creditors’ Claims (Moratorium) 
     Easing the process of rescuing/ liquidating the assets of the company requires a 
legal mechanism whereby secured and unsecured creditors are prevented from 
commencing or continuing legal claims against the company and secured creditors 
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 See above section 3.4.3. 
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 Henoch B., ‘Post-Petition Financing: Is There Life After Debt?’, (1991) 8 B.D.J. 575, p. 577. 
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 See below section 5.5.2.2. 
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 Article 3 of Recovery of Government Debts Act 1994. 
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are prevented from seizing assets of the company and enforcing their rights for a 
limited period of time.75 Therefore, in order to protect the assets of the company 
and to facilitate insolvency proceedings, both England and the US insolvency laws 
impose a stay on creditors’ claims.76 
     In Oman, upon the issuance of an adjudication of bankruptcy, actions brought 
by ordinary creditors are stayed and these creditors may not take individual 
enforcement proceedings against the assets of the bankrupt, nor may they finalise 
proceedings begun before the issuance of the adjudication of bankruptcy.77 
However, secured creditors may bring and continue actions against the bankrupt 
company and may enforce or continue the enforcement against the assets that 
guarantees their rights.78 
     In addition, if the company wishes to avoid the consequences of the 
adjudication of bankruptcy, it is able to negotiate a composition or settlement with 
its creditors.79 In this case and upon the court issuing a decision to commence 
composition procedures, all bankruptcy proceedings, other claims and enforcement 
actions relating to the trader are automatically stayed.80 However, before the 
issuance of such a decision, the court may make protective orders in order to 
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 Jackson T., ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement, and the Creditors’ Bargain’, (1982) 91 
Y.L.J. 857, p. 862; Goode R., above 8, pp. 64-65. 
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 See above section 3.4.2. 
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preserve the trader’s assets until the application for settlement is determined.81 
This is similar to the interim moratorium that is found in England.82 
E- Persons Administering Bankruptcy 
     Finch stated that “corporate insolvency processes are not mere bodies of rules: 
they are elaborate procedures in which legal and administrative, formal and 
informal rules, policies and practices are put into effect by different actors”.83 Thus, 
it is important that those players should have cultural, institutional, disciplinary and 
professional backgrounds which influence their work.84 In England, for instance, 
insolvency practitioners are required to have a professional qualification from a 
recognised professional body, the Secretary of State or a competent authority 
designated by the Secretary of State.85 In the US, ‘The United States Trustee 
Program’,86 established in 1979, consists of 21 trustee regions covering almost all 
of the United States. It is a competent division within the Department of Justice 
responsible for overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases and private 
trustees, as well as appointing bankruptcy professionals (lawyers, trustees) and 
investigating bankruptcy fraud.87 
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     In Oman, the Commercial Code creates three types of bankruptcy officials who 
are authorised to control bankruptcy proceedings.88 These officials are the 
‘bankruptcy judge’, the ‘trustee/ trustees’ and the ‘supervisor/ supervisors’ 
appointed by the court from amongst creditors. A ‘bankruptcy judge’ is a court 
appointed official who is empowered to oversee the whole bankruptcy process and 
make all the necessary arrangements for its completion.89 During bankruptcy 
processes, the bankruptcy judge appoints one or more trustees, provided that their 
number does not exceed three.90 The roles of the trustee, called liquidator of a 
company in the case of liquidation,91 are to administer, safeguard, realise and 
distribute the assets of the bankrupt.92 In order to ensure the neutrality of the 
trustee, it is stated that neither the spouse of the bankrupt nor relative or relative by 
marriage to the fourth generation may be appointed as a trustee.93 Also, the trustee 
must not be a person who was a partner, employee, accountant or agent of the 
bankrupt during the three years preceding the adjudication of bankruptcy.94 In 
addition, the powers vested in the supervisors include inspecting the balance sheet 
and report submitted by the trustee and assisting the adjudicator in supervising the 
work of the bankruptcy trustee.95 Further, it is worth noting that the bankruptcy 
adjudicator may at his own discretion, or at the request of the bankrupt or the 
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supervisor, order the dismissal or replacement of the trustee or a reduction in the 
number of trustees.96 In addition, the public prosecutor may also have a role in 
bankruptcy proceedings if any element of fraud is detected.97  
     Hence, under the current Omani bankruptcy regime, a number of bankruptcy 
officials play a central role in any bankruptcy case, starting with the judges who 
administer the whole bankruptcy law and ending with trustees who realise and 
distribute the assets of the bankrupt. These tasks which are performed by 
bankruptcy officials require expertise, skill and sufficient knowledge of various 
bankruptcy issues. However, one of the main issues with the current bankruptcy 
regime in Oman is that judges revolve between different courts, dealing with 
different subject matters and there are no specialised bankruptcy judges who deal 
only with bankruptcy cases. In addition, Oman does not have in place a regulation 
for bankruptcy trustees/ administrators nor there is a program whereby sufficient 
training for a number of professionals is provided. As a result, the trustee is not 
required to have a particular qualification nor he is required to obtain specific 
training. 
F- The Treatment of Small Bankruptcies 
     In order to ease the bankruptcy process, the Commercial Code provides special 
treatment to small bankruptcy cases.98 Small bankruptcies are defined by Article 
679 as bankruptcies where, after taking the inventory, the value of the bankrupt’s 
assets is less than ten thousand Omani Rials (approx. £15,800). In such cases, the 
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court may, at its own discretion or at the request of the trustee or a creditor, reduce 
the period of bankruptcy proceedings as it deems fit.99 Thus, the Commercial Code 
does not provide a specific time limit to finalise bankruptcy processes of small 
bankruptcy cases and full discretion is given to the court to determine the time 
based on the circumstances of each case. 
     It is worth noting that the above-mentioned treatment applies to all traders, 
whether a sole merchant, or a small, medium or large company100, as long as the 
value of the assets is less than the amount stipulated. Also, even if the value of the 
bankrupt’s assets is less than ten thousand Omani Rials, the court may decide that 
this special treatment will not be given.101 Thus, applying the normal procedures to 
small bankruptcy cases is one of the options that the court may use. This can be 
considered to be one of the issues with the current bankruptcy regime in Oman. 
Having in place detailed procedures to regulate these kinds of small bankruptcies 
is desirable.  
G- The Position of the Employees 
     As discussed in the previous chapter,102 both in England and the US insolvency 
regimes promote the concept of rescue culture. The aim of such a concept is to 
reorganise the distressed company instead of liquidating its affairs.103 Reorganising 
the business of the distressed company would have the effect of maximising the 
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welfare of all creditors.104 Saving the jobs of the company’s employees is one of 
the main benefits of rescue culture.105 However, if rescuing the company’s 
business is not economically viable, then liquidating its affairs is inevitable. 
Following bankruptcy, the employees are normally given special protection in 
regard to some of their entitlements.106 They are given priority over the secured 
and unsecured creditors. However, the amount that employees are able to claim as 
priority is limited and differs from one jurisdiction to another.107 For instance, in 
England, employees’ entitlements have preference and are ranked ahead of 
floating charge claims and general unsecured creditors.108 By statute they have a 
preference for four months of unpaid wages (up to a prescribed maximum limit per 
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employee of £800),109 and accrued holiday entitlements; unpaid pension 
contributions from the employer to a maximum of twelve months to state and 
occupational pension schemes; and unpaid levies on coal and steel production.110 
In the US, each employee is entitled to a maximum of US $4,650 in priority ranking 
and only entitlements which accrued in the 90 days prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition are claimable with priority.111 However, Chapter 11 contains no 
protection of existing terms and conditions of employment contracts during 
business transfers while the law in England provides protection in this regard.112 In 
England, employment contracts are transferred as part of a business transfer with 
existing employment rights remaining good against the transferor.113 
     In Oman, as in England and the US, in the event of an employer’s bankruptcy 
employees are given some kind of preferential protection. First of all, preference is 
given to the unpaid salaries and wages due for fifteen days for workers, thirty days 
for staff and servants and ninety days for seamen prior to the issue of the 
adjudication of bankruptcy.114 Oman’s Labour law also affirms such a preference 
by stating that the wages of the worker shall have priority over all debts owed by 
the employer except alimony115 which is adjudicated by Sharia Court.116 Unlike the 
case in England and the US, in Oman there is no limit set for the amount to be 
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paid. However, the restriction, as stated in the Commercial Code, is on the period 
in which this preferential treatment applies.117 Redundancy payments and accrued 
holiday entitlements are afforded no priority at all and, as a result, they are 
considered as unsecured debts. Further, according to Article 70 of the Social 
Insurance Law of 1991 unpaid pension contributions from the employer have 
preference over all debts owned by the employee and must be paid after 
government debts and judicial expenses have been paid. 
     It seems that various laws have granted priority status to a certain claimant. For 
example, Oman’s Labour Law of 2003 grants workers’ wages priority over 
government debts while Recovery of Government Debts of 1994 states that debt 
owned by the government, despite the fact that it is not secured and arose later, 
will have top priority and must be paid before secured creditors are compensated. 
Also, while the Social Insurance Law of 1991 grants preference, after paying 
government debts and judicial expenses, to unpaid pension contributions, the 
Personal Affairs Law of 1997 gives alimony top priority over all debts. In this case, 
and in determining the priority of each debt, the reliance is on courts. An interview 
with a High Court Judge118 reveals the fact that courts normally grant alimony and 
the wages of the employees’ priority over all government debts. It is believed that 
the reason behind this preference is that the government is viewed as a well-
pocketed entity and it is inappropriate to grant the debts of the government priority 
over the debts of alimony and employees.119 
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4.5. Bankruptcy Procedures 
     Under the current regime, bankruptcy procedures apply to companies with legal 
personality and to sole merchants.120 Thus, while liquidation procedures are 
designed merely for companies,121 bankruptcy procedures are designed for both 
sole merchants and companies. As will be shown below,122 if a company ceases to 
pay its debts, it may be declared bankrupt. Thus, amongst other grounds, 
bankruptcy is one of the grounds set out in Article 14 of the Commercial 
Companies Law of 1974 upon which a company may be wound up by the court. 
Bankruptcy procedures under the Commercial Code are distinguished from 
winding up procedures under the Commercial Companies Law. Bankruptcy does 
not entail the extinction of the company, and its legal personality remains in 
existence until the liquidation of its affairs is concluded.123 Retaining its legal 
personality means that during the course of bankruptcy proceedings, the company, 
as discussed below,124 may propose a scheme of arrangement with its creditors in 
order to terminate its bankruptcy.125 It is not like the case in England where a 
company cannot be made bankrupt,126 but if it cannot pay its debts it may be dealt 
with under the equivalent process of winding up, laid down in the Insolvency Act of 
1986.127 
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4.5.1 Who can Request a Bankruptcy Declaration? 
     An application for bankruptcy can be made by the trader itself,128 a court, and 
creditors.129 Article 581 of the Commercial Code states that “A merchant may be 
declared bankrupt at the request of one of his creditors or at his own request. The 
court may declare a merchant bankrupt of its own accord.” Unlike the case in UAE, 
Bahrain and Egypt,130 in Oman the public prosecutor is not given the authority to 
initiate bankruptcy proceedings unless it is shown that the debtor has committed a 
criminal act e.g. fraudulent bankruptcy.131 In this case, the debtor will be 
prosecuted according to the applicable provisions of both the Commercial Code 
and Penal Law. 
A- Debtors 
     The sole merchant may voluntarily file for a declaration of bankruptcy if he is not 
able to pay his commercial debts.132 However, it is not obligatory for a debtor to 
apply to a competent court for a declaration of bankruptcy once the cessation of 
payment takes place, but it is optional.133 This is contrary to the case under the 
laws of UAE,134 Bahrain135 and Egypt,136 whereby if a period of time (30 days in 
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UAE, 15 days in Egypt) lapses from the date of cessation of payment, the debtor is 
obliged to apply for a declaration of bankruptcy; indeed, failure to do so would 
result in a criminal offence being committed.137 
     In the case of a company,138 power to apply for adjudication of bankruptcy on 
behalf of a company is generally vested in directors.139 Thus, directors of the 
company may apply for a declaration of bankruptcy when the company is unable to 
pay its due commercial debts.140 However, before submitting such an application, 
directors should obtain the consent of a majority of partners in the case of general 
partnerships and limited partnerships; the consent of the ordinary general 
assembly in the case of joint stock companies; and the consent of partners’ 
committee in the case of limited liability companies.141 As in the case of the sole 
merchant, the debtor company is not obliged to apply for a declaration of 
bankruptcy if it ceases paying its due commercial debts.142 
     The debtor’s request must be submitted by way of a report explaining the 
reasons for the cessation of payment,143 to which several documents shall be 
attached, such as the accounting books, a copy of the latest balance sheet, the 
profit and loss account, a detailed statement of movable and immovable assets 
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and their approximate value on the date of the failure to pay, a statement of the 
names of the creditors, their addresses, their rights and their obligations and 
security.144 In this regard, this thesis argues that the rationales behind presenting 
such documents are to assist the court in determining the bankruptcy of the debtor 
and to examine the grounds for the failure and whether they should be attributed to 
the debtor or to external factors.   
B- Creditors 
     An application for adjudication in bankruptcy made by creditors takes the form 
of a petition addressed to the civil court with jurisdiction in the area where the 
debtor carries on business.145 This application can be made by any creditor who 
must satisfy the court that the trader has not paid a commercial debt when it has 
fallen due.146  In this regard, the Commercial Code does not prescribe a de minimis 
amount of the commercial debt. Thus, principally, whatever the amount of the debt 
is, the creditor is eligible to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor if 
cessation of payment of a due commercial debt occurs. It is worth noting that, in 
one of its judgments, the high court asserted that although the unpaid debt is 
commercial, due and undisputed, because of the amount of the unpaid commercial 
debt, the court has the discretion to reject the request for a bankruptcy 
declaration.147 Further, even though the debt is not yet due and payable, in some 
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cases the creditor is able to commence the proceedings.148 For instance, any 
creditor for a deferred commercial debt is entitled to apply for his trading debtor to 
be declared bankrupt if that merchant has no known domicile, has fled the country, 
closes down his premises, proceeds to liquidation or takes action harmful to his 
creditors.149 However, it is not enough for the creditor to allege this, rather the 
creditor must demonstrate that the debtor has already failed to pay a due 
commercial debt.150 In this regard, it can be asserted that such restriction provides 
some sort of protection to the debtor. 
     If a bankruptcy application is submitted by a creditor, according to Article 671 of 
the Commercial Code the debtor is able to appear before the court to defend 
himself and prove that he is able to pay his debts. Further, it should be noted that 
the Commercial Code puts some measures in place aiming to prevent any creditor 
from seeking a court judgment against the debtor without having legitimate 
grounds.151 In this regard, Article 596 of the Commercial Code states that “if one of 
the creditors applies for the debtor to be declared bankrupt and the court rules to 
refuse the application, the court may impose a fine not exceeding three hundred 
Omani Rials (approx. £475) on the creditor and the ruling shall be published in the 
Official Gazette at his expense if it appears to the court that the creditor intended to 
harm the commercial reputation of the debtor, without prejudice to the debtor’s 
entitlement to demand compensation”. 
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     In addition, one of the preconditions for submitting a bankruptcy application is 
that the petitioning creditor should have an interest in such petition.152 Even though 
all creditors have the right to submit a bankruptcy application, generally the court 
tends to reject the request of secured creditors if it is satisfied that their securities 
can be met without affecting the business of the debtor.153 In one instance, the high 
court stated that the secured creditor had no interest in submitting an application of 
bankruptcy since their debts were secured and they were able to enforce their 
securities to recover their money.154 However, after enforcing the security, if one of 
the secured creditors did not recover the whole secured debt, the remaining 
amount was considered to be an unsecured debt.155 Having considered it as an 
unsecured debt, the secured creditor had an interest in approaching the court and, 
as a result, could apply for the bankruptcy of the debtor.156 
C- The Court 
     Unlike the case in both England 157 and the US,158 in Oman the court acting 
under its own initiative can apply for the bankruptcy of a trader.159 As a general 
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rule, the court should be a neutral entity and cannot be one of the petitioners.160 
Thus, giving such power to the court can be considered as a departure from this 
general rule. However, due to such a departure and lack of any court precedent, it 
is unclear how, in practice, an application of bankruptcy is submitted by the court. 
Nonetheless, Article 763 of the Commercial Code provides an example in which 
the court may initiate bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor. It is provided that 
if the debtor applies for a preventive composition scheme and the court rejects the 
application, in such a case the court may at its own discretion initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings.161 
4.5.2 The Nature of the Debt 
     Even though all the above-mentioned players have the right to submit a 
bankruptcy application, failure to pay a single debt is not sufficient ground to accept 
such a request.162 Thus, a number of conditions should be met in order for a 
bankruptcy petition to proceed.163 First, the unpaid debt must be a commercial 
debt; ceasing to pay a civil debt is not sufficient to apply for a bankruptcy 
application.164 Nevertheless, a creditor of a civil debt can apply for the bankruptcy 
of the debtor if it is demonstrated that the debtor has failed to pay a commercial 
debt.165 Secondly, the debt must be due, unless one of the exceptional cases 
stated above is proven, e.g. the debtor has no known domicile, proceeds to 
                                                             
160
 Naseef A., Comprehensive Commercial Encyclopedia, (4
th 
edition, Beirut, Ewidat Press, 1999), 
p. 120. 
161
 See Article 763 of the CC. 
162
 Ibid, Articles 579 & 582. 
163
 Ibid. 
164
 Ibid, Article 579. 
165
 Ibid. 
209 
 
liquidation or takes action harmful to his creditors.166 Further, the petition should be 
based on an undisputed due commercial debt.167 A bankruptcy petition that is 
based on a disputed commercial debt will usually be rejected and the petitioner is 
asked to establish the debt in separate proceedings.168 Finally, as mentioned 
above, the Commercial Code does not prescribe a de minimis amount of the 
commercial debt.169 However, in one of its judgments the high court stated that 
even though the unpaid debt was commercial, due and undisputed, in this case the 
amount of the debt did not justify the declaration of the debtor’s bankruptcy.170 It 
went further by saying that although the appealing bank demonstrated the debt, the 
declaration of bankruptcy was governed by judicial discretion.171 However, it is 
difficult to take this ruling as a base to rely on since in one of its judgments the high 
court stated that “regardless of the amount of unpaid debt, the court has the right to 
declare the bankruptcy of any trader even though he ceases to pay a single 
commercial debt”.172 Even though in the former decision the court refused to 
declare the bankruptcy of the trader since the amount of the commercial debt, in 
the view of the court, did not justify the bankruptcy declaration, in the later decision 
it is clearly stated that it is possible to declare the bankruptcy of the trader without 
taking into consideration the amount of the unpaid debt. Thus, it can be concluded 
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that at the end of the day, the facts of each case determine the outcome of the 
bankruptcy application. 
4.5.3 Declaration of Bankruptcy 
     After the bankruptcy application is submitted, the court may order the necessary 
actions to be taken to maintain or manage the assets of the debtor until the 
bankruptcy petition is determined.173 Also, the court may appoint whomsoever it 
chooses to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor and the reasons behind the 
failure to pay and submit a report accordingly.174 Principally, at this stage, the 
management of the company will remain in place and it is entitled to run the 
business unless the court opts to displace them.175 
     Having ensured that the conditions for adjudication exist,176 the court makes an 
order declaring the debtor bankrupt.177 In case of a company, if a firm is declared 
bankrupt, all the general liability partners must be declared bankrupt.178 This 
includes general liability partners who have left the company after the suspension 
of payment, provided that no more than two years have elapsed since the date on 
which notice of their departure from the company was entered in the commercial 
register.179 It is worth mentioning that, under Omani law, the bankruptcy of one of 
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the general liability partners may not lead to the bankruptcy of the company,180 
although it is one of the grounds for winding up a general partnership and a limited 
partnership.181 Article 41 of the Commercial Companies Law of 1974 states that 
“unless the partnership’s Memorandum of Association provides otherwise, the 
partnership shall be deemed dissolved upon the death, declaration of ineligibility or 
bankruptcy or withdrawal of one of its partners. The remaining partners, however, 
may decide unanimously to continue the partnership between them provided such 
a decision is registered in the Commercial Register”. 
     Furthermore, it should be pointed out that in its bankruptcy judgment the court 
should determine a provisional date for the cessation of payment.182 However, if it 
does not, the date on which the judgment was pronounced is deemed to be the 
date for the suspension of payment.183 If it does, the date of cessation may not be 
referred back to more than two years from the date the bankruptcy judgment is 
pronounced.184 
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4.5.4 Effects of the Bankruptcy 
A- Effect on the Debtor 
     As stated above,185 from the day on which the judgment of bankruptcy is issued, 
a bankrupt will be prohibited from practising a number of civil rights, e.g. becoming 
a director or a member of the management board of any company for a period not 
less than a year and from applying for a public job or position.186 Such restrictions 
apply to both sole merchants and the general liability partners in a bankrupt 
company.187 Thus, since the bankruptcy of a company leads to the bankruptcy of 
all general liability partners, all general liability partners are prohibited from 
practising these civil rights. 
     Furthermore, upon the issuance of bankruptcy adjudication, the debtor will be 
prohibited from managing his assets or disposing of them.188 The prohibition on 
administration and disposal by the bankrupt debtor covers all assets owned by the 
bankrupt, including those that accrue to him after the declaration of bankruptcy.189 
In this case, the management of the business will be handed over to the trustee 
who is responsible for administering the assets190 on behalf of the bankrupt under 
the supervision of a bankruptcy judge.191 Thus, after declaring the bankruptcy of 
the company, the management of the company will be displaced and the 
bankruptcy trustee will administer the assets of the bankrupt company. In this 
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regard, Omani law does not distinguish between an honest, negligent, or fraudulent 
debtor. 
     It is worth noting that the trustee in bankruptcy might be considered as a 
representative of the bankrupt, the bankrupt’s creditors and the public. Since the 
trustee administers the property on behalf of the bankrupt debtor, it can be said 
that the trustee is a representative of the bankrupt. The trustee may, also, be 
considered as the representative of creditors of the bankrupt in that one of his 
duties is to realise the greatest amount of assets for the benefit of creditors.192 In 
addition, safeguarding the public interest is one of the duties of the trustee.193 In 
affirming such contention, it is stated that “the trustee shall assume responsibility 
for all actions necessary to safeguard the rights of the bankrupt”;194 and that “at the 
request of the trustee, the bankruptcy judge may authorise the continued operation 
of the business where the public interest, the interest of the debtor, or the interest 
of creditors so requires”.195 Having been authorised, the trustee shall appoint an 
external person to run the business of the bankrupt or the bankrupt himself may be 
appointed to run the business.196 In this regard, the trustee has discretion in 
determining whether to appoint a new management to run the business or allow 
the old management to do this task.197 Hence, even though in principle directors 
will be displaced upon the initiation of the bankruptcy process, the bankruptcy 
trustee may order that they retain their position during bankruptcy processes. 
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B- Effect on Creditors 
     By statute, once a bankruptcy adjudication is declared, a ‘group of creditors’ is 
established.198 Such a group consists of ordinary creditors having valid claims 
against the bankrupt arising prior to the issue of the adjudication of bankruptcy.199 
This group enjoys a legal personality and is represented by the bankruptcy 
trustee.200 It is believed that the purpose of organising the ordinary creditors into a 
body is that of protecting their collective interests and being represented by the 
bankruptcy trustee.201 However, secured creditors are not considered part of this 
group unless they waive their rights.202 It can be said that their ability to enforce 
their securities despite the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings justifies the 
exclusion of secured creditors from becoming a part of a ‘group of creditors’.203 
     In addition, as stated above,204 upon the issuance of an adjudication of 
bankruptcy, ordinary creditors’ actions are stayed and these creditors are unable to 
take individual enforcement proceedings against the assets of the bankrupt, nor 
may they finalise proceedings begun before the issuance of the adjudication of 
bankruptcy.205 It is believed that the reasons for such a stay are that the claims of 
the ordinary creditors will be satisfied proportionately out of the assets of the 
bankrupt debtor; and that the bankruptcy trustee normally takes action on their 
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behalf since he is responsible for safeguarding their interests.206 Nonetheless, this 
restriction does not apply to secured creditors since they are not prevented from 
bringing or continuing actions against the bankrupt company.207 In this case, this 
thesis argues that granting a secured creditor the right to enforce his securities 
might result in preventing any effort from the trustee to authorise the continued 
operation of the business. 
     Furthermore, upon bankruptcy, the terms of all monetary debts will be 
eliminated and all the bankrupt’s debts are deemed to have become due at the 
date of the bankruptcy declaration.208 Also, an adjudication of bankruptcy halts the 
interest on debts only with respect to the group of creditors.209 However, “interest 
on debts guaranteed by mortgage or lien may be claimed only from sums produced 
by the sale of assets guaranteeing those debts”.210 The distinction made between 
secured and unsecured creditors during bankruptcy proceedings clearly 
demonstrates that under the current bankruptcy regime the interests of secured 
creditors, usually banks, are well protected and their ex ante bargains are 
respected even though a debtor enters into bankruptcy proceedings.  
C- Effect on Contracts Concluded before the Declaration of Bankruptcy 
     In general, the adjudication of debtor bankruptcy does not result in the 
automatic rescission of a contract to which a bankrupt is a party,211 unless such a 
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contract is based on ‘personal consideration’ in which a contract cannot be 
performed except by the bankrupt himself.212  Since one of the responsibilities of 
the trustee is to administer the business of the bankrupt,213 the trustee is required 
to perform the contract on behalf of the bankrupt. However, if the bankruptcy 
trustee decides not to perform the contract or will no longer continue to do so, the 
other party is given the right to seek the rescission of the contract.214 Having 
sought the rescission of the contract, the contracting party is not given priority in 
respect of compensation arising from the termination of the contract, but rather he 
is entitled to share in the bankrupt’s estate as an ordinary creditor.215 It is, thus, 
apparent that in Oman the bankruptcy of the trader alone cannot be used as a 
ground to terminate the contract. This is the case in England, as well, where the 
mere fact of insolvency does not in itself put an end to contracts.216 In affirming 
this, in Chalmers, re Edwards,217 Sir G Mellish, L. J, stated that “I agree with what 
was said by Crompton, J. in Griffiths v. Perry, that the mere fact of the insolvency 
of the purchaser did not put an end to the contract. It certainly would be very unfair 
if it had that effect; for if the insolvent had any beneficial contracts remaining, it 
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would be hard on him as well as on his creditors if they could not have the benefit 
of those contracts”.218 
     Article 630 of the Commercial Code goes further by annulling any contract 
clause to terminate or modify the contract based on the debtor’s bankruptcy or 
based on the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. This is similar to the case under 
the US Bankruptcy Code where any contract clause that terminates or modifies the 
contract based on the debtor’s financial condition or insolvency is invalidated.219 
Thus, in both Oman and the US, clauses which allow a counterparty to cancel a 
contract by reason of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings are void. 
Article 633 of the Commercial Code gives the bankruptcy trustee the choice of 
determining whether to accept or to reject the performance of such a contract. If 
the bankruptcy trustee rejects the performance of the contract, the other 
contracting party has the right to seek court judgment to terminate the contract.220 
     The case in England differs in that great respect is given to the sanctity of a 
contract221 and the contracting parties are allowed to insert such a clause. Such a 
clause is known as an ‘ipso facto clause’, in which a contract contains a provision 
permitting the counterparty to cancel on the insolvency of the other.222 In 
addressing this issue, Goode stated that the ipso factor clause “caused concern 
among insolvency practitioners, who consider that such clauses are detrimental to 
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the administration procedure” and, as a result, they should be annulled as contrary 
to public interest.223 Further, in liquidation for instance, the effect of a termination 
clause is that a contract right that constitutes an asset of the firm prior to the 
commencement of proceedings is removed from the reach of the general body of 
creditors.224 Also, it is claimed that allowing a supplier to cut off the lifeblood of a 
manufacturing company could obstruct any attempt to rescue the business of the 
company.225 Therefore, it is argued that ipso facto clauses can give suppliers 
considerable leverage against administrators to get paid ahead of other creditors, 
thereby disrupting the administration process.226 Nevertheless, Milman, rightly, 
argued that “it is not appropriate to require a supplier to continue to deliver goods 
or services to an insolvent customer’ unless “there is in place a cast iron guarantee 
that payment for any future deliveries will be made”.227 It is worth noting that during 
the Standing Committee stage of the Enterprise Act 2002, an amendment was 
proposed to suspend ipso facto clauses in administration,228 however the Minister 
rejected this by saying that “a keystone of jurisprudence north and south of the 
border is freedom of contract and that is the fundamental difficulty with the 
amendment…. if those entering into contracts knew that the terms could be 
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overridden, they might be less likely to enter into or continue a contract if they 
became aware that the company was in financial difficulty”.229 
     As shown, counterparties are prohibited from exercising their rights to terminate 
the contracts under both Oman’s bankruptcy regime and the US Chapter 11, while 
they are permitted to exercise them under administration proceedings in England. 
However, this thesis stands on the view that a balance should be struck between 
respecting the notion of freedom of contract and promoting the concept of business 
rescue. Giving the contracting parties the right to negotiate their own contract and 
to include ipso facto clauses and, on the other hand, stay the enforcement of such 
rights pending the completion of the reorganisation process or bending the 
approval of the court creates some sort of balance. In this regard, following the 
experience of the US,230 where the bankruptcy trustee is given the right to assume 
or reject any executor contract of the debtor is advisable. Upon the rejection, other 
contracting parties have the right to terminate their contracts after seeking the 
approval of the court. However, if the bankruptcy trustee assumes the contract, the 
other contracting parties should be given adequate assurance of future 
performance. 
4.5.5 Liability of Directors of Bankrupt Companies 
     Upon the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, directors or managers of the 
company may be subject to a civil liability or may be found guilty of a criminal 
offence.231 Article 695 of the Commercial Code gives a bankruptcy trustee the right 
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to seek court permission to order all members of the Board of Directors or all of the 
managers, or some of them jointly or severally to pay all or some of the debts of 
the company unless they establish that they have exercised necessary care in 
running the business of the company. It is stated that in determining the liability of 
the managers for compensating the damages resulting from their weakness in 
managing the company, such compensation should be restricted to the level of 
their faults.232 Further, the company’s directors may incur criminal liability in the 
case where the company’s bankruptcy has been caused by fraudulent actions on 
their part, pursuant to Article 301 of Oman’s Penal Code of 1974 which provides for 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years. The Penal Code provides 
examples of actions that are considered as fraudulent actions, including 
concealment, mutilation or destruction of the company’s books or concealment of 
assets.233 It can be said that the rationale behind such liabilities is to encourage the 
directors or managers of the company to initiate bankruptcy proceedings once they 
perceive a financial crisis, even though they will be displaced during the process. 
Running the business, despite such trouble, is against the interests of creditors and 
might lead to further loss.  
4.5.6 Set-off in Bankruptcy 
     Set-off is defined by Roy Goode as “the right of a debtor who is owed money by 
his creditor on another account or dealing to secure payment for what is owed to 
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him by setting this off in reduction of his own liability”.234 In clarifying such a 
concept Wood states that “a creditor with a set- off on insolvency is a super-priority 
creditor: the bankrupt owes him 100, he owes the bankrupt 100. On set-off the 
creditor is paid in full. If there is no set-off, then the creditor pays 100 to the 
bankrupt and may get little or nothing on the 100 which the bankrupt owes the 
creditors”.235 Both English and the US laws recognise the concept of set-off in 
insolvency, although with some differences.236 For instance, in the US, even 
though the Bankruptcy Code does not create a right of set-off,237 it recognises the 
right of set-off existing under non-bankruptcy laws.238 However, in the US whether 
or not to allow a set-off right on a specific contract is entirely within the discretion of 
the bankruptcy judge.239 In England, insolvency set-off is mandatory and 
contracting out of insolvency set-off is not allowed.240 In this regard, Rule 4.90 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 makes all actual, contingent and future debts subject to 
set-off whether they are owed by or to the debtor company. 
     In Oman, Article 604 of the Commercial Code declares that upon the 
adjudication of bankruptcy, the bankrupt debtor is forbidden from receiving or 
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making any payments. Thus, in principle, bankruptcy set-off is not allowed under 
the current bankruptcy regime. However, Article 607 provides certain requirements 
that, if met, render set-off rights to be accepted. Accordingly, on the bankruptcy of 
the debtor, set-off arrangements are allowed if it is demonstrated that the rights 
and obligations of the parties are ‘associated’.241 Association of the rights and 
obligations of the parties exists specifically if they result from a ‘single cause’ or are 
included in a ‘current account’.242 Therefore, Omani courts might dismiss any 
setting-off arrangements if they are satisfied that the rights and obligations of the 
parties are not sufficiently associated. 
4.6 Composition with Creditors 
     Omani Commercial Code regulates two types of compositions that can be 
concluded between a trader and his creditors. The first type is a ‘Judicial 
Composition’,243 while the second type is a ‘Preventive Composition’, each having 
a different aim.244  
(A)  Judicial Composition: initiated by a bankruptcy judge after a declaration of 
bankruptcy. The Commercial Code does not state what is meant by a 
judicial composition. However, a commentator defines it as “a composition, 
made by a bankruptcy judge following an adjudication of bankruptcy, 
between a bankrupt and his creditors in order to allow the bankrupt to retain 
                                                             
241
 Article 607 of the CC. 
242
 Ibid, Article. 
243
 Ibid, Articles 698 to 721 set out the procedures of judicial composition. 
244
 Ibid, Articles 753 to 786 set out the procedures of preventive composition. 
223 
 
his rights after taking a number of precautionary measures to protect the 
creditors”.245 
(B)  Preventive Composition: proposed by a trader prior to the issuance of the 
bankruptcy judgment to avoid the declaration of bankruptcy.246 Similar to the 
case of the Judicial Composition, it is not defined by the Commercial Code, 
although the procedures to be followed are set out. 
     Mostly, the procedures to be followed in order to conclude such compositions 
are similar in a number of aspects. For instance, once judicial or preventive 
composition is initiated, a creditor committee is automatically established and all 
approved creditors are invited by the bankruptcy judge to vote on the proposed 
composition.247 It is worth noting that secured creditors are not considered part of 
the Creditor Committee248 and, as a result, they are not allowed to participate in 
voting in favour of or against the composition, unless they relinquish their 
securities.249 It is argued that the ability of the secured creditors to enforce their 
securities at any time is behind their exclusion.250 Also, both compositions require 
court approval to formally sanction the proposed composition.251 
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     Notwithstanding the similarities of procedures of both Judicial and Preventive 
Composition, a number of divergences exist.252 During judicial composition 
procedures the trader is declared legally bankrupt and all the above-mentioned 
consequences of bankruptcy are applied.253 If approved by the majority of 
creditors, the court can issue an order annulling the bankruptcy and hand the 
management back to the debtor.254 However, during preventive composition 
procedures the status of bankruptcy does not yet exist.255 Hence, it can be said 
that the aim of preventive composition is to escape the status of bankruptcy being 
declared, while the aim of judicial composition is to alleviate the impact of a 
bankruptcy judgment and grant a debtor the chance to pursue his business and 
discharge him from being bankrupt if composition is reached and approved. It is 
stated256 that preventive composition aims to achieve a number of benefits. These 
include: preventing the distressed trader from falling into bankruptcy; benefiting the 
creditors by giving them an alternative to avoid the length, complexities and cost of 
bankruptcy procedures; and also having an impact on the public interest since 
maintaining the business of the company, while paying creditors’ debts, can result 
in preserving jobs and protecting the interests of other stakeholders.257 Thus, a 
trader, whether a sole merchant or a company, may avoid the consequences of an 
adjudication of bankruptcy if the trader is able to present an acceptable deal to his 
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creditors through what is called ‘preventive composition’ or a ‘composition scheme 
with creditors’. 
     Since each of these compositions has its own aim, it is essential to deal with 
them separately. 
4.6.1 Judicial Composition 
     As stated above,258 the aim of a judicial composition is to terminate the effects 
of the bankruptcy on the trader. This thesis argues that it is difficult to consider this 
composition as a rescuing process since rescuing the business of the company is 
not the purpose of such a composition. According to the Commercial Code, the 
purpose of initiating a judicial composition is to terminate the bankruptcy 
adjudication.259 Also, since this composition is initiated by a bankruptcy judge after 
a bankruptcy adjudication is declared, normally secured creditors have already 
enforced their securities during bankruptcy proceedings, which renders any 
attempt to rescue the business challenging, especially if the availability of such 
assets are important to continue the business.260 Further, once a trader is declared 
bankrupt, his reputation will be affected, and as a consequence, although a judicial 
composition is concluded, suppliers will be frustrated from contracting with a 
distressed trader. 
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     Once a bankruptcy judgment is delivered, a bankruptcy judge can initiate a 
voluntary judicial composition between the bankrupt and his creditors. However, 
although it is possible in the event of negligent bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge is 
not allowed to initiate such a composition in the event of fraudulent bankruptcy.261 
It is claimed that the objective of judicial composition is to honour the trader who is 
declared bankrupt without committing any kind of fraud.262 This is affirmed by 
Article 715 where it is provided that the composition should be annulled if the 
debtor is subsequently convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy or “where after 
ratification a deception arises as a result of the bankrupt having concealed assets 
or exaggerated his debts”. If initiated, all approved creditors, whose debts have 
been finally or temporarily admitted, are invited to hear the submission of the 
trustee and vote on the proposed composition.263 Secured creditors are not 
allowed to vote on the proposed composition unless they relinquish their rights as 
secured creditors.264 If any of the secured creditors participate in the voting on 
composition without declaring whether he assigned his securities in whole or in 
part, he is considered to have dispensed with the whole security.265 The court will 
not sanction the composition unless it is approved by a majority of creditors, 
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holding two thirds of the debts.266 In determining the majority, it is clearly stated 
that non-voting creditors are not counted.267 Such composition usually includes 
provisions whereby the debtor is granted respite for payment of the debts and it 
may be a compromise whereby the release of the debtor from part of his debt is 
agreed.268 
4.6.2 Preventive Composition 
     The title of Part Four of the Fifth book of the Commercial Code is ‘Preventive 
Composition from Bankruptcy’. This title indicates that the aim of the preventive 
composition is merely to prevent the trader from bankruptcy. Thus, preventive 
composition is an alternative available for a distressed trader to avoid a declaration 
of bankruptcy and to continue the operation of the business if a composition with 
creditors is reached. However, as will be shown below,269 lack of regulating a 
number of issues renders the Preventive Composition regime insufficient to 
promote rescue culture. Examples of such issues are imposing stay on secured 
creditor’s actions and allowing post-petition financing. Since preventive 
composition is distinct proceedings under the current regime, it is necessary to 
examine its efficiency. 
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4.6.2.1 Eligibility to Applying for Preventive Composition 
     An application for a preventive composition can be made by the trader itself.270 
Unlike the case in the bankruptcy procedure, a court and creditors are not eligible 
to submit such an application. Thus, the preventive composition is open merely to 
sole traders and companies facing difficulties with making payments to their 
creditors. In the case of a company, an application for a composition by a company 
should be made by the director who represents the company.271 However, the 
director is not permitted to submit an application unless he obtains the consent of a 
majority of partners in the case of general partnerships and limited partnerships; 
the consent of the ordinary general assembly in the case of joint stock companies; 
and the consent of the partners’ committee in the case of limited liability 
companies.272 
     The rights of a sole merchant or a company to request a preventive composition 
is not without restrictions.273 As a consequence, it is not possible for any trader to 
submit an application unless a number of conditions are met. Articles 753, 755 and 
758 of the Commercial Code set out conditions whereby if met the trader is eligible 
to initiate preventive composition proceedings. 
(A)  Disturbance of the Trader’s Business 
     Article 753 of the Commercial Code states that any individual trader or company 
whose financial affairs are so disturbed as to lead to a suspension of payments 
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may apply for a composition with its creditors. Unlike the case in bankruptcy, 
cessation of payment of a commercial debt is not a prerequisite for initiating a 
composition scheme, but rather the disturbance or instability of business activities 
in a manner which leads to such a cessation is sufficient.274 However, the criteria to 
be used to determine the level of business disruption and its consequence on 
paying debts are not defined. In this case, it is the task of the court to assess the 
level of disturbance and its effect on paying debts.275 This is clear from Article 758 
of the Commercial Code whereby the trader is required to present before the court 
a number of documents before approving the commencement of such a 
composition. In this regard, the petitioner is required to present his application to 
the court accompanied by an explanation of the disruption of his business 
activities, a detailed composition proposal and various other documents (including 
the principal commercial books, a copy of the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account, a list of the names of creditors, a detailed statement of personal expenses 
over the two years preceding the application for composition, and various other 
documents).276 If a request for preventive composition is submitted by a company, 
there are additional documentary requirements including a certified copy of the 
company’s articles of association and a copy of the resolution of the partners or the 
general assembly consenting to the presentation of the application leading to a 
composition with the creditors.277 
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     Further, it is rightly argued that since any trader whose business activities are 
disturbed is allowed to submit a composition application, it is inevitable that any 
trader that has already ceased paying commercial debts is eligible to request a 
preventive composition.278 Thus, once a cessation of payment takes place, the 
trader is allowed to initiate a composition scheme application.279 However, it is 
unclear whether or not it is possible for the trader to request a preventive 
composition with creditors during bankruptcy proceedings. There is no provision 
under Oman’s Commercial Code. This is unlike the position in Egypt where it is 
clearly stated that “the court must order the postponement of the bankruptcy 
application, if the debtor submits a formal application for a composition with his 
creditors. In such a case, the court must deal with the debtor application and 
postpone bankruptcy proceedings”.280 
     Once the debtor realises that his business activities are in trouble or ceases 
paying a due commercial debt, he has the right to request a preventive 
arrangement to be concluded with his creditors. It is worth noting that Oman’s 
Commercial Code does not set a time-limit for submitting such a request. Thus, the 
trader has the right to submit a composition application at any point in time, as long 
as the adjudication of bankruptcy is not yet declared. This is unlike the case in 
Egypt,281 where the trader is required to apply within 14 days (20 days in UAE)282 
of being unable to make payment. If this period has elapsed, the trader is not able 
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to request a preventive composition scheme. It is claimed that the reason for 
stipulating an exact period is to encourage the trader to request a preventive 
composition at an early stage and to protect the interests of the creditors.283 
However, in this regard, this thesis argues that the approach adopted by the Omani 
legislator provides more flexibility for the trader and gives him the chance to initiate 
a formal scheme of arrangement with his creditors as long as an adjudication of 
bankruptcy is not declared. Restricting the period of submission to 15 or 20 days 
from cessation of payment means that both the trader and his creditors have to 
bear the cost and the length of bankruptcy procedures and it also means that any 
attempt to rescue the business of the company will be hampered. 
(B)  Non-Committal of Fraud or Gross Fault 
     It is not enough for the trader to allege that his business activities are so 
disrupted as to lead to a cessation of payment. He has to prove, further, that such 
disturbance is not caused by his gross fault or as a result of fraud.284 Hence, the 
trader is unable to initiate a composition scheme if it is demonstrated that the 
trader committed an act of fraud, for example, by concealing some of his assets 
with the intention of obtaining a preventive composition with his creditors.285 Also, it 
is not possible to opt for a preventive composition scheme if the trader commits a 
gross fault.286 
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     Even though the Commercial Code does not state what is meant by gross fault 
or an act of fraud, both Oman’s Commercial Code and Penal Law provide a 
number of circumstances that, if committed, lead to fraud and gross fault. Article 
784 of the Commercial Code provides a number of acts that amount to fraud 
committed by the trader; these include: exaggerating the evaluation of his assets in 
order to persuade the court to commence a preventive composition with his 
creditors; enabling, deliberately, a fictitious creditor to participate in voting on the 
composition; or if the trader deliberately omits to mention a creditor within the list of 
the creditors. Further, Article 302 of Oman’s Penal Law provides examples of 
circumstances that amount to gross fault, including if the trader’s personal 
expenses being high compared to his normal spending or gambling with the 
company’s money. It is worth pointing out that the acts included in both the 
Commercial Code and Penal Law are not inclusive and the court has full discretion 
to determine whether or not such an act amounts to fraud or gross fault.287 
(C) Trading Continuously for at Least Two Years 
     In addition to the above mentioned requirements, a trader should demonstrate 
that he has traded continuously for two years preceding the submission of the 
application.288 As a consequence, if the trader has closed his shop or postponed 
his business during these two years, he is not eligible to request a preventive 
composition scheme. It is claimed that such a requirement reflects the intention of 
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the legislator to prevent any fresh trader from benefiting from this scheme and to 
allow the old and the serious trader to seek the benefits of such a scheme.289 This 
means that any new trader or any old trader who postpones his trading within a 
period of two years before submitting such an application is unable to submit a 
composition application. This, as a result, means that bankruptcy proceedings are 
the only available option for both new traders and old traders who closed or 
postponed their business activities even for a short period of time. However, this 
thesis argues that all honest traders must be given the chance to have recourse to 
such a scheme. A new trader, as well as an old trader, may face a temporary 
financial crisis.  
4.6.2.2 Opening of Composition Proceedings 
     Once the trader submits a preventive composition application accompanied by 
all the required documents, the court will examine this application.290 During this 
phase, the court might order that all necessary measures be taken to safeguard 
the assets of the trader pending the determination of the application.291 Article 763 
of the Commercial Code provides that the court should reject the application if the 
debtor fails to state the causes of the disturbance of his business activities, some 
required documents are missing, or the trader has previously been convicted of 
fraudulent bankruptcy, forgery, theft, fraud, breach of trust or embezzlement of 
public funds. Having dismissed the debtor’s request, the court can initiate 
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bankruptcy proceedings if it is satisfied that the requisite conditions are met.292 If 
after examining the application, the court decides to accept the request, the court 
must order the opening of composition proceedings.293 Article 764 states that such 
an order must also appoint one of its member judges as a commissioner for 
preventive composition to supervise the proceedings; appoint one or more 
supervisors to carry out the proceedings, set a date for the meeting of creditors to 
verify debts and to discuss the proposal, and this meeting must be held within 30 
days from the date of the opening of the proceedings.294 
4.6.2.3 Management of the Business during Preventive Composition 
Proceedings 
     Unlike the case in bankruptcy, during preventive composition proceedings, the 
trader retains the right to administer the company’s assets under the supervision of 
the composition trustee.295 However, in order to protect the interests of creditors, 
the trader is forbidden from practising a number of activities that are not required 
for the continuation of his normal business activities without prior permission from 
the composition trustee.296 Such acts include granting gifts, disposing of assets by 
mortgage or transferring ownership.297 It is worth noting that the role of the 
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composition trustee is not to intervene in the management of the business; rather it 
is merely to supervise the trader’s actions and report them to the commissioner.298 
     As discussed above,299 in determining the optimism of any insolvency regime, 
the availability of a number of criteria should be within the judgment.300 Providing 
incentives for directors in order to encourage them to file for the process as early 
as possible is one of the criteria used.301 As explained in the previous chapter,302 
the difference between the US Chapter 11 and the administration regime is that in 
England once the administrator is appointed the management of the company is 
displaced unless the administrator decides otherwise. In the US, the notion of 
debtor-in-possession is adopted, which provides some sort of encouragement to 
directors to apply for Chapter 11 once they are aware of the financial crisis.303 This 
notion is also adopted in England, mainly during CVA and scheme of arrangement 
proceedings, although in the CVA the management runs the company under the 
supervision of an insolvency practitioner.304 Leaving previous management in 
control without any kind of supervision has its merits, although this might lead to a 
number of undesired consequences, such as overinvestment and losing creditors’ 
trust.305 In this regard, this thesis306 argues that leaving the management in place 
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while appointing a trustee to supervise their conduct provides a level of credibility 
and assurance for creditors. This is the case during preventive composition where 
the management of the business retain their position, however their conduct is 
supervised by the composition trustee. Westbrook, rightly argued that even though 
they are flawed, the existing management will run the company and preserve its 
value better than will a court-appointed trustee who knows nothing about it.307 She 
based her argument on the fact that the concern of the court-appointed trustee will 
be to investigate past wrongdoing, such as questionable transactions with lenders 
and other creditors, while the focus of the management will be on searching for 
practical steps to maintain the business.308 
     It is worth noting that even though the management of the business is given the 
right to stay during composition proceedings, this does not mean that the trader, 
under the current regime, has an incentive to apply for a composition scheme with 
creditors. Despite the advantage of retaining management, the trader might be 
subject to bankruptcy proceedings being commenced by the court. Article 763 
provides that if the court dismisses the debtor’s request for a preventive 
composition with his creditors, the court can initiate bankruptcy proceedings if it is 
satisfied that the required conditions apply. In this case, this thesis puts forward the 
argument that the trader might be discouraged from applying for a preventive 
scheme, even if he senses a disturbance in his business activities. 
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4.6.2.4 Stay on Creditors’ Actions (Moratorium) 
     Upon the court’s decision to commence the composition, all bankruptcy 
proceedings, other claims and enforcement actions relating to the trader are 
automatically stayed.309 Such a stay applies to both secured and unsecured 
creditors.310 Also, it is worth noting that the court may make protective orders in 
order to preserve the trader’s assets until the application of preventive composition 
is determined.311 
     The difference between bankruptcy and preventive composition proceedings is 
that while secured creditors’ claims are not stayed during bankruptcy proceedings, 
all claims, whether secured or unsecured, are stayed during preventive 
composition proceedings. Staying all creditors’ claims, while negotiating the 
composition with creditors, has an impact on the success of the process and in 
preserving the assets of the debtor. The trader will not be able to reach an 
agreement with his creditors if any of them are allowed to pursue their claim during 
the process. Thus, the stay is designed to protect the assets of the trader for a 
specific period of time in which the trader is enabled to sort out his financial 
difficulties by concluding a composition arrangement with his creditors. It is argued 
that that if creditors, secured and unsecured, were left free to pursue their rights 
against the company’s assets, these assets would be destroyed and, as a result, 
the purpose of the rescue regime frustrated.312 Further, it is said that without such 
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a moratorium “the creditors would take enforcement action before negotiations 
could be undertaken”.313 
     Although their debts are secured, secured creditors are bound by such a stay. 
However, they are given the right to apply to the court in order to have the stay 
lifted. The position adopted by Oman is similar to that of England,314 where total 
discretion is given to the court to decide whether to lift the stay or not, after 
balancing the interests of all creditors. 
4.6.2.5 Voting System and the Concept of ‘Cram Down’ 
     Once the composition trustee is notified by the court of his appointment, he 
must, within five days of the notification, notify the Commercial Registry of the 
opening of composition proceedings and publish the initial consent to commence 
composition proceedings in the Official Gazette together with an open invitation to 
creditors to attend the first set of creditors’ meetings to present proof of their 
debts.315 During this meeting, which should be held under the presidency of the 
commissioner,316 creditors are required to specify the amount of their debts 
supported by the necessary evidence, and the trader is given the chance to dispute 
any debt.317 Once verification of debts is concluded, the composition trustee will 
present a report on the financial condition of the trader together with his or her 
                                                             
313
 Finch V., ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, (2005) 86 M.L.R. 713, p. 728. 
314
 Ian F., The Law of Insolvency, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), p. 543; see above pp. 153-
154. 
315
 Article 768 of the CC. 
316
 Ibid, Article 771. 
317
 Ibid, Article 772. 
239 
 
opinion on the terms of the proposed composition.318 In this case, the participating 
creditors are given the right to discuss the proposed composition scheme before 
voting on it.319 
     All unsecured creditors whose debts have been accepted may vote in favour of 
or against the composition arrangement.320 It is worth noting that the issue of 
classification of classes321 is absent under the preventive composition since all 
unsecured creditors are treated as a single class for voting purposes. The 
preventive composition proposal should be accepted by a simple majority voting in 
favour, provided that this simple majority holds at least two-thirds of the total debt 
of the trader.322 As in the case of the judicial composition, secured creditors are 
also prevented from participating in such voting unless they relinquish their rights 
as secured creditors.323 If the secured creditor participates in the voting on 
composition without declaring whether he has assigned his securities in whole or in 
part, he is considered to have dispensed with the whole security.324 
     Having been approved by a simple majority of creditors, court approval is 
required to formally sanction the implementation of the voted composition.325 In this 
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regard, the concept of ‘cram-down’, where a bankruptcy court can impose the plan 
over the wishes of the dissenting creditors,326 is adopted by the Commercial Code. 
Article 712 states that “ratification of the composition shall render it effective in 
respect of all creditors from whom the body of creditors is composed, even their 
debts are not ascertained”. However, the outcome of such composition would not 
affect the position of secured creditors as they are given the right to enforce their 
securities. 
4.7 Liquidation Procedures 
     Under the current regime in Oman, liquidation procedures, as mentioned above, 
apply merely to companies. In this regard, Article 14 of the Commercial Companies 
Law of 1974 sets out the grounds upon which a company is dissolved and, as a 
result, liquidated. Examples of these grounds are expiration of the fixed term of the 
company, accomplishment of the purpose for which the company was established, 
bankruptcy of the company and agreement of the partners to dissolve the 
company. According to this Article, bankruptcy is one of the grounds upon which a 
company may be wound up.327 Thus, if the company ceases to pay its commercial 
debts, bankruptcy procedures will be initiated followed by liquidation procedures. 
     Winding up or liquidation is defined as a collective insolvency procedure leading 
to the end of the company’s existence.328 This process is carried out by a person 
called a liquidator whose functions are to collect and realise the assets, discharge 
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the company’s liabilities to its creditors and distribute the surplus by way of 
dividends to creditors.329 Thus, the role of the liquidator is important since he is the 
only person to administer the assets of the company during the process. However, 
under the current regime there is no regulation in place whereby the liquidator is 
obliged to obtain a professional qualification. Furthermore, as in the case of a 
bankruptcy procedure, during liquidation processes secured creditors’ actions are 
not stayed and, as a consequence, they have the right to pursue their claims.330 
The only claims that are stayed are those of unsecured creditors.331 
4.8 Assessing the Efficiency of Oman’s Current Bankruptcy Regime 
     Having highlighted some features of both bankruptcy and composition with 
creditors; proceedings under the current Omani system, the aim of this part is to 
assess the efficiency of such procedures. This assessment will be based on what 
has been discussed above and on the 2014 Doing Business Report issued by the 
World Bank.332 This thesis argues that assessing the workability of a bankruptcy 
law in normal times is important since such an assessment will determine the level 
of suitability of such law during a financial crisis. In this regard, it is rightly asserted 
that “to judge how efficient bankruptcy regimes may be in times of systemic 
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distress, it is useful to know how they perform in normal times”.333 A study of 88 
high and middle income countries was conducted and revealed that bankruptcy 
procedures for companies are costly, time consuming and the processes are 
inefficient.334 This part of the thesis will consider a number of points. First, Oman’s 
ranking based on the World Bank Doing Business Report of 2014 will be dealt with. 
In this regard, the reasons, based on the view of this thesis, behind the lower 
ranking of Oman will be highlighted. Then, this part will examine whether the 
Omani bankruptcy system, as it currently stands, is considered to be a creditor-
friendly regime or a debtor-friendly regime. Further, how far the preventive 
composition scheme can be regarded as a scheme that promotes the concept of a 
rescue culture will be discussed. Finally, the notion of collectivity under Oman’s 
current bankruptcy system will be examined. 
4.8.1 Bankruptcy Efficiency in Oman and the World Bank Report   
     In judging the efficiency of bankruptcy systems, the World Bank uses various 
benchmarks, including the cost of the proceedings, the length of the process, and 
the recovery rate for creditors.335 
     According to the latest data collected by the World Bank,336 Oman stands at 72 
in the ranking of 189 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency (figure 1). The 
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ranking on the ease of resolving insolvency is based on the creditors’ recovery 
rate, which is recorded as cents on the dollar recovered by creditors through 
reorganisation, liquidation and debt enforcement proceedings.337 The recovery rate 
is also a function of time, cost and other factors, such as the lending rate and the 
likelihood of the company continuing to operate.338 Out of 189 economies included 
in the World Bank report, Japan is ranked number 1 in the easing of resolving 
insolvency,339 while the UK is ranked 7340 and the USA is ranked 17.341 At the level 
of Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC),342 in comparison, Saudi Arabia is number 
106 and UAE is number 101.343 However, the ranking of Bahrain and Qatar is 
higher than that of Oman. Bahrain comes at the top on the ease of resolving 
insolvency cases. This is due to that fact that, in Bahrain, in most bankruptcy 
cases, the most likely outcome is that the company will be sold as a going concern 
entity and not as a piecemeal sale.344 Resolving insolvency takes 2.5 years on 
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average and costs 10% of the debtor’s estate with the average recovery rate being 
67.4 cents on the dollar.345 
 
     The case in Oman is significantly different. In this regard, this thesis argues that 
there are a number of reasons behind the lower ranking of Oman. First, according 
to the latest World Bank report, most bankruptcy cases in Oman end up with 
selling the assets of the company piecemeal and not as a going concern.346 This is 
due to the fact that under the current bankruptcy regime secured creditors are able 
to enforce their securities, even though bankruptcy proceedings are initiated.347 
Thus, there is no compulsory mechanism in which all creditors’ claims are stayed. 
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According to the creditors’ bargain theory,348 bankruptcy creates what is called a 
‘common pool’ problem arising when diverse creditors affirm rights against a 
common pool of assets.349 The supporters of this theory propose the establishment 
of a compulsory debt collection system which helps in reducing the cost of debt 
collection and in increasing the aggregate pool of assets. This kind of system 
requires imposing a stay on creditors’ actions to prevent the race to the court-
house between creditors.350 In this regard, as explained in Chapter Three,351 both 
England and the US adopt the concept of staying creditors’ claims during the US 
Chapter 11 and administration proceedings in England. In Oman, the lack of a 
moratorium during bankruptcy processes encourages secured creditors to enforce 
their securities against the company. This, as a result, might impede any attempt to 
sell the company as a going concern entity. 
     Secondly, under the current regime there is no exact time-limit whereby 
bankruptcy processes should be completed. For example, during bankruptcy 
proceedings, Article 665 of the Commercial Code states that within thirty days of 
the date of his appointment the bankruptcy trustee should present to the court a 
statement containing the reasons behind the cessation of payment; however, the 
court can extend this period at its own discretion. Also, Article 669 states that once 
the debts have been verified, the bankruptcy trustee, within sixty days, should 
deposit to the court a list containing the names of the secured creditors and the 
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amount of their securities; however, where necessary the court has the power to 
extend such period. Hence, in both articles the court is given the power to extend 
the period without setting a maximum period. According to the latest World Bank 
Doing Business Report, resolving bankruptcy cases in Oman takes 4.0 years on 
average, while resolving such cases takes less than two years in many other 
countries.352 As shown in Figure 2, resolving insolvency takes only 6 months in 
Japan, a year in the UK, 1.5 years in the USA and 1.9 years in France. At the GCC 
level, the ranking of Oman is far below the desired level. Resolving bankruptcy 
cases takes 2.5 years in Bahrain, 2.8 years in both Qatar and Saudi Arabia and 3.2 
years in the UAE.353 
 
                                                             
352
 The Word Bank, ‘Economy Profile: Oman’, above 332, p. 91. 
353
 Ibid. 
247 
 
Spending years to resolve a bankruptcy case has its impact on wasting the 
resources of the debtor’s assets which means that the recovery rate of creditors is 
diminished. This is reflected in the weak recovery rate received by creditors in 
Oman compared with other countries.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the average recovery rate in Oman is 36.6 per cent 
compared to 66.2% in Bahrain and 55.5 in Qatar.354 
4.8.2 Pro-Debtor or Pro-Creditor Regime? 
     Based on the availability of a number of legal characteristics, bankruptcy 
regimes are generally divided into debtor-friendly regimes and creditor-friendly 
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regimes.355 The main characteristics of a debtor-friendly regime are that of allowing 
easy access to bankruptcy proceedings, maintaining management and not 
displacing them, staying all creditors’ actions, granting a super-priority to the new 
lender, and adopting the concept of cram-down where dissenting creditors are 
forced to accept a reorganisation plan.356 Further, the company is given the right to 
assume or reject so-called executory contracts since ‘ipso facto’ clauses are 
invalidated.357 It is argued that the main characteristics of a debtor-friendly regime 
are based on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.358 This is obvious from the 
discussion in the previous chapter, where it is shown that the main features of the 
US Chapter 11 are leaving the management of the company in place during 
bankruptcy proceedings and imposing an automatic stay on all secured and 
unsecured creditors’ claims.359 In addition, the court has the discretion to impose 
the reorganisation plan over the wishes of the dissenting creditors, although this 
subject to two tests, namely ‘the best interest of creditors test’ and a ‘feasibility 
test’.360 
     One of the main characteristics of a creditor-friendly regime is that creditors’ 
interests are favoured over those of the debtor.361 This is the case, for instance, 
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under the receivership regime in England,362 where a floating charge holder is 
given the right to appoint an administrative receiver to protect his interests. In this 
regard, the aim of this regime is not to protect the interests of the debtor by saving 
the assets of the company, but rather it is to maximise the returns of the floating 
charge holder.363 Moreover, it is said that another key feature of a creditor-friendly 
regime is the treatment granted to priorities.364 Unlike the case in the US where a 
post-bankruptcy new lender can be granted super priority over pre-bankruptcy 
secured creditors, in England, no super priority status is granted and pre-
bankruptcy priorities are respected.365 In addition, during administration 
proceedings the managers are displaced during the process, which is one of the 
main features of the creditor-friendly regime.366 It is argued that a purely creditor-
friendly regime is found under the insolvency system where priority and security 
are mainly given to secured creditors and where managers are replaced during 
bankruptcy proceedings.367 However, McCormack stated that the level of 
differences between the US and the UK insolvency laws are exaggerated and he 
criticised the idea that the US law is pro-debtor and the UK law is pro-creditor.368 
As shown in the previous chapter,369 a closer examination of the administration 
regime in England reveals the fact that even though the management of the 
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business is displaced, secured and unsecured creditors’ actions are stayed and the 
concept of cram-down on dissenting creditors is recognised. These are also 
features of the debtor-friendly regime. Hence, this thesis is in favour of 
McCormack’s assertion that the degree of divergences between the US and the 
UK regimes is exaggerated. 
     Based on what has been discussed above, this thesis argues that the Omani 
regime, as it stands today, can be categorised as a creditor-friendly regime. This is 
due to a number of reasons. First, the Omani bankruptcy regime still lacks a proper 
reorganisation procedure. Under the current regime, a merchant debtor has no 
choice except to apply for bankruptcy proceedings. Applying for such procedures 
means that the debtor will be punished370 and secured creditors will be able to 
seize the assets.371 As stated above,372 during bankruptcy procedures, secured 
creditors are able to enforce their claims against the debtor since no stay is 
imposed on them. Further, management is displaced during bankruptcy 
proceedings and a bankruptcy trustee is appointed to administer the process.373 
The aim of the trustee is not to save the business of the debtor, but instead it is to 
collect the assets and protect the interests of the creditors.374 Hence, it can be said 
that the aims of bankruptcy procedures are to safeguard the interests of the 
creditors and to penalise the debtor. 
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     Even though the debtor opts to apply for a preventive composition scheme, 
protection of secured creditors is also evident. During preventive composition 
proceedings, all claims, whether secured or not, are stayed.375 However, the 
problem is that secured creditors are not allowed to vote on the composition plan 
unless they waive their securities. Also, once the plan is approved by a majority of 
unsecured creditors, the court does not have the right to impose the plan over the 
wishes of secured creditors.376 Thus, secured creditors are given the right to 
pursue their claims, despite the approval of such a plan. Moreover, once the 
company enters a liquidation phase, secured creditors are able to enforce their 
securities since their claims are not stayed during liquidation processes.377 Thus, 
there is no mechanism in place in which all claims are stayed and in which all 
assets are collected by the trustee in order to distribute them between various 
creditors, both secured and unsecured. 
4.8.3 Preventive Composition Scheme and the Concept of ‘Rescue Culture’ 
     The preventive composition scheme is one of the options available for a 
distressed trader to avoid the hardship of bankruptcy proceedings. The main aims 
of such a scheme are to avoid the consequences of being a bankrupt debtor and it 
is an attempt to conclude a composition plan with unsecured creditors.378 However, 
the concern to be raised here is how far this scheme is from being a rescue 
process. In approaching such a concern, it is necessary to examine the availability 
of a number of criteria during a preventive composition regime. Tolmie stated that 
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there are a number of requirements for having a successful rescue regime.379 
Examples of such requirements are the ease and speed of accessing the process, 
the possibility of requesting new financing during the rescue process, imposing a 
moratorium on creditors’ claims (stay on creditors), and providing incentives for 
directors in order to encourage them to file for the process an early stage.380 
     An application for a preventive composition cannot be made by creditors and 
the court. The only option available to them is to apply for bankruptcy procedures. 
The right to apply for such a composition is given only to the trader itself, whether it 
is a sole merchant or a company.381 However, it is not possible for the trader to 
request the initiation of such a process unless a number of conditions have been 
met.382 As explained above,383 the debtor has the right to request a preventive 
composition with creditors once he perceives the disturbance of his business 
activities384 in a way that leads to a cessation of payment of commercial debts. 
Nevertheless, the trader has to demonstrate that he has traded continuously for 
two years preceding the submission of the application for a preventive composition 
regime.385 This requirement makes it impossible for any new trader or an old trader 
who postponed his business during these two years, for whatsoever reason, to 
apply for such a regime. Further, it is important for the trader to demonstrate that 
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the disturbance of business activities is not caused by his gross fault or as a result 
of fraud.386 Hence, this thesis argues that under the current regime, it is not easy to 
access a composition arrangement scheme since all the above-mentioned 
requirements have to be satisfied. Also, proving the occurrence of such factors is 
rather difficult and time-consuming. In the absence of such criteria and of previous 
court cases, it is not clear how the disturbance of business activity is assessed. 
     In addition, during a preventive composition process, the management retain 
their position and run the business under the supervision of the composition 
trustee.387 Not displacing the management has its impact on encouraging them to 
apply for such a regime as early as they sense trouble. According to the 
Commercial Code, the management is allowed to conduct any act that is required 
for carrying on business activities without the need to seek permission from the 
composition trustee.388 By implication, this might include seeking new financing 
from an existing creditor or from a new lender. However, the management is 
forbidden from granting a new security to the lender.389 Hence, as is the case 
under the administration regime in England,390 granting a super priority status to 
the new lender is not allowed during the composition. Thus, the new lender would 
be considered as an unsecured creditor. This might have the effect of discouraging 
others from providing such financing to troubled businesses. 
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     Furthermore, one of the main drawbacks of the composition scheme is that 
secured creditors do not have a say in negotiating a composition plan,391 though 
their claims are stayed during the process.392 If they want to participate, they have 
to relinquish their rights as secured creditors.393 Since they are not allowed to vote 
on the composition plan, the court does not have the right to impose the plan over 
their wishes.394 Thus, they are given the right to enforce their securities. This, as 
this thesis believes, leads secured creditors to go to the court in order in enforce 
their securities and, as a result, the assets of debtor will be wasted. This also has 
its impact on deterring any attempt to rescue the business of the debtor, 
particularly if the assets are essential to continue the business. 
     Based on what has been stated above, this thesis argues that the preventive 
composition regime is far from being a rescue process. The aim of this regime, as 
designed by the legislator, is merely to escape bankruptcy procedures and the 
consequences of bankruptcy declaration.395 Even though some of the criteria of a 
successful rescue regime are found under this regime,396 the lack of a number of 
requirements renders it inefficient to be considered as a rescue regime. 
Complicating the access to this regime, preventing secured creditors from voting 
on a composition plan, not providing an incentive for a new lender and not 
imposing the plan over the wishes of secured creditors all play a central role in 
causing the inefficiency of such an option. 
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4.8.4 Bankruptcy and Liquidation vis-à-vis the Notion of Collectivity 
     As discussed in Chapter Two,397 even though the principles of the creditors’ 
bargain theory and the multiple values theory vary, both theories recognise the 
importance of having in place a compulsory debt-collection system. Having such a 
system would help in protecting the assets of the debtor from being seized by 
secured creditors and in preventing a loss of value for all creditors if the debtor’s 
assets are worth more as a whole than as a collection of pieces.398 In this regard, 
under both the US Chapter 7 liquidation and winding-up proceedings in England, 
the notion of collectivity is recognised. For instance, in England on entry into 
liquidation, the assets of the company are protected from hostile and damaging 
action by creditors.399 However, unlike the case under administration, in the 
company voluntary arrangement and scheme of arrangement regimes, under the 
liquidation regime, the notion of collectivity prevails and the main function of the 
liquidator is to collect the assets of the insolvent company in order to maximise 
returns for creditors.400 
     In Oman, during both bankruptcy and liquidation procedures secured creditors 
are given the right to enforce their securities. As shown above,401 even though the 
concept of staying creditors’ claims is adopted under both regimes, the only claims 
stayed are those of unsecured creditors. Not staying secured creditors’ actions 
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means that creditors will waste the assets in order to be first to seize their 
securities or to obtain a judgment against the debtor in what is described as ‘race 
to the court house’ between creditors.402 Hence, the notion of collectivity is not 
adopted under the current regime. This might be one of the reasons behind the 
lower ranking of Oman in easing insolvency that in the World Bank Doing Business 
Report. As shown in Figure 3 above,403 the average recovery rate in Oman is 37.3 
per cent. Adopting the notion of collectivity might help in increasing creditors’ 
recovery rate since the assets will be collected by the liquidator instead of allowing 
creditors to seize their own securities. Allowing creditors to pursue their claims also 
means that the liquidator needs to use the debtor’s resources to defend secured 
creditors’ allegations before the court and to pay lawyer’s fees. All of these actions 
have an impact on wasting the assets of the debtor. Furthermore, dealing with 
secured creditors’ actions means that the time required to accomplish all 
bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings would be increased.  
4.9 Concluding Remarks 
     In this chapter, an overview of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman was 
provided. As explained, there are three bankruptcy proceedings available: 
bankruptcy procedures,404 preventive composition procedures405 and liquidation 
proceedings.406 However, the liquidation regime is only available for companies 
whether they are bankrupt or not since there are a number of grounds upon which 
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companies are liquidated; bankruptcy is one of them.407 Further, bankruptcy 
procedures apply for all types of traders whether an individual trader or a large, 
medium or small company. Hence, under the current regime there is no special 
bankruptcy procedure designed merely for medium and small companies. This is 
one of the main issues with the current bankruptcy regime since all traders, despite 
their size, have to follow the same bankruptcy procedures. Moreover, the 
preventive composition proceeding, as mentioned above,408 is not meant to be a 
rescue procedure; rather, it is a scheme used to escape the consequences of 
bankruptcy declaration. 
     This chapter explored the various reasons behind the inefficiency of the 
bankruptcy regime in Oman.409 For instance, all current bankruptcy regimes share 
the problem that persons administering the processes are not required to obtain a 
particular qualification.410 Also, the main obstacle of both bankruptcy proceedings 
and liquidation proceedings is that secured creditors are given the right to enforce 
their securities during the process without having to wait until the end of such 
proceedings.411 During preventive composition proceedings all claims, whether 
secured or not, are stayed. Nonetheless, the problem is that secured creditors are 
not permitted to participate in voting on the plan unless they relinquish their 
securities.412 This means that even though the composition plan is approved by 
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unsecured creditors, secured creditors are not bound by such a plan and they have 
the right to pursue their claims.413 
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Chapter Five: A Call for Future Bankruptcy Reform in Oman 
5.1 Introduction 
     In the first chapter, it was demonstrated that, at present, Oman does not have a 
separate bankruptcy law.1 Rather, in dealing with the bankruptcy of traders, both 
the Commercial Code of 1990 and Commercial Companies Law of 1974 make a 
number of provisions. Nevertheless, it was argued that for a number of reasons2, 
the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is insufficiently regulated.3 For instance, 
currently, there are no formal rescue proceedings available for distressed debtors. 
Instead, the current provisions under the Commercial Code are mostly in the form 
of preventive composition procedures4 that allow a postponement of a declaration 
of bankruptcy in an attempt to secure preventive settlement with creditors. If such a 
preventive composition fails, suffering the consequences of bankruptcy declaration 
is inevitable. Hence, the philosophy of a rescue culture is not recognised under 
either the Commercial Code or the Commercial Companies Law. This is unlike the 
case in both England and the US. As discussed in Chapter Three, in promoting the 
concept of rescue culture, England, for example, modernised the administration 
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regime by the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002. Under this Act, rescuing the 
business of the company as a going concern becomes the overriding objective of 
the administration regime.5 It was demonstrated that establishing a rescue 
procedure has an impact on preserving the value of viable enterprises, saving jobs 
and maximising the interests of secured creditors.6 However, it was established 
that the costs of corporate rescue proceedings have been increased by greater 
professional regulation.7 Hence, it is suggested that to protect the UK rescue 
culture, the rising costs of running an administration need to be properly defined.8 
     The bankruptcy proceedings in Oman, as they currently stand, suffer from a 
number of drawbacks. As discussed in the previous chapter,9 there are three 
bankruptcy proceedings in Oman, namely bankruptcy proceedings, preventive 
composition proceedings and liquidation proceedings. However, there are a 
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number of deficiencies in regard to each of these proceedings.10 Whilst one of the 
main obstacles of the current bankruptcy procedures is that secured creditors’ 
actions are not stayed during the process, this problem is overcome during 
preventive composition proceedings since all claims, secured and unsecured, are 
stayed. Nevertheless, the composition scheme is not regarded as a rescue 
process; rather it is an alternative means to escape the consequences of 
bankruptcy declaration.11 It was argued12 that under this scheme secured creditors 
are not given the right to participate in voting on a composition plan unless they 
relinquish their rights as secured creditors. Also, the trader cannot apply for this 
composition scheme unless it has been established that he has traded 
continuously for two years prior to the submission of the application for a 
preventive composition regime, and the disturbance of business activities has not 
been caused by his gross fault or as a result of fraud.13 Furthermore, the liquidation 
regime14 is not a true collective procedure because secured creditors are not 
forbidden from enforcing their securities during the assets’ realisation phase.15 
     Taking lessons from the experience of both England and the US may help in 
overcoming such obstacles. However, it is worth noting that caution should be 
exercised since what might be appropriate in England and in the US might not be 
suitable in Oman. Hence, this thesis endeavours to propose a regime that is 
appropriate to be adopted by the Omani legislator. It is not the aim of this chapter 
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to propose wholesale transplantations of England or the US bankruptcy regimes. 
Rather, the aim is to opt for principles that would seem appropriate in promoting 
the concept of rescue culture in Oman and for promoting the concept of collectivity 
during the liquidation phase in Oman. For instance, as will be argued below,16 it is 
not appropriate for Oman to transplant the concept of the debtor-in-possession as 
it stands in the US, where directors run the company during the US Chapter 11 
without any kind of supervision. However, it is argued that opting for the CVA 
approach of England is more suitable for Oman since directors retain their position 
and they run the company under the supervision of bankruptcy practitioners.17 
     In addition, it is worth explaining that such a proposal will take into account the 
evaluations that have been undertaken in the previous chapters. For instance, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, whether the aim of bankruptcy law is merely to 
maximise the return of creditors or whether there are other interests that deserve 
equal protection is, theoretically, subject to debate.18 Each of the discussed 
theories incorporated some justification for bankruptcy law and its procedures.19 
However, it was demonstrated20 that this thesis supports the view that in designing 
bankruptcy law it is necessary not to focus only on maximising the interests of 
secured creditors. That is to say, the aim of any proposed bankruptcy regime 
should not be to maximise merely the interests of secured creditors, but rather take 
into account the interests of all stakeholders. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 
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taking into account the interests of employees, suppliers and customers, secured 
creditors should not be left unprotected. Thus, in this case, it is necessary to strike 
a balance between the interests of creditors and the interests of others. In this 
regard, it is useful to take note of the experience of both England and the US. As 
discussed above,21 even though both jurisdictions encourage the rehabilitation of 
distressed debtors, the rescue plan will not be forced upon the wishes of the 
dissenting creditors unless they are sufficiently protected.  
     Furthermore, in proposing a rescue regime, a number of factors should be 
present.22 The importance of each factor has been highlighted in Chapter Three.23 
Encouraging the debtor to apply for bankruptcy proceedings as they sense the 
crisis looming, staying all creditors’ actions, facilitating access to funding and 
adopting the concept of cram-down, are all examples of such factors. However, as 
will be demonstrated below,24 in proposing these factors care should be taken 
since it may not be appropriate to transplant the whole experience of England or 
the US.  
5.2 Structure of the Chapter 
     This chapter, first of all, is going to explore the theories underpinning legal 
transplantation. Then, the possible consequences of legal transplantation in the 
receiving countries and the criteria used to measure the success of legal 
transplants will be examined. Furthermore, the general importance of transplanting 
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bankruptcy laws will be highlighted. After that, this chapter will demonstrate the fact 
that Oman can be considered as a country which imports many legal rules and why 
it is important for Oman to adopt some of the bankruptcy principles that are found 
in other jurisdictions.25 In addition, the necessity for introducing bankruptcy reform 
in Oman will be dealt with and in this regard, particular focus will be placed on 
Oman’s economic vision of 2020 and the role of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in promoting the national economy. Finally, this chapter will propose a map 
for future bankruptcy reform in Oman and what needs to be done in order to have a 
modern bankruptcy law. 
5.3 Legal Transplants 
     There is a spectrum of different possibilities as to what is meant by ‘transplant’. 
Watson, for instance, states that a legal transplant is “the moving of a rule or a 
system of law from one country to another or from one people to another”.26 
However, in criticising such a definition, it is argued that Watson’s definition of a 
legal transplant is both narrow and loose from a number of perspectives. It is 
narrow because it is only concerned with legal history and the examples provided 
in his book are mainly inspired by the various influences exercised by Roman law 
on different peoples.27 Also, Watson concerns himself only with the area of private 
law.28 Further, it is argued that in defining the concept of a legal transplant Watson 
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overlooked the necessity of acknowledging the strong determining role of the 
cultures of the ‘sending’ or ‘receiving’ countries when assessing the fate of such 
transplantation.29 It is asserted that “legal transplants have now become a generic 
phrase to refer broadly to the influence of foreign law on the drafting of new 
legislation and to the movement of law beyond national borders”.30 Thus, currently 
the term ‘legal transplant’ is used as a generic term for all transnational or cross-
border spread of law.31 
A- Theoretical Debates 
Whether legal transplants are possible or not is subject to intense debate.32 The 
debates have centred on the following issue: is it possible to transplant laws and 
legal institutions from one legal system to another? In answering such a question, 
various approaches have been developed since legal scholars approach law in 
many ways. As Orucu stated, legal scholars “are dedicated to various trends such 
as ‘law as rules’, ‘law as system’, ‘law as culture’, ‘law as tradition’, ‘law as social 
fact’, ‘law in context’, ‘law and history’, ‘law and economics’, and ‘law and legal 
theory”.33 However, based on various conflicting views, the aim of this part is to 
explore the possibility of legal transplantations. 
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     On one side of the debate, there are some scholars who oppose the idea of 
legal transplants. For instance, in his book, “The Spirit of Laws”, Montesquieu 
argues that “the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular 
cases in which human reason is applied. They should be adopted in such a 
manner to the people whom they are framed, as to render it very unlikely for those 
of one nation to be proper for another”.34 Thus, according to Montesquieu, legal 
rules cannot cross cultural boundaries since they express the spirit of nations and 
are, as a result, “deeply embedded in, and inseparable from their geographic, 
customary and political context”.35 In line with Montesquieu, Pierre Legrand also 
opposes the possibility of legal transplantation. He stated that “anyone who takes 
the view that ‘the law’ or ‘the rule of the law’ can travel across jurisdictions must 
envisage that law is a somewhat autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, 
epistemological, or cultural baggage”.36 However, he believes that such a view is 
mistaken. Legrand views the rule of the law as “an incorporative cultural form, as 
an accretion of cultural elements, it is buttressed by important historical and 
ideological formation”37 and, as a consequence, “rules cannot travel” and legal 
transplants are impossible.38 Since legal rules mirror the society in which they have 
evolved, their meaning does not survive the journey from one jurisdiction to 
another.39 Accordingly, he argues that “at best, what can be displaced from one 
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jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words” and “in any 
meaningful sense of the term, ‘legal transplants’, therefore, cannot happen”.40 
However, in response to such allegations, it is rightly argued that the spread of 
Roman law throughout the continent of Europe, or international or transnational 
commercial law41 of today, demonstrates the possibilities of legal transplants.42 
The movement of legal rules, practices, and institutions has been a normal 
occurrence all around the world and it is hard to find a legal system in the 
developed world that has not imitated or borrowed from another country’s law.43 
This leads Miller to state that “the economic development, democratization, and 
globalization have today so sharply increased the number of legal transplants that 
at least in developing countries, most major legislation now has a foreign 
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component”.44 In this regard, despite the difference in culture, transplanting foreign 
rules or doctrines might help in filling a gap or meet a particular need in the 
importing countries.45 As will be demonstrated below,46 in order to promote the 
concept of rescue culture, many countries have reformed their bankruptcy laws 
through transplanting the experience of other jurisdictions.  
     On the other side of the debate, a number of scholars recognised the 
importance of legal transplants in developing national laws. Watson, through a 
number of books and articles, views direct transplants of whole legal systems as 
constituting the most important fertile source for legal development.47 He argues 
that legal transplants are “socially easy” and, indeed, they are as alive and well as 
they were in the age of Hammurabi.48 This is due to the fact that “legal rules are 
not particularly formulated for the society in which they operate;49 rather they are 
the intellectual creation of clever lawyers, easily adaptable to local use by other 
clever lawyers elsewhere on the globe”.50 According to this approach, despite the 
historical origin of legal rules, they “can survive without any close connection to any 
particular people, any particular period of time or any particular place”.51 Hence, to 
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him, legal borrowing is, in fact, the key to how law is changed and developed.52 In 
supporting his arguments, Watson provides a number of examples of the reception 
of Roman law and the spread of English common law. In one of his arguments, 
Watson contends that successful transplantation could be achieved even when 
nothing was known by the importing country of the political, social or economic 
situations of the foreign law.53 However, in criticising Watson’s approach it is stated 
that “free transplant theory’ loses sight of the law’s unavoidable susceptibility to 
some external pressures from culture and society”.54 Nevertheless, Watson 
acknowledges the fact that a tomato plant that moves from X to Y is still a tomato 
plant. Nevertheless, its subsequent development depends on Y’s soil, temperature, 
wildlife and so on.55 
     As stated above,56 whereas Watson opposes the idea that legal rules mirror the 
society in which they have developed, Legrand supports such an idea and, as a 
consequence, he argues that legal transplantations are impossible. However, it is 
stated that there are many scholars who tend to fall between these two positions, 
seeing legal rules both as embedded in a legal system and a culture and subject to 
be transplanted from one jurisdiction to another.57 In this regard, even though 
Kahn-Freund, for instance, recognises the possibility of legal transplants, he 
asserts that to avoid serious risk of rejection, sometimes having knowledge of the 
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political and social conditions in the donor system is necessary.58 Thus, even 
though he acknowledges the possibility of legal transplantations, the chances of 
survival or risk of rejection of the transplanted legal rules or institutions depend on 
political factors.59 In his article, Kahn-Freund refers to Montesquieu’s opinion that it 
was only in the most exceptional circumstances that the institutions of one country 
could serve those of another at all.60 Based on Montesquieu’s view, a range of 
factors militate against transplantation, such as geography (for example, the size 
and geographic position of a country), social and economic (for instance 
occupation, destiny, wealth of the population, trade), cultural (such as religion, 
traditions, customs) and political factors (such as the nature of the government).61 
However, Kahn-Freund affirms that the geographical, the economic and social, and 
the cultural elements have greatly lost their importance over time, but that the 
political factors have equally greatly gained in importance.62 Then, he differentiates 
between two types of institutional transfer.63 In this regard, he suggests a 
continuum of legal rules, the terminal points of which are, on one side, a rule which 
can easily be ‘transferred’ by mechanical insertion and, on the other side, a rule 
                                                             
58
 Kahn- Freund, above 42, pp. 3-4; see Stein E., ‘Uses, Misuses-and- Nonuses of Comparative 
Law’, (1977-78) 72 N.U.L.R. 198.  
59
 Kahn-Freund, above 42, p. 7. 
60
 Ibid, p. 6. 
61
 Ibid, p. 7; see also Stein E., above 58, p. 199; Forsyth A., ‘The ‘Transplantability’ Debate in 
Comparative Law: Implications for Australian Borrowing from European Labour Law’, p. 3, (2006), 
Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, the University of Melbourne, Working Paper 
No.8, available at: http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/wp381.pdf. accessed on 20/02/2014. 
62
 In supporting his argument, Kahn-Freund provided a number of examples; for in-depth discussion 
see Kahn-Freund, above 42, pp. 8-17. 
63
 Ibid, p. 6; for a summary of Kahn-Freund: see Stein E., above 58; see also Teubner G., ‘Legal 
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences’, (1998) 61 (1) 
M.L.R. 11, p. 17.   
271 
 
analogous to the transplant of a kidney from one person to another, with the 
attendant risk of rejection by the home environment.64 He argues that any given 
rule or institution may be placed at an appropriate point of this continuum.65 In 
supporting his argument, Kahn-Freund offers a number of examples.66 For 
instance, within the area of family law, there are significant variations in the 
conditions and the consequences of a divorce, mainly as regards alimony.67 In this 
case, even though fundamental rules of divorce laws have been transplanted 
successfully from Australia and New Zealand to England, radical changes in the 
same direction have occurred in Canada and in New York.68 Hence, the law of 
divorce and alimony would prima facie appear to be most closely linked to local 
environmental factors, such as moral and religious beliefs.69 Also, he provides an 
example involving rules of an institutional nature where the power factors appear 
much more strongly than in divorce law.70 Examples of these rules are those which 
organise constitutional, legislative, administrative or judicial institutions and 
procedures, and above all, policy-making power.71 According to him, all these rules 
are closest to the second side of the continuum and “they are the ones most 
                                                             
64
 Kahn-Freund, above 42, p. 6. 
65
 Kahn-Freund states that “in the metaphorical language I am using, the kidney and the carburetor 
are the terminal points of a continuum, and any given legal rule or institution may be found at a 
different point of it”: ibid 
66
 See ibid, pp. 13-27. 
67
 Ibid, p. 13. 
68
 Ibid, p. 14; see also Deech R., ‘Comparative Approaches to Divorce: Canada and England’, 
(1972) 35 (2) M.L.R. 113.  
69
 Stein E., above 58, p. 200. 
70
 Ibid, p. 201; Kahn-Freund, above 42, p. 17. 
71
 Kahn- Freund, above 42, p. 17. 
272 
 
resistant to transplantation”.72 For instance, he states that the failed attempt to 
transplant the English jury system to the Continent in the Nineteenth Century and 
the unsuccessful attempt to export the British parliamentary institutions into 
countries which do not share a particular feature in history, or a social structure, 
and of political consensus characteristic of the UK, demonstrates how such rules 
and institutions are resistant to transplantation.73 
     In addition, scholars such as Orucu and Sacco highlight the importance of legal 
transplantation. In his article, Orucu asserts that the movement of legal rules and 
institutions is a natural stage in legal development. According to Orucu, the future 
development of laws and institutions is closely tied to the movement of ideas and 
institutions from one place to another.74 Moreover, both Orucu75 and Sacco76 argue 
that borrowing and imitating others’ legal systems is of crucial importance in 
understanding the course of legal change. However, Orucu argues that many 
problems may arise for recipient legal systems as a result of the transmigration of 
law.77 The scope of these problems depends on factors such as the size of the 
transmigration, the characteristics of legal movement, the success or otherwise of 
transpositions and ‘tuning’, the element of force or choice inherent in the move and 
the social culture of the new environment.78 Thus, particular consideration should 
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be paid to legal-cultural convergence and non-convergence which may come about 
as a consequence of import.79 
     To sum up, according to many scholars legal transplants are possible.80 
However, those scholars who recognise the importance of legal transplants 
disagree on the method of such transfers. While Watson acknowledges the 
possibility of legal transplantations despite cultural differences between the 
exporting and importing jurisdictions,81 Kahn- Freund is of the view that for such a 
transplant to be successful, knowledge of the political and social conditions of the 
exported legal rules is crucial.82 However, in this regard, Xanthaki83 makes the 
statement that: 
     “What matters when selecting a legal system for comparative examination in the 
process of legal transplantation is not the similarity of its characteristics with that of 
the receiving legal order, but the functionality of the proposal. If the policy, concept 
or legislation of a foreign legal system can serve the receiving system well, then 
the origin of the transplant is irrelevant to its success. As long as the transplant can 
serve the social need to be addressed, the transplant can work well in the new 
legal ground.” 
     This thesis supports Xanthaki’s assertion by arguing that despite the origin of 
transplanted rules or principles, they can be adopted in order to overcome the 
deficiencies of the legal system in the importing country. In this regard, the 
appropriateness of foreign rules and principles can be judged by trying to assess 
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their workability and functionality before adopting them.This can be done by 
consulting a number of national and foreign experts and organising government 
symposiums in order to predict the workability and functionality of the proposed 
rules and principles. However, in assessing the functionality of such rules or 
principles, recourse should be made to a number of factors. For instance, in 
proposing foreign rules or principles, it is important to take into account cultural 
factors in the importing country (people’s attitudes towards the proposed principles, 
religious convictions). It is true that sometimes transferring the institutional context 
of foreign countries is not appropriate. This is due to social, cultural and political 
factors in the importing country. For example, Kahn-Freund provided examples of 
the attempted failures to transplant the English jury system to the Continent and 
the transplant of British parliamentary institutions to other countries.84 Also, it is 
necessary to take into consideration the difference between the infrastructure in 
the importing and exporting countries. This includes, for example, the competence 
of courts in dealing with proposed principles and the qualifications of persons 
administering the law. In this regard, even though one of the aims of this thesis is 
to take notes from the experience of both England and the US, it is not appropriate 
to adopt all bankruptcy principles that are adopted by both these jurisdictions. 
Rather, the aim is to opt for bankruptcy principles that are appropriate for Oman. 
As will be discussed below,85 even though the notion of debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
is adopted in the US,86 it is not suitable to be wholly adopted by the Omani 
legislator. This is due to a cultural factor that while in the US bankruptcy is 
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considered as a result of doing business;87 in Oman bankruptcy is considered as a 
disgrace and might be a result of management failure. Due to such a belief, in 
Oman, it is not suitable to allow the management to run the company without some 
kind of supervision. As will be demonstrated below,88 the adoption of the notion of 
DIP as it is adopted under the company voluntary arrangement in England may be 
better. Thus, the differences between Oman, England and the US will be taken into 
account when proposing bankruptcy concepts or principles for Omani legislation. 
B. The Effect of Legal Transplants 
     It was argued above that transplanting the experience of other countries is 
important in legal development, as long as foreign rules or principles serve the 
needs89 of the importing country. However, when an importing country applies a 
rule that has been transplanted from another country, it is effectively applying a 
rule to its own local circumstances and, as a result, the interpretation of a legal rule 
may vary more in the importing country than in its origin.90 As Watson states, a 
tomato plant that moves from X to Y is still a tomato plant. Nevertheless, its 
subsequent development depends on Y’s soil, temperature, wildlife and so on.91 
Transplant countries, as a consequence, are likely to suffer from what is called ‘the 
transplant effect’; that is, the mismatch between pre-existing conditions and 
                                                             
87
 Moss G., ‘Chapter 11- An English Lawyer Critique’, (1998) 11 Insolvency International 17, p. 17. 
88
 See below section 5.5.4.2. 
89
 The needs of an importing country can be judged by identifying the drawbacks of its legal system 
and seeing how such drawbacks are dealt with under other jurisdictions.     
90
 Berkowitz D., Pistor K. & Richard J., ‘The Transplant Effect’, (2003) A.J.C.L. 163, p. 177; also see 
Berkowitz D., Pistor K. & Richard J., ‘Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’, 
(2003) 47 E.E.R 165. 
91
 Watson A., above 48, p. 80. 
276 
 
institutions and the transplanted law, which might weaken the efficiency of the 
imported legal order.92 Also, as is empirically demonstrated,93 it can be argued that 
the differences of infrastructure between the importing and exporting countries 
might have an impact on increasing the effects of the transplant. For instance, in 
their study, Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Richard analysed the 
consequences of legal borrowing by comparing the ‘level of legality’94 achieved 
over the last two hundred years in forty- nine different countries.95 Their study 
develops and tests the proposition that “the way in which a country received its 
formal law is a much more important determinant of the current effectiveness of its 
legal institutions than the particular legal family that it adopted”.96 They based their 
argument on two key perceptions.97 First, for the law to be efficient, it must be 
meaningful in the context in which it is applied so society has an incentive to use 
the law and to demand the establishment of institutions that work to enforce and 
develop the law.98 Second, the judges, practitioners and other legal elites that are 
responsible for developing the law must be able to increase the quality of law in a 
way that is responsive to demand for legality.99 Thus, for law to be functioning, a 
demand for law should exist so the law on the books will be used in practice and 
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legal persons responsible for developing and administering the law will be 
responsive to this demand. Also, they assumed that if the transplanted law 
matches local conditions in the importing country, the law will be used and function 
as in an origin country,100 and as a result, strong public demand for institutions to 
enforce this law would follow.101 However, if the transplanted laws do not match 
local circumstances, or if they were imposed via colonization and the population 
within the transplant was not familiar with the law, then the demand for using these 
laws would be weak.102 They assumed that countries that received the law in this 
fashion were subject to the ‘transplant effect’.103 Hence, their main argument was 
that “legality is largely a function of demand for law. Only if demand for law is high, 
will there be a high voluntary compliance and will a society invest in the legal 
institutions necessary for upholding the legal order”.104 Therefore, based on their 
view, voluntary reforms initiated by the receiving countries (receptive transplants) 
are more likely to achieve better results than reforms imposed by outside forces 
(unreceptive transplants).105 Even though they recognised the possibility of legal 
borrowing from other countries, they argued that “a good fit of foreign with 
domestic law may not be only a lucky coincidence, but could be enhanced by 
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meaningful adaptation of imported laws to local conditions”.106 Furthermore, in his 
article ‘the codification of law and the transplant effect’, Pistor argues that over the 
past two hundred years of legal transplant, countries that transplanted a legal 
system wholesale have less efficient legal institutions107 today than countries that 
developed their own rules.108 This is, in her view, attributed to: initial economic 
conditions in the importing country, the political regime, cultural divergences, and 
inconsistency with pre-existing legal institutions.109 
     Hence, both of the above-mentioned studies acknowledged the existence of 
legal transplantations. However, such transplantations have an impact on the 
receiving countries in a way that might affect the implementation of such rules. It is 
argued that the effect of legal rules depends mainly on its “context-institutions, 
social and political forces and legal culture”.110 Thus, while it is normally an easy 
task to copy the text of foreign law, it is extremely difficult to transfer this context.111 
However, this does not undermine the importance of taking lessons from the 
experience of other jurisdictions. Thus, this thesis stresses that in the course of 
drafting or revising laws, it is desirable to adopt foreign rules or principles if these 
are appropriate in filling the gap in the importing country. As will be demonstrated 
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by examples,112 during its legislation path, Oman has tended to adopt some foreign 
legal principles. The aim of this thesis is, also, to take lessons from the experience 
of both England and the US by adopting some of the bankruptcy concepts or 
principles available under both jurisdictions. However, since Oman might be 
subject to ‘transplant effect’, this thesis argues that minimising the effect of 
transplantations can be planned for by assessing in advance the workability and 
functionality of the proposed foreign rules. Also, as will be discussed below,113 in 
assessing the impact of the imported legal principles on the importing country, it is 
important to continually review the effects of such transplantation.  
C. Measuring the Success of Legal Transplants 
     It is argued that legal transplants are as old as the law.114 However, as 
discussed above, the importing countries may suffer from what is called ‘the 
transplant effect’;115 that is, the mismatch of local conditions between the countries 
of origin and the importing countries.116 Hence, the question to be asked is whether 
it is possible to measure or anticipate the level of success of the transplanted legal 
rules. A number of scholars have approached this question but have failed to 
elaborate specific criteria117 to be used in judging the success of legal 
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transplants.118 Watson, for instance, states that “a successful legal transplant- like 
that of a human organ- will grow in its new body, and become part of that body just 
as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its parent system”, and 
“subsequent development in the host system should not be confused with 
rejection”.119 Thus, according to him, the success of a legal transplant depends 
largely on the recipient country’s desire for the foreign transplanted legal rule, 
rather than an awareness of, or similarities with, its context.120 However, in 
response to Watson, it is argued that measuring the effectiveness of the 
transplanted rules is too difficult since societies often have different ideas121 and 
what is considered success from one point of view does not necessarily entail 
success from another.122 Further, Neiken states that the meaning of success is 
vague and he raised a number of concerns,123 such as whether success should be 
judged from the perspective of those promoting or those receiving the transfer. 
Does the meaning to be given to success depend on the aims of the intentions and 
interests of those promoting an adaptation, and those who then do (or do not) 
make use of new opportunities, or submit to new controls or requirements (or resist 
and avoid them)? Or is it something for the scholar to assess in terms of external 
criteria, taking into account perhaps also those factors and unintended outcomes 
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which could not have been known to the social actors concerned, such as the way 
a given change is affected by the differentiating and integrating effects of 
globalisation? Thus, he argues that the most essential question from which there is 
no escape is who gets to establish what is meant by success.124 “What some 
observers and participants will see as success, others may well see as failure.”125  
     Since it is difficult to define the notion of success, it is proposed that such 
success can be assessed on a case by case basis, with particular reference to the 
specific reality considered.126 As a consequence, legal transplants are considered 
to be successful when they have shown to have resolved127 the judicial problems 
for which they have been made.128 Furthermore, in her book, Dupré argues that the 
success of any law importation will depend on the expectations that might be 
associated with it.129 For instance, it is necessary to have the expectation that 
transplanting legal rules from a foreign country would not turn the legal system of 
the imported country into an ideal one. However, legal transplants should be 
viewed as a successful process since normally something new will come out of it. 
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5.3.1 Transplanting Bankruptcy Laws 
     It has been already noted that the movement of legal rules, practices and 
institutions has been a normal occurrence all around the world and globalisation 
has increased the number of legal transplants.130 As will be demonstrated below,131 
many countries have reformed their bankruptcy laws through transplanting, 
imitating and borrowing other countries’ laws. In this regard, there are a number of 
drivers for reforming bankruptcy laws.132 First, some countries reform their laws, in 
particular corporate and bankruptcy laws, in order to attract foreign investment and 
to show foreign investors from various countries that they comply with the best 
recognised standards.133 Secondly, because of globalisation, many countries 
believe that building a viable bankruptcy system “will help fuel a market 
economy”.134 As a consequence, many countries135 have attempted to establish a 
reorganisation regime for failing traders like Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code.136 Further, several international organisations, such as funding agencies like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, normally make loan 
agreements to developing countries conditional upon adopting a specific model, 
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generally the Anglo-American model.137 This type of conditionality was also an 
essential feature of efforts made by the IMF to rescue banks and other financial 
institutions during the Asian Financial Crisis.138 However, it is stated that countries 
in financial crisis, as a result, are significantly dependent on infusions of funds from 
multilateral institutions, and are likely to be much more susceptible to lawmaking 
influence by these institutions than countries in stable financial circumstances.139 
Also, it is argued that since insolvency laws are integral to the development and 
growth of markets, many countries have recognised the importance of introducing 
bankruptcy reforms.140 
     Based on the above-mentioned factors and in recognition of the importance of 
rescue culture, many countries have reformed, and some are in process of 
reforming, their bankruptcy laws.141 However, in most cases, these new reforms or 
proposed reforms do not arise from existing cultural conditions;142 instead, the 
rules of such laws are transplanted from elsewhere and the cultural views are 
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expected to change with such reforms.143 It is stated that in many areas of 
commercial law, national law reforms can no longer be purely national.144 To one 
degree or another, the force for reform, the content of reform, and the ‘trajectory’ of 
reform proceeds from or responds to transnational and global context.145 The great 
majority of the national bankruptcy reforms of the past 15 years are influenced by 
transnational or international developments.146 It is stated that such reforms are 
not, normally, derived from the traditional cultural values of these countries; 
however, the reforms are attributed to the influence of ideas drawn from the notion 
of rescue culture.147 Thus, in recognition of the importance of rescue culture, many 
new bankruptcy laws have been transplanted from the United States.148 
     Despite the increase in transplantations of the US bankruptcy system, it is 
argued that the new reforms or proposed reforms have little impact, in reality, on 
the transplanted countries, if cultural views149 or attitudes are not changed.150 In 
her study, Martin examined the role of history and culture in developing bankruptcy 
and insolvency systems in a number of developed and developing countries.151 In 
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this regard, she argued that importing countries should avoid the wholesale 
transplantation of bankruptcy laws; rather, these countries should take into account 
the economic needs of their societies and their unique cultural components.152 This 
is due to that fact that regardless of what bankruptcy law says, the reality may be 
quite different.153 For instance, in Germany, the enacted Insolvency Code of 1999 
adopted the concept of a debtor-in-possession.154 However, the adaptation of this 
concept has been criticised and mistrusted by most of German society for a 
considerable time regardless of what the law says.155 Also, despite the technical 
requirement that an appointed administrator shall be independent, in reality the 
lead bank chooses an administrator who is friendly to its interests.156 As a result, 
Martin states that “long-held and strong cultural values may stand in the way, 
despite the best intentions of lawmakers”.157 
     Furthermore, an empirical and a legal study in six Asian legal systems (China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan) was conducted to 
examine how local legal cultures shape national approaches to corporate 
insolvency law and practice.158 That study suggested that law reforms which can 
mesh with pre-existing traditional attitudes, even if the source of the reform is a 
foreign one, are more likely to be successfully implemented.159 Also, this study 
demonstrated that despite the different cultures between these Asian systems and 
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the exported legal systems, traditional cultural values and attitudes to debt have 
been changing.160 As a consequence, this empirical study concluded that while the 
cultural attitudes in these Asian countries might continue to operate to some 
degree, particularly amongst the smaller and family companies, their impact on the 
imported bankruptcy laws seems to be declining.161 However, this is not to claim 
that cultural attitudes are not expected to change with such reforms. For instance, 
in China cultural views toward insolvency have changed over time as people have 
become more accustomed to the concept of insolvency.162 In their empirical study, 
one of the interviewees noted that “[I]n the beginning, people regarded bankruptcy 
as a loss of face; now they see they are given other opportunities as a result of 
bankruptcy. Employees see it as fortunate and only reasonable that their enterprise 
go bankrupt”.163 Also, in Japan there is a call to change cultural attitudes toward 
bankruptcy. For example, Japan’s Economy Minister has called for a change in 
both the laws and the attitudes towards debt repayment.164 In promoting the use of 
the Corporate Reorganisation Act, the Japanese Government broadcasted on 
prime-time television the merits of using this Act.165 In addition, within the area of 
business law, another empirical study examined the viability of transplanted foreign 
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investment code in Kazakhstan.166 This study also reached the conclusion that 
even though the transplanted law in question did not emerge from the culture of 
Kazakhstan and does not comport with Kazakhstan’s culture, the law has been 
accepted.167 
     These studies contradict the view of the supporters of the conventional theories 
that a specific culture requires a specific legal system and the view of both 
Montesquieu and Legrand that legal rules cannot cross cultural boundaries since 
they mirror the culture of the home country. Hence, it is argued that transplanted 
laws that grow outside the land of the importing countries can be accepted, even 
though this might occur after the passage of a period of time. The examples stated 
above demonstrate how cultural attitudes have changed as a result of such reform. 
However, cultural views can be changed by raising awareness amongst all 
stakeholders and communities about the advantages of using rescue proceedings. 
It was emphasised in a recent EU study that even though domestic policymakers 
adopt laws that promote the philosophy of a fresh start, there is a need to introduce 
a European cultural campaign promoting rescue culture.168 
5.3.2 Oman as an Importing Country 
     Although Oman is an Islamic country, most of its laws have western 
characteristics.169 In this regard, laws were enacted, even though some of their 
features contradict the principles of Sharia law. For example, one of the earliest 
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laws that was enacted in 1973 was the Law Relating to the Interpretation of Certain 
Terms and General Provisions (3/73). This law introduced a number of technical 
provisions normally encountered in western jurisdictions, such as rules governing 
the effect on private rights caused by the repeal of an existing law and its 
replacement by a new law.170 Furthermore, as is the case in most Arab States, the 
Omani Penal Law of 1974 abandoned the penal principles of Sharia and 
transplanted instead western notions of criminality and punishment.171 This is 
especially significant because the Islamic rules of crime and punishment, 
particularly what are called the hudud crimes, were abandoned.172 These include 
the most forbidden crimes, such as adultery, false accusation of adultery, drinking 
alcohol, theft, brigandage (a group of corrupt people joining together to use arms, 
cut off highways, steal property, kill people and prevent the free passage of 
persons, called highway robbers and brigands)173 and apostasy (the partial or 
complete abandonment or rejection of the beliefs and practice of a religion by a 
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person who is a follower of that religion).174 However, this does not mean that the 
role of Sharia has totally been discarded;175 rather, it is limited to the laws of family, 
including marriage, divorce, wills and inheritance.176 This leads a commentator to 
classify Oman as having a hybrid Islamic- Napoleonic system.177 Thus, the laws of 
Oman and the laws of some Arab countries, as described by Sfeir, are a composite 
of:178 
     ‘‘(1) a residual of Islamic law rules, whether in modern statutory form, as is the 
case with laws of domestic relations, or in its classical form applicable in Saudi 
Arabia as the common law of land where no statutory legislation exists, (2) the 
European-based codes, which constitute the backbone of the law in the private and 
public law fields, some of which succeeded in incorporating certain Islamic law 
rules of contracts and obligations considered viable under today’s conditions, and 
(3) a growing number of major, topical legislation, in the form of comprehensive 
statutes in such fields as arbitration, banking, copyright, environment, maritime, 
social security, taxation and so forth.’’  
 
It is true that Oman’s Penal Law, Company law, Civil and Criminal Procedures, 
Law of Evidence and Maritime Law are designed to imitate, repeat and copy 
Western laws.179 Except when dealing with some cases, Sharia courts have been 
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replaced by modern civil courts. Currently, Sharia principles appear only rarely in 
the Official Gazette, and, when they do, it is usually only for the purpose of 
measuring a traditional Sharia obligation, such as a bloodwite (compensation paid 
by a murderer to the family of the victim) or dower (paid by the groom to the bride 
under Islamic law).180 
     In addition, the Commercial Code was enacted in 1990 and includes a number 
of general principles of contracts and tort contained in the Napoleonic Code.181 It is 
worth noting that before the enactment of this law, reliance was on the principles of 
Sharia law.182 However, after the issuance of the Commercial Code, the role of 
Sharia in determining commercial acts has been narrowed considerably from its 
original position as the sole source of law. In this regard, Article 5 of this Code 
clearly states that Sharia law applies only in the absence of specific legislative 
provisions and in the absence of local or general customs. Hence, in the event of 
bankruptcy, if the court is unable to resolve an issue because of lack of a statutory 
provision, in this case the recourse will not be to Sharia rules, but rather the court 
should, firstly, look at local or general bankruptcy usages.183 In the absence of 
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such usages, the principles of Sharia will be utilised. This is despite the fact that 
Oman’s Basic Statute (known also as a Constitutional law) of 1996 clearly states 
that “Islamic Sharia is the basis for legislation”.184 However, this Basic Statute also 
contains provisions that point in another direction: the duty of obedience of the 
Basic Law, the principle of democracy and the legislation authority of the 
constitutional councils, the enactment of human rights such as the principle of 
equality, freedom of religion and others which might be against the principles of 
Sharia. This led a commentator to argue, rightly, that constitutional laws in most 
Muslim countries normally have one foundation basic norm that seems to say: the 
basic idea of this state is the compatibility of Sharia and Rule of Law; however, it 
appears that working out the details does not necessary reflect this norm.185 
     Since the core of this thesis is to examine the bankruptcy system in Oman, the 
specific question to be asked is what are the reasons for the lack of interest in 
Islamic principles in regard to bankruptcy. Why is Oman’s Commercial Code 
transplanted from other jurisdictions while, in dealing with bankruptcy, Sharia has a 
number of principles?186 It seems that this is due to a number of factors. First, 
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Oman is a modern187 country and the enactment of written laws started in 1973. 
The enactment of the Commercial Companies Law was in 1974. Unlike the case in 
Sharia where the concept of corporation does not exist, the Commercial 
Companies Law of 1974 followed the modern trend in granting a company a 
separate legal entity.188 Thus, in designing the Commercial Code the same 
approach was followed and, as a result, the rules governing the bankruptcy of 
companies in particular and the individual trader in general were transplanted.189 
Secondly, since the Commercial Code was enacted in 1990, it had to meet modern 
business needs in order to attract foreign investment.190 It had to establish rules 
and procedures that conformed remarkably well not only in Oman but also across 
national boundaries. Such needs were acknowledged even before the enactment 
of the Commercial Code. For instance, in 1972, a special Committee for the 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes was established to deal with commercial 
matters.191 Thus, even before the enactment of the Commercial Code in 1990, 
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Sharia rules were abandoned and this Committee was established merely to 
handle commercial cases according to modern principles, to the local and general 
customs and to Sharia principles as a last resort.192 Finally, as Hamoudi has 
argued,193 such a departure might be due to the fact that the Sharia bankruptcy 
principles are not useful194 or relevant to the order of modern commercial life and, 
as a consequence, the tendency has been to transplant other laws and ignore the 
rules of Sharia. For instance, the concept of cram-down is not recognised under 
Sharia law and, as a consequence, the debtor will be discharged from his debts in 
only two ways: full repayment of all unforgiven debts or death.195 In his regard, 
Qatar has begun a process of Islamisation of its banking sector through issuing 
bank directives designed to expand Islamic banking within the country, and 
initiated a bankruptcy regime in a 2006 law that bears all of the hallmarks of a 
Western transplant.196 However, it is worth mentioning that this does not mean 
Islamic law does not encourage the settlement of debts through partial or entire 
forgiveness or through granting respite. Rather, the Holy Quran encourages the 
creditors to forgive and grant debtors respite, even though such a demand 
constitutes purely a moral and not a mandatory obligation. In this regard, verse 
2:280 of the Holy Quran says that “if a person is in difficulties, let there be respite 
until a time of ease. And if you give freely [i.e. if you forgive the debts voluntarily] it 
would be better for you, if only you knew”. This Quranic verse makes it certain that 
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the concepts of social responsibility and charity are at the heart of the Sharia’s 
teaching.197 Even though the obedience of these concepts is not mandatory, it is 
argued that “this forceful divine recommendation to be kind to one’s debtor is 
balanced by the Quranic verse that compels a Muslim to repay their debts- making 
it a sin and not just a legal obligation not to pay off all of the debts that you have 
the capacity to repay: “O you who believe, you shall fulfill your covenants”.198 While 
Sharia encourages creditors to forgive their debtors or grant them respite, it urges 
the debtor to fulfill his obligation under the contract. Hence, it can be argued that 
Hamoudi’s argument that Sharia bankruptcy principles are not relevant to the order 
of modern commercial life is far from the truth.199 
     From the above discussion, it is obvious that during the past forty years of the 
legislation path in Oman, the Omani law-making elites chose to import most laws 
from other jurisdictions. Hence, transplanting others countries’ laws is not a new 
phenomenon in Oman. This leads to the question: in improving the bankruptcy 
regime in Oman, to what extent is it possible to learn from the experience of 
England and the US? To put it differently, what is the impact of proposing modern 
concepts to be adopted by the Omani legislator, such as the concept of rescue 
culture, the notion of ‘cram-down’, imposition of stay on secured creditors’ claims 
and the notion of ‘debtor-in-possession’. This thesis argues that such concepts, if 
proposed, might be accepted by the Omani legislator. This view is supported by a 
number of rationales. First, the current bankruptcy regime in Oman fails to deal 
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with the needs of today’s business. The law, as it stands today, is outdated and 
inconsistent with modern business requirements.200 As discussed in the previous 
chapter,201 the current regimes focus merely on the complete dissolution of the 
distressed debtors. However, the modern trend is the introduction of a rescue 
culture into bankruptcy frameworks, thereby rehabilitating viable firms instead of 
liquidating them. Hence, such concepts are unlikely to be rejected by the Omani 
legislator since they have the intention to follow the modern trend in the area of 
bankruptcy law. In this regard, in 2013, for instance, one of the issues discussed in 
the ‘Government Symposium for the Development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Oman’ was bankruptcy of small and medium enterprises and how 
reform of bankruptcy law is needed in order to encourage the concept of rescuing 
these enterprises instead of liquidating them. It is worth noting that, based on a 
royal order issued by His Majesty the Ruler of Oman, all recommendations stated 
in the final report of this symposium shall be considered as decisions that need to 
be implemented by the government and various institutions, not recommendations 
that have to be considered.202 Thus, the importance of establishing a modern 
bankruptcy regime is fully acknowledged. Secondly, Oman’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2000 and Oman’s Free trade Agreement with the 
United States, which came into force on January 1, 2009, fosters the government’s 
desire to bring Omani commercial laws into conformity with internationally 
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accepted standards.203 In this regard, in 2011 the U.S. Department of Commerce 
started providing training and capacity building to encourage Omani policy-makers 
to update the current bankruptcy regimes to allow for appropriate restructuring of 
the distressed enterprises.204 Also, in support of Oman’s interest in increasing 
international trade and entrepreneurship, the Commercial Law Development 
Program (CLDP)205 is providing technical assistance to Omani law makers in order 
to develop a bankruptcy law that supports the restructuring of struggling 
businesses.206 Finally, it is argued that such reforms will be accepted, even though 
some of the notions that will be proposed are not recognised under Sharia law, 
such as the notion of cram-down. This is due to the fact that the Commercial Code 
of 1990 has already incorporated provisions that are inconsistent with the strict 
rules of Sharia. Nevertheless, such rules207 were accepted and have been in force 
since the enactment of this Code. For instance, one of the fundamental principles 
of commercial transactions under Sharia is the prohibition of riba, which is 
translated as interest or usury, undue profits or excessive gain from a 
transaction.208 However, such usury is not prohibited under the Commercial Code. 
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In this regard, Article 80 of the Commercial Code states that “a creditor shall have 
the right to exact interest in exchange of the procurement by the debtor of a loan or 
commercial debt…. [W]here the debtor fails to make the repayment on the due 
date, the creditor shall be entitled to exact the agreed interest for the period of 
delay”. The acceptance of usury, although strictly forbidden under Sharia, indicates 
that the introduction of bankruptcy principles that are not recognised under Sharia 
law may not be rejected, since such principles are not strictly prohibited. This is 
manifested by the desire of the Omani legislator to bring commercial laws into 
conformity with the needs of today’s business. 
     Hence, as it is stated by Markovits “starting from scratch means one must look 
for models” and “working from scratch also means that legislatures can provide 
their new laws with equally new supportive institutions”.209 Reforming Oman’s 
bankruptcy regime is important to avoid what is called ‘jurisdiction shopping’.210 It is 
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stated that many Middle-eastern based institutions are electing to make use of 
debtor-friendly bankruptcy regimes, e.g. US Chapter 11, to escape the deficiencies 
of their home jurisdictions.211 This can be done by a change of a company’s Centre 
of Main Interest (COMI) to the jurisdiction having a competitive bankruptcy 
framework.212 It is argued that bankruptcy laws vary widely with respect to the 
complexity of the proceedings and the possible outcome and, because of these 
potentially huge distinctions, it can be advantageous for companies in difficulty to 
choose a jurisdiction which provides procedures that allow them to reach their aims 
in the easiest, cheapest and most effective way.213 In this regard, Hellas 
Telecommunication, for instance, considered the insolvency procedures in England 
to offer a ‘more flexible environment’ for rescuing the business of the company 
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than Luxembourg.214 Thus, in order to avoid this kind of jurisdiction shopping and in 
order to follow the modern trend, the Omani legislator should learn from the 
experience of other jurisdictions. If we acknowledge the fact that ‘business is 
business’ all over the world,215 then the best bankruptcy law practices can be the 
best everywhere as long as they serve the importing country.216 
5.4 The Necessity for Bankruptcy Reform in Oman 
     In the previous chapter, it was argued that, from a number of angles, the current 
bankruptcy regime in Oman is outdated and inconsistent with the needs of 
business today.217 This thesis supported such an argument by stating a number of 
justifications.218 As a result, the view of this thesis is that the introduction of 
bankruptcy reform in Oman is more necessary now than in previous years. This is 
due to a number of reasons to be discussed below. 
A- Oman’s Economic Vision of 2020 
     It was acknowledged that in order to formulate a clear vision for Oman’s 
economy, it was necessary to prepare the required studies for carrying out a 
comprehensive evaluation of production and service sectors. Thus, after 
conducting a number of studies219 and examining a number of proposals 
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conducted by various Ministerial Committees,220 in 1995 a government conference 
was held in order to present “the draft statement of the Vision for Oman’s Economy 
(formulated by the various ministerial committees) to a wider audience in Oman”.221 
During this conference, a number of recommendations, which helped in formulating 
the final draft of the Vision for Oman’s Economy and its associated policies and 
mechanisms, were made. His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman, 
approved the final draft of ‘Oman’s Economic Vision: 2020’ in June 1995. Within 
the framework of such a vision, Oman’s economy will be able to shift from one that 
relies on government initiatives and spending, oil resources and expatriate labour 
as the main engines of economic activity, to one that relies “on private initiatives, 
national labour, and renewable resources that lead to achievement of sustainable 
development, and an improvement in the living standards of the Omani citizens”222. 
     It is aimed that Oman’s 2020 vision will be achieved through four major 
strategies:223 sustainable development within a stable macroeconomic224 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
annual consultations with the government of the Sultanate of Oman regarding the country’s 
financial and fiscal positions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested a group of measures 
related to the economic adjustment process. More examples of further studies: see Ministry of 
National Economy, ‘Long-Term Development Strategy (1996-2020): Vision for Oman’s Economy-
2020’, (2
nd
 edition, 2007), pp. 13-14. 
220
 Proposals have been made by the Ministry of Development and Development Council and other 
ministries: see ibid, pp. 15-35. 
221
 It was felt that a conference of this nature is useful in providing examples of planning experience 
from other countries: ibid, p. 21. 
222
 Ibid, p. 7. 
223
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224
 The subject-matter of economics has been divided into two parts: micro economics and macro-
economics. The term micro economics is derived from the Greek word mikros, meaning ‘small’ and 
the term Macro Economics is derived from the Greek word macros, meaning ‘large’. Thus, micro 
economics deals with the analysis of small individual units of the economy, such as individual 
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framework,225 human resources development,226 diversification of economy227 and 
development of the private sector.228 These strategies are  based on a number of 
dimensions, such as (i) upgrading the government role in the basic fields229 and 
reducing its role in the production and service fields; (ii) offering suitable conditions 
for economic diversification through, for example, developing small and medium 
size establishments and the encouragement of foreign direct investment through 
the establishment of an encouraging climate for investment, through the 
promulgation of laws, institutional and administrative procedures and the 
development of the infrastructure necessary for attracting such investment. In order 
to implement these strategies and dimensions, the government has instituted a 
number of formal five-year development plans, the first of which was implemented 
during the period 1996-2000.230 Currently, Oman is in the middle of the Eighth 
Five-Year Development Plan (2011-2015).231 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
consumers, individual and small firms. On the other hand, Macro Economics concerns itself with the 
analysis of the economy as a whole and its large aggregate: Mishra R., Industrial Economics and 
Management Principles, (Firewall Media, 2008), p.24; It is also stated that Microeconomics deals 
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single market-. Macroeconomics deals with human behavior and choices as they relate to an entire 
economy. Microeconomics deals with the demand for a particular good or service, while 
macroeconomics deals with total demand for goods and services: see Arnold R., Macroeconomics, 
(Cengage Learning, 2006), p. 3. 
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 See Long-Term Development Strategy, above 219, pp. 43-62. 
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 The five-year plans, which Oman began implementing in 1976, aim to deliver economic growth 
on a carefully studied basis as well as social welfare. They are constantly reviewed during their 
implementation, so that the challenges facing them can be identified and investigated: see Oman: 
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     One of the fundamental objectives of the 2020 economic vision of Oman is to 
diversify the economy through attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).232 FDI is 
considered one of the sources that Oman relies on to implement the program 
adopted by the government within the framework of the 2020 economic vision.233 It 
is clearly acknowledged that in order to encourage foreign investors, the 
government should create the proper climate234 to induce such investment.235 The 
government believes in the role that can be played by foreign investment in 
economic development,236 creation of jobs for Omanis, transfer of technology and 
the opening of markets for Omani products.237 
     However, in encouraging such investment, each country has to offer the best 
environment for foreign investors. In this regard, there are a number of factors that 
acts as a determinant of FDI. It is argued that the size and the potential growth of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
231
 In this regard, the Supreme High Committee for the Five-Year Development Plans sets out the 
basic elements and guidelines for the five-year development plans. This involves carrying out half-
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markets, strong institutions (i.e. the competence of the judiciary) and an investor-
friendly environment (i.e. protecting creditors’ rights, reducing taxes, and 
encouraging business reorganisation) are drivers of FDI.238 Thus, due to a range of 
factors, it is necessary to enact a number of business laws in order to attract 
FDI.239 First, it is stated that the flows of FDI are to some extent determined by the 
effectiveness of the legal system240 of the host country.241 Further, it is asserted 
that “the quality of the laws and regulation, and the extent to which this quality is 
reflected in their implementation, may be a useful signal to foreign investors of the 
overall quality of the business environment”.242 Nowadays, investors are more 
prudent in making their investment decisions since the risk of facing bankruptcy 
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 Hornberger K., Battat J. & Kusek P., ‘Attracting FDI: How Does Investment Climate Matters’, 
view point, World Bank; available at: 
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has increased considerably.243 As a result, before choosing the destination of their 
business, foreign investors may look for effective bankruptcy law jurisdictions.244 
     Since the encouragement of FDI is one of the important pillars of Oman’s 
economic vision of 2020, Oman has to provide a tempting economic climate in 
order to attract such investment. In an attempt to ease the access of foreign 
investment into the country, Oman has already provided incentives for foreign 
investors. Such incentives include establishing what is called a ‘One Stop Shop’, 
an e-Government initiative to provide on-line company registration to enable 
investors to set up companies in Oman while minimising paperwork, saving costs 
and time.245 Also, while there is no personal income tax, the rate of corporate tax is 
a flat rate of 12% applicable to all companies registered in Oman, whether wholly 
Oman-owned, wholly foreign-owned or joint venture companies with a percentage 
of foreign equity.246 Further, a number of laws have been enacted to provide 
protection and encouragement to both foreign and domestic investors, such as the 
Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1994, Privatisation Law of 2004, Arbitration Law 
of 1997, Industrial Property Rights Law of 2008 and the Copyrights Law of 2008. 
For instance, because of the increasing engagement of Oman in the world 
economy and the opening of the Omani market to foreign investors, the Arbitration 
Law of 1997 was issued in order to attract foreign investment by assuring them of 
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the fact that they are free to opt for arbitration.247 Further, the aims of establishing 
the Public Authority for Investment Promotion and Export Development (PAIPED) 
in 2011 are to increase the private sector’s role in providing the investments 
needed for the Sultanate’s development plans and to promote the export of Omani 
goods to countries around the world.248  
     Hence, the aim of these laws and the purpose of offering a number of incentives 
are to facilitate the access of foreign investment to the market. However, the view 
of this thesis is that it is not sufficient to facilitate merely the access to the market; 
rather, it is also important for Oman to regulate the exit from the market in an 
orderly manner. This is to say that future bankruptcy law should offer an alternative 
to liquidating the business of viable distressed enterprises. As stated above, 
because of the increased occurrence of bankruptcy worldwide,249 investors tend to 
direct their investment to countries that have an effective bankruptcy law 
jurisdiction. As a result, in order to attract more potential foreign investment, Oman 
has to reform its bankruptcy law in a manner that attracts such investment. 
Reforming bankruptcy law in a way that encourages the rehabilitation of a 
distressed debtor’s business instead of liquidating its assets, particularly if it is a 
viable business, can result in controlling its exit from the market. It is asserted that 
having effective market exit procedures could also help in accelerating the rate of 
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economic growth and has an effect in saving and creating jobs.250 Hence, this 
thesis support the view that promoting the philosophy of the rescue culture leads to 
the implementation of Oman’s economic vision 2020 since attracting foreign 
investment is one of its main pillars. However, as will be discussed below,251 this is 
not to suggest that rescuing the business of the enterprises should be at the 
expense of secured creditors. Rather, their interests should be protected and the 
rescue plan should not be imposed on them unless sufficient protection is 
provided. 
B- The Role of Small and Medium Enterprises 
     Another factor that necessitates bankruptcy reform in Oman is the important 
role that is played by SMEs. The significant contributions that are made by SMEs 
in promoting national economies have been acknowledged by both developed252 
and developing countries.253 As a consequence, in constructing their development 
strategies, countries often rely on these enterprises since they contribute 
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considerably to the economy and their growth rate exceeds that of large firms.254 
However, at present, there is no common definition of small and medium 
enterprises and such definitions that do exist vary from country to country.255 This 
difference emerges from the fact that countries usually define SMEs based on their 
own criteria, usually benchmarking against annual sales turnover, number of full-
time employees and shareholders’ funds.256 For instance, under EU law and 
according to the Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, the main factors 
determining whether a company is an SME are the number of employees and 
either turnover or the total of the balance sheet.257 Also, in the US, the Small 
Business Administration258 sets small business criteria based on a number of 
factors, such as the number of employees, revenue and type of industry. 
     In Oman, there are two key factors that define the size of a business: the 
number of employees and the amount of annual sales turnover. This is based on a 
Ministerial Order issued by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 2012.259 
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Table 1. Definition of SMEs in Oman 
Type No. of Employees Annual Sales Turnover 
(R.O)  
Micro 1-4 To 25.000 
Small 5-9 25.000 - 250.000 
Medium 10-99 250.000 - 1.500.000 
 
As shown in Table 1, the criteria used to determine the type of SMEs do not 
differentiate between various manufacturing sectors. Thus, any enterprise will be 
categorised as a micro, small or medium enterprise if its number of employees and 
its annual sales turnover are within the limits specified by the Ministerial Order. 
     The number of SMEs in Oman is almost 75,000 (see Table 2) and these 
enterprises account for over 90 per cent of the registered enterprises.260 
Furthermore, these enterprises are the major contributors of Oman’s GDP.261 At 
the beginning of 2013, almost 13.8 per cent of Oman’s GDP was accounted for by 
small and medium enterprises.262 Further, SMEs are the engine for job creation 
since they are the main providers of many job opportunities for Omanis and 
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expatriates.263 According to statistics released by the Ministry of Manpower264 in 
2012 it is shown that there are over 218,588 Omani employees and 1,460,645 
foreign employees in the private sector. Most of these jobs are provided by small 
and medium enterprises.    
Table 2. Number of SMEs in Oman in 2010  
Sector  1-9 910-99 
Agriculture/fishing/surgery  144 31 
Mining  42 135 
Raw material  14120 794 
Construction  2558 911 
Gas/electricity/water 66 53 
Retail and wholesale  33835 1604 
Hotels and restaurant  5488 540 
Transport/storage/telecommunication 1103 241 
Financial services 741 198 
Housing/ hiring  3639 399 
Educational services 339 300 
Health/ charities  639 72 
Social and personal services  6951 50 
Total  69665 5328 
Source: Ministry of National Economy 
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     In recognition of the importance of SMEs for diversification and development of 
the economy, prospective increased employment opportunities and gainful use of 
domestic resources, the Directorate General for Development of SMEs,265 in the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, was established in 2007. Furthermore, one of 
the main pillars of the Oman 2020 development vision is promotion of SMEs. In 
this regard, it is intended that SMEs will be responsible for 50 per cent of Oman’s 
manufacturing by the year 2020.266 In addition, in recognition of the relevance of 
SMEs for economic development and following a Royal Order made by Sultan 
Qaboos, the ruler of Oman, in January 2013 a three day ‘Government Symposium 
for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises in Oman’ was held. One of 
the issues discussed in this symposium was ‘bankruptcy of small and medium 
enterprises’ and how the current bankruptcy regime is inconsistent with the 
requirements of business today. 
     The importance of SMEs in Oman is manifest.267 Hence, due to their role in 
economic development, it is crucial to provide the necessary legal framework in 
order to preserve the continuous contributions of these types of enterprises. Oman 
has already launched several unique initiatives to help the SME sector in playing 
its role in the Sultanate’s economic development. Such initiatives include 
facilitating access to the necessary funding to SMEs in order to help them expand 
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and create jobs. For instance, the Oman Development Bank268 was established to 
provide finance to corporate, medium enterprises and small projects for the key 
sectors, such as industry, agriculture, tourism, fisheries, medicine and education. 
In this regard, the bank charges an interest rate of only 3 per cent per annum. It 
also provides interest free loans for small investors who are fully devoted to their 
projects and have no other commitments elsewhere.269 Further, such incentives 
include granting these enterprises land to be used in running their businesses. 
However, to sustain the constant contributions of SMEs, this thesis argues that 
regulating the exit of unviable enterprises from the market in an organised manner 
is fundamental. In addition, offering SMEs an alternative route to liquidation 
procedures is necessary. In this regard, rehabilitating the viable enterprises helps 
in protecting existing jobs and maintaining the continuous contributions of SMEs to 
Oman’s economy. As was discussed in Chapter Two,270 many scholars were of the 
opinion that it is not the aim of bankruptcy law just to liquidate the assets of 
distressed debtors, but rather the role of bankruptcy law is also to rehabilitate the 
assets of viable enterprises.  
C- Other Factors 
     Another factor that necessitates the need for introducing bankruptcy law reform 
in Oman is that current bankruptcy regimes are ill-regulated due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, as stated in the previous chapter,271 the definition of the word 
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‘bankruptcy’ is vague and it is unclear what sort of tests are to be adhered to in 
determining the status of ‘inability to pay debt’.272 Whether reliance should be on 
the ‘cash flow test’ or ‘balance sheet test’ is ambiguous. Secondly, there is no 
definite time-limit for the completion of all bankruptcy procedures and this results in 
spending four years on average to resolve bankruptcy cases in Oman.273 Such a 
lengthy period has an impact on wasting the assets of the company since secured 
creditors’ actions are not stayed during the process. Thirdly, the lack of availability 
of restructuring procedures also renders the bankruptcy regime of Oman to be 
insufficiently regulated. Finally, the lower ranking of Oman in the World Bank 
Business Report of 2014, compared to other countries, in resolving insolvency 
cases also requires the introduction of such reform. As stated in the previous 
chapter,274 Oman stands at 72 in the ranking of 189 economies on the easing of 
resolving insolvency. Where it only takes one year in the UK, 1.5 years in the USA, 
and 2.5 years in Bahrain, resolving bankruptcy cases takes 4 years in Oman.275 
     All the above factors call for an urgent reform of Oman’s bankruptcy regime. 
However, any future bankruptcy reform should take into account the reasons 
behind the inefficiencies of the current bankruptcy regime. Examples of such 
reasons are that, as already discussed in the previous chapter, the current 
bankruptcy regime does not promote the rescue of the distressed debtors,276 
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access to bankruptcy proceeding is not easy,277 there is no a particular time-limit 
within which the bankruptcy procedure should be completed, the persons 
administering the proceedings are not required to be qualified,278 and there is no 
clear priority rule.279 In this regard, this thesis argues that future bankruptcy reform 
should address these issues and try to overcome such inadequacies by taking note 
from the experience of England and the US. Hence, proposing a map for future 
reform is the aim of the next part of this chapter. 
5.5 A Map for Future Reform 
     In Chapter Four,280 it was clearly shown how Oman’s current bankruptcy regime 
is inefficiently regulated. Such insufficiency emerges from the fact that the current 
bankruptcy regime does not encourage the rehabilitation of enterprises but rather 
that liquidating the assets of businesses is their main purpose. The importance of a 
rescue culture has not yet been recognised by the Omani legislator.281 Even 
though Omani Law allows the distressed trader to opt for the preventive 
composition scheme, the aim of this scheme is not to rescue the company.282 
Rather, as it is stated in the Commercial Code,283 the aim of this scheme is to allow 
the distressed debtor to escape the consequences of bankruptcy declaration. This 
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leads to a failure to encompass some of the principles that are considered vital to 
any modern bankruptcy regime.284 
     Currently, the Commercial Code, for instance, complicates access to the 
preventive composition scheme.285 First, the only person who can apply for this 
scheme is the distressed debtor.286 However, applying for this scheme is not 
without restrictions. The rights of an individual trader or a company to apply for this 
scheme is restricted and a number of conditions have to be met for such an 
application to be approved by the court.287 As discussed above,288 for such an 
application to be approved by the court, the suffering debtor has to demonstrate 
that his/ her business activities are disturbed in a way that leads to the cessation of 
payments,289 he/she traded continuously for two years,290 and that the disturbance 
of the business is not the result of gross fault or fraud.291 Secondly, even though 
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the Commercial Code encourages the distressed debtor/ management of a 
company to file for a preventive composition scheme by allowing them to stay at 
office, there is no statutory obligation on them to apply for this scheme once they 
sense the disturbance of the business. However, as stated in the previous 
chapter,292 Article 695 of the Commercial Code gives a bankruptcy trustee the right 
to seek a court permission to order all members of the Board of Directors or all the 
managers, or some of them jointly or severally to pay all or some of the debts of 
the company unless they establish that they have exercised the necessary care in 
running the business of the company. Also, the company’s directors may incur 
criminal liability in the case where the company’s bankruptcy has been caused by 
fraudulent actions on their part, pursuant to Article 301 of Oman’s Penal Code of 
1974 which provides for imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years. 
Nevertheless, even though there is a reference to director liabilities under both the 
Commercial Code and Penal Code, there is are no detailed statutory provisions 
analogous to the UK law on wrongful trading and company director 
disqualification.293 It is argued that the UK insolvency law offers company directors 
incentives as in ‘sticks and carrots’ in order to encourage them to take action once 
they sense the disturbance of the business.294 Although the traders/ directors are 
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aware of the disturbance of the business’s activities, in Oman they are not obliged 
to apply for a preventive composition scheme. Thirdly, one of the issues with the 
current composition scheme is that even though actions are stayed during the 
proceedings, secured creditors are not allowed to participate in the voting on the 
preventive composition plan unless they relinquish their securities.295 
     In addition, since creditors are not allowed to apply for a preventive composition 
scheme, the only option available to them is to apply for bankruptcy procedures. 
Applying for bankruptcy proceedings means that, if statutory conditions are met,296 
the court may declare the bankruptcy of the trader297 and a bankruptcy trustee will 
be appointed to administer and realise the assets of the bankrupt company or sole 
merchant.298 Furthermore, currently once bankruptcy procedures are initiated 
secured creditors are not prevented from enforcing their securities during 
bankruptcy proceedings.299 This means that the assets of the debtors will be 
wasted since secured creditors will run to the court house to be first to secure the 
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enforcement of their securities.300 The reason behind this behaviour is that secured 
creditors are not given the necessary incentives to negotiate a rescue deal with 
their debtors. Hence, it can be argued that not staying secured creditors’ claims 
during bankruptcy proceedings is another issue with the current bankruptcy regime 
in Oman. As discussed in Chapter Two,301 despite the divergences between the 
creditors’ bargain theory and multiple values theory, in recognition of the 
importance of the notion of collectivity, both theories recognise the importance of 
staying creditors’ actions during bankruptcy proceedings. For instance, Jackson 
stated that staying creditors’ claims will help in increasing the common pool of 
assets and (help in increasing) also the returns of the creditors.302 It was also 
discussed in Chapter Three303 that under both England and the US bankruptcy 
laws, the notion of collectivity is recognised.304 
     From the above discussion, it is argued that Oman’s current bankruptcy regime 
needs to be modernised.305 However, such modernisation needs to reflect the 
requirements of today’s business and needs to reflect Oman’s economic vision 
2020. As stated above,306 there are a number of factors that necessitate the 
introduction of bankruptcy reform in Oman, such as the importance of SMEs in the 
development of the national economy and the desire to attract FDI. For instance, 
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even though its importance in the development of the economy is recognised,307 
there are no rescue bankruptcy procedures designed for SMEs. 
     The aim of this section is to draw a map for future bankruptcy regimes by 
acknowledging the importance of taking lessons from the experience of both 
England and the US regimes. Nonetheless, learning from the experience of these 
jurisdictions means recognising the fact that wholesale transplantations of both 
England and the US regimes are not appropriate, but rather the purpose is to adopt 
the principles that, based on the researcher’s point of view,308 are important for any 
future bankruptcy reform. In this regard, it is worth noting that proposing the 
adaptation of bankruptcy principles that are found in England or the US will be 
subject to a number of factors that should be taken into account. It was 
emphasised that309 in proposing bankruptcy principles, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the differences in culture and infrastructure between the importing 
and exporting countries. In this regard, this thesis argues that the competence of 
the court and the professionalism of persons administering the bankruptcy 
processes are of great importance in administering bankruptcy cases.310 
Furthermore, even though this thesis places great emphasis on the importance of 
introducing a future rescue regime based on the experience of both England and 
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the US, the proposed regime will take into account the particular characteristics311 
of Oman. Thus, it is not the aim of this thesis to suggest mere transplantations of 
bankruptcy principles that are found in England and the US. Whilst it is sometimes 
appropriate to combine the experience of both England and the US,312 in some 
cases opting for only the US approach or the approach in England is the preferred 
choice.313 As stated in Chapter Three,314 even though both England and the US 
adopt the concept of a rescue culture, there are a number of differences between 
the legal frameworks governing corporate restructuring in the two jurisdictions. In 
this regard, Moss stated that while corporate insolvency in England is regarded as 
a disgrace,315 in the US business failure is viewed as a result of misfortune rather 
than wrongdoing.316 Also, whereas in the US risk taking is thought to be a good 
thing and creditors are perceived as being greedy, in the UK the judicial bias 
towards creditors reflects a general social attitude which is inclined to penalise risk-
takers when the risk goes wrong and side with creditors who lose out.317 As stated 
above,318 both England and the US adopt the notion of DIP, the concept of 
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moratorium and the notion of cram-down. However, because of such divergences, 
each of them adopts these concepts in a different manner. Hence, these 
differences will be taken into account when proposing bankruptcy concepts or 
principles to be adopted by the Omani legislator. 
5.5.1 A Need for a Clear Statutory Mandate 
     In the future, Oman’s bankruptcy law should have a clear statutory vision as this 
will help in designing the appropriate procedures that reflect such mandate. In 
Chapter Two, various theories underpinning bankruptcy law were discussed. Each 
of these theories offers justifications for bankruptcy law and its processes. For 
instance, the creditors’ bargain theory views bankruptcy law as having a single 
function to maximise the interests of creditors.319 Because of this view, the 
supporters of this theory affirmed that the provisions of bankruptcy law should be 
designed to reflect these ends.320 Thus, according to them, rehabilitating the 
business of the company should not be attempted unless it serves and maximises 
the interests of creditors as a whole. However, other theories, e.g. 
communitarian,321 forum,322 and the multiple values theory323 oppose the creditors’ 
bargain theory by asserting that besides protecting the interests of creditors, 
bankruptcy law should be directed to serve the interests of others, such as 
employees, customers, the government and so on. Thus, the supporters of these 
theories propose a number of aims that should be followed by bankruptcy laws. 
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These aims include establishing a forum in which all interests affected by the 
failure of the business can be heard,324 establishing a compulsory debt collection 
system,325 distributing the effects of financial distress among a broad range of 
actors326 and establishing a clear priority rule.327 
     In this thesis, it is argued that bankruptcy law should be designed in a way that 
protects the interests of creditors whilst protecting the interests of other 
stakeholders, such as employees, customers and suppliers.328 This is due to the 
fact that in the event of financial distress, certain confronting claimants outside the 
common pool of creditors arise exclusively because of the trader’s bankruptcy and 
for no other reason.329 As a result, bankruptcy law should take into account these 
claimants. However, caution should be taken since it is impossible to treat all 
stakeholders equally. Each group has its own interests.330 For instance, the interest 
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of secured creditors is in enforcing their securities promptly; the interest of 
employees is in safeguarding their jobs and in receiving their salaries; the interest 
of suppliers is in enforcing their contracts; the interest of the government is in 
gaining taxes and the interest of the local community is in benefiting from the 
service of the company. Even though the legislator is advised to strike a balance 
between the various interests affected by the troubles of the debtor, it is worth 
mentioning that striking the right balance is sometimes difficult and someone will 
be targeted. For example, if it is unviable to rehabilitate the company, the 
employees will be the target and they will lose their jobs as a result of liquidating 
the assets of the trader. Also, even though the administrator decides to rehabilitate 
the enterprise, creditors’ interests should not be prejudiced and sufficient protection 
should be provided. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Three,331 the 
reorganisation plan will not be implemented unless it is proven that all pre-petition 
creditors are sufficiently protected. Also, in the US, a super priority status will not 
be granted to the new lender unless it is demonstrated that secured creditors 
interests are not affected.332 
     In addition, in designing bankruptcy law, the Omani legislator should state 
clearly the aim of each of bankruptcy proceedings. For instance, in designing a 
rescue regime the purpose of such a regime should be clearly stated in the 
bankruptcy law. In this case, a lesson can be learned from the position under the 
administration regime in England. Under the Enterprise Act 2002, the purpose of 
the administration regime has been clearly articulated in a single hierarchy of 
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objectives. In paragraph 3 (1), it is clearly stated that the purpose of administration 
is to rescue the company as a going concern. However, if this is not applicable, the 
administrator should seek to implement the second objective, which is achieving a 
better result for the company’s creditors (as a whole). If the implementation of the 
second objective is not applicable, the administrator should follow the final 
objective, which is to make distribution to one or more secured or preferential 
creditors. The Enterprise Act 2002 offers clarity in relation to the aims of the 
administration regime and the same should be done by the Omani legislator. 
Hence, if besides the liquidation regime, the Omani legislator opts for a single 
bankruptcy regime that applies to large enterprises with special provisions devoted 
to SMEs, the mandate of such a regime should be clear. In this regard, this thesis 
supports the view that the future bankruptcy regime of Oman should be designed 
in a way that encourages the rehabilitation of viable enterprises and puts into 
liquidation those which are not. Rescuing viable enterprises has its impact on 
maximising creditors’ returns,333 and saving employees’ jobs.334 Even though the 
bankruptcy regime should be devised to save the business of the company, this 
should be done through providing adequate protection to the creditors. This is due 
to the fact that secured creditors, usually banks, are the main providers of credit 
and bankruptcy law should take their interests into account during bankruptcy 
proceedings. In this case, a lesson should be taken from the position under the US 
                                                             
333
 In this regard, in England, for instance, a recent empirical study shown that post-Enterprise Act 
administrations deliver more returns to secured creditors than pre-Enterprise Act administrations: 
see Frisby S., above 6. 
334
 As stated above, for example the rescue of Game Group in the UK has saved nearly 3,200 jobs: 
see above p. 122. 
324 
 
Chapter 11. As stated above,335 although the aim of Chapter 11 is to rescue the 
enterprise through proposing a rescue plan, such a plan will not be imposed over 
the wishes of objecting creditors unless it is proven that they are sufficiently 
protected. Also, if valid contracts are assumed during bankruptcy processes, the 
other contracting parties should be given adequate assurance of future 
performance. It is not suitable to oblige a supplier to continue to deliver goods or 
services to a bankrupt customer unless there is in place a sufficient guarantee that 
payment for any future deliveries will be made.336 
5.5.2 Certainty and Predictability in Bankruptcy Law 
     Besides having a clear statutory vision, this thesis argues that it is important for 
the Omani legislator to design a bankruptcy law that provides a level of certainty 
and predictability. There are a number of rationales supporting this argument. First, 
it is stated that “a predicable law promotes stability in commercial transactions, 
fosters lending and investment at lower risk premiums, and promotes consensual 
resolutions of disputes between a debtor and its creditors by establishing a 
backdrop against which parties can assess their relative rights”.337 Secondly, in the 
absence of predictable and certain bankruptcy law and procedures, foreign 
investors might be reluctant to initiate their business. As stated above,338 one of the 
determinants of the flows of FDI is the effectiveness of the legal system in the host 
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country. Thirdly, this thesis argues that before initiating their investment, it is 
necessary for domestic and foreign investors to know ex ante the available 
bankruptcy regimes and the procedures that can be used in the event of financial 
distress.339 Furthermore, it is important for the suppliers to know in advance the 
fate of their contractual arrangement with the troubled traders and the sort of 
protection available for them.340 Finally, the bankruptcy law should be predictable 
in order to enable various participants to evaluate legal risks in advance to help 
them adjust their transactions to reflect those legal risks.341 The aim of this part is 
to highlight the importance of offering clarity in regard to the bankruptcy test, and 
offering certainty and predictability in regard to priority entitlement. 
5.5.2.1 Certainty in Regard to Bankruptcy Tests 
     Oman’s Commercial Code of 1990 does not provide an exact meaning of the 
phrase of ‘inability to pay debt’.342 As stated in the previous chapter,343 any trader 
who ceases to pay a due commercial debt might be declared bankrupt. In most 
jurisdictions, the expression ‘inability to pay debt’ is examined by making reference 
to two tests of bankruptcy. The cash flow bankruptcy test in which a company is 
insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due344 and the balance sheet 
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bankruptcy test where a company is insolvent if its liabilities exceed its assets.345 
As explained in Chapter Four,346 this is the case in England where the definition of 
inability to pay debts is clearly stated in Section 123 of the Insolvency Act of 1986 
and this definition includes both tests of insolvency. This provides clarity in the 
sense that in England directors are obliged to apply for the administration regime 
as soon as they become aware of the problem.347 Thus, having a clear criterion in 
regard to the phrase ‘inability to pay debt’ helps them in avoiding the 
consequences of wrongful trading and disqualification proceedings.348 
     Under Oman’s current bankruptcy regime, the ‘inability to pay debts’ is vague 
and it is unclear what sort of tests are used to determine the status of 
insolvency.349 For instance, in one of the High Court Rulings, it is clearly stated that 
“regardless of the amount of unpaid debt, the court has the right to declare the 
bankruptcy of any trader”.350 Even though the debtor ceases to pay a single 
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commercial debt, the court has the right to declare the status of bankruptcy.351 
Based on this ruling, reliance is on the cash flow bankruptcy test without taking into 
consideration the fact that the liabilities of the debtor might exceed its assets. Also, 
this ruling does not distinguish between an honest and dishonest creditor. 
Provoking the bankruptcy of the trader due to a single unpaid debt means that 
viable businesses might be declared bankrupt. Hence, future bankruptcy law 
should establish clear criteria that can be relied on in determining the status of 
insolvency. In this case, it is important to examine the state of bankruptcy by 
making reference to two tests of bankruptcy.  In this regard, the view of this thesis 
is that in determining a trader’s inability to pay debts, both the cash flow test and 
the balance sheet test should be included within the definition of ‘inability to pay 
debts’.352 To clarify, establishing clear guidance helps in providing a level of 
certainty and predictability since it is not appropriate to declare the bankruptcy of 
traders who cease to pay only a single commercial debt. Also, it is advisable to 
prescribe a de minimis amount of the commercial debt that can be used in 
determining whether it is appropriate to declare the bankruptcy of a trader or not. 
Hence, as is the case in England and the US, future bankruptcy law in Oman 
should define the meaning of ‘inability to pay debts’ and such a definition should 
include both the cash flow test and balance sheet test. However, whether to 
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declare the bankruptcy of the trader based on either test should be left to the 
discretion of the court to be considered on a case-by-case basis.353 
5.5.2.2 Clarity and Certainty in Regard to Priority Rules 
     As discussed in the previous chapter,354 the current bankruptcy regime in Oman 
is not clear in regard to the notion of ‘absolute priority’, whereby secured creditors 
are paid first, followed by general creditors (e.g. employees, government) and then 
shareholders if any residual remains, and is not fully articulated under the current 
regime. Thus, senior creditors are paid in full before junior creditors are paid 
anything.355 When a company is liquidated, the distributions to creditors should be 
based on the absolute priority rule to the extent that assets are available.356 Thus, 
in the event of bankruptcy, it is unclear what sort of ranking should be followed 
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since both the Commercial Code of 1990 and the Commercial Companies Law of 
1974 do not offer clear guidance.  As mentioned in the previous chapter,357 in the 
bankruptcy of the debtor, various laws have granted priority to a certain player. For 
instance, while Oman’s Labour Law of 2003 grants worker’s wages priority over 
government debs, the law of Government Debts Recovery of 1994 grants priority to 
debts owed to the government, although they are not secured and were incurred 
later, and these debts must be paid before the payment of secured creditors. 
Furthermore, whereas the Social Insurance Law of 1991 grants preference, after 
paying government debts and judicial expenses, to unpaid pension contributions, 
the Personal Affairs Law of 1997 grants top priority to the amounts of Alimony over 
all debts. Thus, under the current regime, pre-bankruptcy rights are not well-
protected. Due to the uncertainty in the ranking of creditors, secured creditors do 
not know the exact kind of treatment that they will be offered in the event of 
bankruptcy. Also, because of this uncertainty it is impossible to state a precise 
order of the recognised priority rule under the current bankruptcy regime in Oman. 
     It is stated that the normal rule358 in a corporate bankruptcy is that creditors with 
security over an asset of the debtor can pay themselves out of the assets to the 
extent of its value by realising it.359 All unsecured creditors are treated on an equal 
footing and share in bankruptcy assets pro rate (the notion of pari passu)360 
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according to their pre-bankruptcy entitlements361 or sums they are owed.362 Even 
though this is the normal rule of priority in a corporate bankruptcy, an empirical 
study demonstrated that many bankruptcy regimes deviate from this general 
rule.363 According to this study,364 the most important difference between 
bankruptcy regimes is the priority they assign to secured creditors, insolvency 
procedures expenses (i.e. court, expert, legal and administration costs), employee 
wage claims and post-bankruptcy financing. Based on this study, the only 
jurisdictions that place secured creditors first in the priority of payments are the 
UK,365 Germany, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia.366 In many of these 
jurisdictions, the enforcement of security takes place separately from the 
distribution of assets according to the statutory priority of payments.367 In addition, 
while jurisdictions such as France, Canada and Spain grant employees the highest 
priority in liquidation, the US grants limited employees’ wage claims priority over 
secured claims. Moreover, the jurisdictions that place the expenses of bankruptcy 
procedures first are Canada, Greece, Italy and Ireland.368 In these jurisdictions the 
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recovery of secured creditors and all subordinate creditors are exposed to the fees 
and expenses of liquidation procedures.369 This thesis argues that it is not clear 
how the difference between these jurisdictions in the priority ranking may have an 
effect on investment decisions.370 However, it is argued that the quality of the laws 
and regulation may be a useful signal to foreign investors of the overall quality of 
the business environment371 and in making their investment decisions, investors 
are becoming more prudent since the risk of facing bankruptcy has increased 
considerably.372 
     Further, another study provided a comparative summary of various insolvency 
regimes in the MENA region.373 This study demonstrated that all bankruptcy 
regimes in MENA countries grant a number of claims priority over pre-bankruptcy 
rights of creditors.374 According to this study,375 Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar and 
Kuwait grant priority to the public policy exception (i.e. costs of court, taxes, costs 
of the estate and employee wages) over creditors’ rights. Saudi Arabia only grants 
priority to liquidation costs, employee wages, rent and wife’s dowry. Egypt also 
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gives rent a priority. Nevertheless, in Saudi Arabia secured creditors’ rights are not 
subordinate to the public policy exceptions and the fund from secured creditors’ 
collateral is held in trust by the bankruptcy trustee and paid to the secured creditors 
after the collateral is sold.376 Although the issue of priority in Oman is not 
mentioned in this study, this thesis argues that clarity of priority rights is also a 
problem in Oman since, as stated above,377 a number of different laws address the 
priority of payment. Further, the Omani Commercial Code grants limited employee 
wages claims priority over other creditors.378 
     It is clearly demonstrated by the above-mentioned studies that bankruptcy laws 
worldwide often grant priority rights to certain claims by adjusting and modifying 
pre-bankruptcy entitlements through having redistribution379 provisions.380 
However, it is worth noting that whether or not bankruptcy law should be viewed as 
having a redistributional role is subject to controversial debate.381 As discussed in 
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Chapter Two,382 on one side of the debate, the supporters of the creditors’ bargain 
theory view bankruptcy law as a system that should be designed to mirror the 
agreement one would expect the creditors to reach among themselves (ex ante).383 
Thus, the supporters of this theory would argue that it is not the objective of 
bankruptcy laws to redistribute losses in bankruptcy, but rather the same rule that 
distributes losses outside bankruptcy should be applied.384 However, on the other 
side of the debate, the supporters of the multiple values approach view bankruptcy 
law as having a redistributional role.385 Warren, for instance, argues that one of the 
proper functions of the bankruptcy law should be to allocate losses that arise by 
virtue of the bankruptcy and in doing so bankruptcy law should contain wealth 
redistribution provisions whereby protection should be given to certain claimants 
who are least able to bear the costs of such a failure.386 In supporting Warren’s 
view, Korobkin argues that bankruptcy law is not merely a response to the problem 
of debt collection but rather it is also a distinct system for responding to the 
problem of financial distress.387 As a consequence, in dealing with financial 
distress, bankruptcy law should and must modify rights recognised under 
substantive non-bankruptcy law.388 However, Baird argues that if social policy 
rationally favours employees, legislation could favour employees in all businesses, 
not just those that are unable to meet their debt obligation or find themselves in 
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bankruptcy for some other reason.389 If some interests are in need of such 
protection, it is better to tackle this problem and provide protection within the whole 
legal system in order to provide a uniform and certain protection.390 Nevertheless, 
Goode argues that some claimants (i.e. employees in regard to their wages) arise 
by virtue of the bankruptcy of the debtor, and, as a result, there is no sense in 
prescribing priority for those claimants except in the context of bankruptcy law.391 
Further, Cantlie states that bankruptcy of the debtor automatically introduces a flaw 
into the bargaining process because a number of claimants are competing for a 
share of a limited pool of assets, and that means that there will not be enough to 
satisfy all claims.392 Thus, there is a need to relieve certain creditors of the costs of 
default by the debtor.393 
     This thesis supports the idea that bankruptcy law should be designed in a way 
that allows pre-bankruptcy entitlements to be adjusted and modified in order to 
pursue a legitimate or public policy (a policy encouraging reorganisation of the 
business of the distressed debtor) and in a way that, also, provides protection to 
pre-bankruptcy creditors.394 In this regard, in order to avoid such uncertainty and 
provide a level of predictability, the view of this thesis is that future bankruptcy law 
should have a clear priority rule. Within the context of this rule, the rights and 
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priorities of creditors established prior to the bankruptcy of the trader should be 
upheld in insolvency cases in order to preserve the legitimate expectations of 
creditors and encourage greater predictability in commercial relationships.395 In this 
regard, it is important for the holders of collateral (security) to be able to determine 
with certainty, at the time it agrees to provide credit, the ranking and the priority of 
its security right.396 Thus, because of the importance of providing credit, future 
bankruptcy law should protect pre-bankruptcy secured entitlements. For instance, 
as discussed in Chapter Three,397 even though the bankruptcy laws of both 
England and the US adopt the concept of moratorium, both countries allow 
secured creditors to apply to the court in order to have the stay lifted.398 In the US, 
for the stay to be imposed on the holder of priority rights, the debtor has to prove 
that the creditor is comfortably over-secured (this is called ‘equity cushion’) or by 
showing that one of the criteria mentioned in the statue is met.399 Also, in England, 
the court is given the discretion to decide whether to lift the stay or not based on 
the facts of each case.400 Further, as explained in Chapter Three,401 in the US, the 
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status of super priority will not be granted to the new lender unless it is established 
that there is adequate value in the collateral to protect fully both old and new 
lenders.402 Thus, when proposing the concept of moratorium and the notion of 
post-petition financing for the Omani legislator, this study will take these issues into 
account.403 
     It is worth noting that the pari passu distribution is one of the principles of the 
law of bankruptcy concerned ensuring an equitable distribution of the company’s 
estate among its creditors.404 It means that, in winding up a business, “unsecured 
creditors shall share proportionately in those assets of the insolvent company that 
are available for residual distribution”.405 However, as stated above, certain 
unsecured creditors’ claims are granted preference over other unsecured claims.406 
These preferential debts are unsecured debts which by force of law fall to be paid 
in a winding up in priority over all other unsecured debts.407 For instance, this is the 
case in Oman where priorities are granted to limited employees’ wage claims,408 
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and government debts.409 However, it is argued that the existence of preferential 
debts frustrates the distribution based on the notion of pari passu410 and, as a 
result, it is submitted that the number of preferential claims should be kept to a 
minimum.411 In this regard, the researcher’s view is that, unlike the case under the 
current regime, tax claims should not be granted preferential treatment. However, 
preferential treatment should be given to employees in regard to some of their 
entitlements. The government is considered as a strong party in most dealings 
and, as a consequence, protection of the weak parties, such as employees, is 
advisable. Also, employees usually rely on their salaries as the main source of their 
income, whereas, the government has various sources and means of increasing its 
income. It is also argued that employees normally depend for their livelihood on the 
uninterrupted receipt of their salary; they cannot diversify away the risk posed by 
the bankruptcy of their employers.412 Nevertheless, the government is widely 
diversified and its revenues are drawn from a vast cross-section of society.413 
     Based on what has been discussed, this thesis argues that in designing a 
priority rule, it is important to grant special protection to secured creditors since 
they are the main providers of credit necessary for running the business. Lenders 
may refrain from providing capital if they know in advance that their securities will 
not be respected in the event of bankruptcy. Therefore, it is essential to offer them 
priority and such priority is limited to specific collaterals that are held by secured 
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creditors. However, the Omani legislator should also prescribe a super priority 
status to be given to any lender who provides financing that is necessary to run the 
business during the restructuring process. Offering such a super priority status is 
important, as otherwise lenders will be frustrated from extending the required 
funding. Moreover, the costs of administering bankruptcy proceedings should be 
taken into account and, as a result, priority should be given to administrators’ 
wages and administration expenses. It is worth mentioning that due to religious 
and moral ground, preferential priority should also be given to the amount of 
alimony. Thus, this thesis proposes the following distribution rule414 to be adopted 
by the Omani legislator:415 
 Super priority claims that result from providing funding during restructuring 
processes. 
 Secured creditors’ claims to the extent of the value of their security.416 
 Preferential creditors’ claims, this includes employees’ wages, alimony and 
administration expenses/ liquidation costs.417 
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 General unsecured creditors.418 
     To conclude, this thesis places emphasis on the fact that it is essential to 
prescribe a priority rule within Oman’s future bankruptcy law. This enables any 
stakeholder to have a sense of certainty and predictability before entering into a 
bargain with the debtor. Also, prescribing such a ranking helps in avoiding any 
dispute that might be raised by one of the participants. However, it is worth noting 
that including a distribution priority rule in bankruptcy law does not indicate that 
every group will be paid at the end of the bankruptcy process. Rather, due to the 
bankruptcy of the company, some groups might be targeted and receive nothing. In 
this regard, all stakeholders should acknowledge the fact that this is the norm 
during the bankruptcy of traders. 
5.5.3 Types of Desired Bankruptcy Procedures 
     Currently, there are three available procedures in Oman, namely bankruptcy 
proceedings, preventive composition procedures and liquidation procedures. 
However, none of these proceedings is geared towards rescuing the business of 
enterprises. As stated in the previous chapter,419 while the aim of the bankruptcy 
procedure is to declare the bankruptcy of a distressed debtor, release him from his 
debts and liabilities and distribute his assets, the aim of the liquidation proceeding 
is to liquidate the assets of the distressed company and to make distribution to 
creditors. The purpose of the preventive composition proceeding is to allow the 
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trader to escape the consequences of the declaration of bankruptcy.420 Thus, the 
aim of this proceeding is not to rescue the business of the enterprise, but rather it 
is merely to give the trader the opportunity to escape bankruptcy proceedings. 
     Furthermore, as stated above,421 one of the main deficiencies of the current 
bankruptcy regime in Oman is that it is outdated and inconsistent with today’s 
business requirements since rescuing the business of enterprises is not 
recognised. Hence, in order to modernise the Omani bankruptcy regime, it is 
important to take lessons from the experience of both England and the US. 
However, as argued above,422 this does not mean to say that the Omani legislator 
should transplant all bankruptcy proceedings that are available in England and the 
US. In fact, there is a need for careful consideration since it is not appropriate to 
transplant all insolvency proceedings from these jurisdictions. As discussed above, 
in proposing foreign rules or principles it is necessary to take into account the 
differences between infrastructures in importing and exporting jurisdictions.423 To 
clarify, the researcher does not support the idea of transplanting all insolvency 
proceedings that are available for distressed enterprises in England. As stated in 
Chapter Three,424 there are five insolvency proceedings in England: administration, 
receivership, CVAs, schemes of arrangement and winding up proceedings. In this 
regard, this thesis argues that it is not sufficient for Oman to transplant the 
receivership procedure because the aim of this procedure is not to rehabilitate the 
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business of the debtor, but rather it is a tool for a floating charge holder to enforce 
his security by appointing a receiver whose main responsibility is to protect the 
interests of his appointer. Also, unlike the case in England, the notion of a ‘floating 
charge’ over all assets of the company is not recognised in Oman and any secured 
creditor is granted a security over a specifically designated asset. Hence, the 
importation of this particular regime is not appropriate, since creditors in Oman are 
not given security over all the assets of an enterprise, and since this regime does 
not support the idea of a ‘rescue culture’, the appointed administrative receiver is 
not obliged to restore the business of the debtor to a profitable status.425 This does 
not mean to ignore the importance of a floating charge security in obtaining credit. 
Pennington, for instance, argued that a floating charge security meets the needs of 
companies, since in raising money they are allowed to grant a creditor security 
over all fixed and unfixed assets.426 However, this type of security has been 
criticised from a number of angles.427 For example, Finch argued that since floating 
charges usually take over the trader’s entire undertaking,428 monitoring in order to 
identify misbehaviour or analyse risks could involve scrutinising the whole 
business’429 and as a consequence, this type of charge offers ‘a relatively 
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expensive method of securing finance’.430 Also, the floating charge is viewed as a 
device particularly favourable to the transfer of insolvency wealth from unsecured 
to secured creditors.431 Unsecured creditors may not receive sufficient notice of the 
impact of the floating charge on their interests, since it might be difficult to inform 
the company charges’ register of the amount secured by the floating chargers.432 
However, even if this type of security is introduced by the Omani legislator in 
future, this thesis argues that administrative receivership should not be adopted in 
Oman since, as stated in Chapter Three,433 it is against the concept of the rescue 
culture. 
     Further, this thesis argues that there is no need to have in place various 
restructuring procedures in Oman, but rather it is enough to have a single 
bankruptcy regime that is designed for all types of companies, large, medium and 
small. However, SMEs represents more than 90 per cent of registered enterprises 
in Oman,434 so that within this regime, it is important to have special procedures 
that are devoted to the rehabilitation of viable SMEs. This can be done, for 
instance, by establishing a rescue regime for SMEs, by the easing of access to the 
reorganisation proceedings and by setting a specific time limit whereby all 
procedures should be completed.435 Hence, proposing wholesale transplantation of 
CVA and scheme of arrangement proceedings in England are not appropriate for 
Oman. Having a single bankruptcy regime provides consistency and predictability 
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in the sense that all debtors and creditors would know the applicable procedures 
that would apply in the event of financial distress. Furthermore, as explained 
above,436 one of the main drawbacks of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is 
that bankruptcy trustees/ practitioners and judges are not required to obtain certain 
qualifications to deal with bankruptcy cases. As a result, proposing a single 
gateway rescue regime to be adopted by the Omani legislator would facilitate the 
practice in Oman. However, as will be discussed,437 establishing a rescue regime 
without having qualified bankruptcy officers renders the law to be ineffectively 
implemented. In this regard, it is appropriate to follow the approach adopted by the 
US Chapter 11. Chapter 11 offers reorganisation rules in which special procedures 
available for small businesses vary from those designed for medium and large 
businesses.438 However, this does not mean to ignore the fact that both the CVA 
and scheme of arrangements embody a number of crucial features that are 
necessary for any bankruptcy regime. As discussed in Chapter Three,439 even 
though one of the weaknesses of both proceedings is that secured creditors’ 
actions are not stayed during the proceedings, the concept of ‘debtor-in-
possession (DIP)’ is a feature of both the CVA and the scheme of arrangement in 
England. This is also similar to the case in the US Chapter 11 where DIP is one of 
its main characteristics.440 
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5.5.4 Establishing a Rescue Regime 
     In previous chapters, the importance of promoting the concept of rescue culture 
has been emphasised. As discussed in Chapter Two, most theories recognised the 
impact of rehabilitating the business of the distressed debtor on maximising the 
interests of all stakeholders.441 As is the case under the US Chapter 11, such 
rehabilitation can be achieved through negotiating a payment plan with creditors or 
through running the business as a going concern.442 However, in Chapter Three,443 
an explanation is given of how rehabilitating the business during bankruptcy varies 
from one jurisdiction to another. For instance, whereas under administration 
proceedings in England displacement of the previous management is viewed as an 
important step in restructuring the business during the administration processes, 
during the US Chapter 11 management, in principle, retains their position and 
plays a role in completing the reorganisation processes. Also, while it is possible to 
give a super priority status to a new lender during the US Chapter 11, the new 
lender is not given such priority during administration proceedings. Thus, even 
though both jurisdictions recognise the importance of having in place a rescue 
regime, in regulating such a regime each country adopts a distinct approach.444 
     This thesis supports the idea that future bankruptcy law should have a 
mechanism whereby it is possible to rehabilitate viable distressed enterprises 
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instead of liquidating them. However, it is affirmed by Tolmie445 that there are a 
number of requirements for having a successful rescue regime. Ease of access to 
the process, encouraging debtors to apply for the process as early as possible, 
staying creditors’ claims, regulating the post-financing and cramming-down 
dissenting creditors, are all examples of such requirements. In this regard, this 
thesis argues that in establishing a rescue regime, it is important for Oman to take 
lessons from the experience of both England and the US. As will be discussed 
below,446 such lessons include facilitating access to the restructuring process, 
introducing a statutory mechanism whereby the rescue plan is imposed on 
objecting creditors, allowing creditors to have the stay lifted, and having qualified 
bankruptcy practitioners. As a consequence, transplanting some principles from 
England and the US will facilitate the establishment of modern restructuring 
procedures. However, as explained above,447 in transplanting such principles care 
should be taken since some principles need to be modified in a way that suits 
Oman.448 For instance, it will be demonstrated below, that it is not appropriate to 
propose the adoption of the administration regime where management is displaced 
and an insolvency practitioner is appointed, since this requires bankruptcy 
practitioners who are qualified to deal with bankruptcy cases. The aim of this part is 
to emphasise the importance of taking into account a number of issues in 
designing a future rescue regime. 
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5.5.4.1 Easing the Access to the Restructuring Process 
     Future bankruptcy law in Oman should provide easy access to reorganisation 
proceedings. Such access can be facilitated by encouraging debtors to apply for 
the process as soon as they perceive a disturbance of their businesses. In this 
regard, debtors should be assured that access to restructuring processes in the 
event of financial distress is facilitated. As discussed in the previous chapter,449 at 
present, for a preventive composition application to be approved by the court, the 
debtor must demonstrate that (i) the disturbance of business activities leads to the 
cessation of paying commercial debts; (ii) such disturbance is not a result of gross 
fault or fraud; (iii) the debtor traded uninterruptedly for two years.450 Because of 
these requirements, old traders who suspend their trading and all new traders who 
trade for less than two years are not eligible to apply for a preventive composition 
scheme. Further, access to the preventive composition scheme is complicated, 
since creditors and courts are unable to apply for this scheme and the only person 
eligible to apply is the distressed debtor. In addition, access to rescue proceedings 
can be facilitated by allowing creditors or the court to file the application. As 
discussed,451 under the current bankruptcy regime, an application for a preventive 
composition scheme cannot be made by one of the creditors. Thus, the only choice 
for the creditors is to apply for bankruptcy proceedings.452 Hence, it is important to 
allow creditors to apply for rescue proceedings. 
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     Furthermore, offering debtors a number of incentives has an impact on 
encouraging directors to attempt a restructuring route instead of running the 
business during its financial trouble. As will be discussed below,453 these incentives 
include allowing directors to retain their position during reorganisation proceedings 
as well as imposing a temporary stay over all creditors’ actions. However, it is 
worth noting that even though this thesis encourages the idea that directors should 
have incentives in order to apply for the process once they sense financial distress, 
there should be statutory provisions to punish the company’s directors who fail to 
apply at an early stage. In this case, a lesson can be learned from England. As 
stated in Chapter Three,454 the UK Insolvency Act of 1986 provides company 
directors with incentives- ‘sticks and carrots’- in order for them to take action once 
they sense the financial crisis.455 Armour and Mokal argue that both ‘wrongful 
trading’456 and ‘director disqualification’457 provisions contain statutory sticks to 
encourage directors to file for an administration regime as soon as they become 
aware of trouble.458 On the other hand, if directors acted at the “earliest appropriate 
moment”, they “would have some hope of regaining control,” since the 
administrator may opt for their stay.459 It is worth pointing out that Article 695 of the 
Commercial Code grants a bankruptcy trustee the right to seek court sanction to 
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order all members of the Board of Directors or all the managers, or some of them 
jointly or severally to pay all or some of the debts of the company. However, in 
order to escape this liability, directors must establish that they have exercised the 
necessary care to avoid further loss.460 Also, according to Article 301 of Oman’s 
Penal Code of 1974, directors may incur criminal liability where it is demonstrated 
that the bankruptcy of the company has been caused by fraudulent action on their 
part. Nevertheless, the problem with these Articles is that they are not detailed, 
which renders them incomplete. For instance, the test to be used in demonstrating 
directors’ liabilities is not clear. In this case, a lesson can be taken from England 
where “in determining whether there was a reasonable prospect of the company 
meeting its liabilities and, if not, whether the director ought to have known this, the 
test would be objective, namely that of the ordinary, reasonable man”.461 Thus, 
introducing statutory sticks of wrongful trading and disqualification proceedings if 
the company leaves it too late, could encourage directors to apply for bankruptcy 
proceedings as soon as they detect the disturbance of the business. However, in 
designing such provisions care should be taken. In this regard, it is rightly argued 
that “a too rigid approach to holding directors and senior management responsible 
will potentially have the effect of preventing people from undertaking such a role if 
it is perceived as being too hazardous”.462 
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5.5.4.2 Adopting the Notion of Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) 
     As stated above, in order to encourage the debtors to apply for restructuring 
processes as soon as they notice the problem, the incentive of retaining their 
position during the process should be offered. Hence, this researcher’s view is that 
it is important for the Omani legislator to adopt the concept of DIP. Nonetheless, in 
proposing the concept of DIP for the Omani legislator caution should be taken 
because, in adopting such a concept, there are two divergent practices. The US 
practice is that during the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy the management retains their 
position and runs the company without any kind of supervision.463 However, in 
England the practice is that under CVA the management runs the company under 
the supervision of one or more insolvency practitioners.464 In this regard, our view 
is that it is not appropriate to propose that the practice of the US should be 
followed by the Omani legislator, but instead it is prudent to opt for the practice of 
England. This thesis argues that465 the appropriateness of foreign principles can be 
judged by trying to assess the workability and functionality of the proposed 
principles in the importing country. Hence, in assessing the workability and 
functionality of adopting, or not, the notion of DIP by the Omani legislator, recourse 
should be made to the cultural view because, as is the case in most Arab 
countries, in Oman the debtor is not viewed as an economic actor who deserves 
protection in the event of financial distress, but is viewed as a wrongdoer who 
needs to be punished and the assets distributed among creditors. This is evident 
from the treatment of the bankrupt under the Commercial Code. Upon the day on 
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which the judgment of bankruptcy is issued, the bankrupt will be prohibited from 
practicing a number of civil rights,466 might not leave Oman unless he/she is given 
permission by the court, and it is possible that the court is given powers to place 
him/her under supervision.467 Because of this cultural view, leaving the 
management to run the business without any kind of supervision is not desirable. 
Moreover, it may be that case that creditors may lack confidence in the debtor on 
account of the financial troubles of the company and this lack of confidence may 
frustrate a rescue process.468 Further, it is argued that leaving directors in control 
may create a lack of trust between creditors and management and as a result the 
level of litigation will rise and the expenses of such litigations will be paid from the 
debtor’s resources.469 It is also worth noting that this thesis does not support the 
idea of adopting the administration approach whereby upon the appointment of an 
administrator, the management will be displaced and the administrator will take 
control over any property belonging to the company.470 Even though this approach 
coincides with the cultural view in Oman and the creditors might be in agreement, 
this approach is not appropriate for Oman due to an institutional factor. As stated 
above,471 at present, bankruptcy trustees in Oman are not required to have 
qualifications and as a result it may be difficult for them to run the business of the 
company where knowledge and experience are highly recommended. Hence, the 
researcher argues that opting for the CVA is more practical, since it provides a 
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level of credibility and assurance for creditors. This also means that the 
management’s decisions are overseen by the bankruptcy practitioner and the risk 
of over-investment could be minimised. 
5.5.4.3 Stay on Creditors’ Actions 
     Any future restructuring regime should have in place a mechanism whereby all 
creditors’ claims are stayed. Imposing a stay on creditors’ actions helps in 
facilitating the process of rehabilitating the business of the company. In the 
absence of such a mechanism, creditors will run to the court-house in order to be 
the first to enforce their securities.472 This type of behaviour could hamper any 
attempt to rescue the company, particularly if the availability of such securities is 
necessary to complete the restructuring process successfully. In this regard, 
Goode rightly argued that if both secured and unsecured creditors are left free to 
pursue their claims, the assets of the company will be destroyed and the purpose 
of the rescue regime will be frustrated.473 
     As discussed in the previous chapter,474 one of the main deficiencies of the 
current bankruptcy regime in Oman is that even though unsecured creditors’ claims 
are stayed during bankruptcy processes, secured creditors’ actions are not. As a 
consequence, bankruptcy trustees have to use some of the debtor’s resources to 
defend secured creditors’ actions before the court. This deficiency will be 
overcome if the debtor opts for the preventive composition scheme. Under this 
scheme, all claims, whether secured or unsecured, are stayed during the 
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proceedings and, as a result, the assets of the company are protected from the 
demands of creditors until the end of the process. However, the aim of this scheme 
is not to rescue the business of the company, but rather it is a statutory alternative 
to escape the consequences of bankruptcy declaration.475 Thus, at present, there 
is no statutory regime designed to rescue the business of distressed traders. 
     Hence, in designing a rescue regime, imposing a stay on secured and 
unsecured creditors’ claims should be one of the main features. Certainly, it would 
be unlikely that the business of the debtor could be successfully reorganised if 
there was not a comprehensive stay imposed over all creditors’ actions. However, 
in imposing a stay, caution should be taken since secured creditors are those most 
particularly burdened by the imposition of such a stay. In this case, there should be 
a mechanism whereby secured creditors are given the necessary legal right to 
seek the lifting of the stay. As explained in Chapter Three,476 this type of 
mechanism is available under both England and the US bankruptcy laws. 
However, the difference between these two jurisdictions is that while in England 
lifting the stay is left to the discretion of the court, in the US the stay will not be 
lifted unless it is proven that the statutory requirements of ‘adequate protection’ are 
met.477 In this regard, this thesis argues that it is crucial for Oman’s future 
bankruptcy regime to deal with this issue and in this case it is advisable to adopt 
the experience of both England and the US. Hence, it is better for the Omani 
legislator to include a number of statutory requirements and to give judges the 
discretion to decide whether to lift the stay or not based on the facts of each case. 
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To clarify, it is appropriate to stipulate that for the stay to be imposed on secured 
creditors, the debtor must demonstrate that a periodic cash payment will be made 
to the secured creditors or an additional or replacement lien equal to the decrease 
in the value of such entity’s interests in the property.478 Further, it is necessary to 
give courts the discretion to decide based on the facts of each case. For instance, 
the court should order the stay to be lifted if secured creditor’s collateral is not 
necessary for the success of the reorganisation. Also, as is the case in England, a 
number of factors play a role in determining whether, or not, a stay has to be 
lifted.479 These factors include the length of the stay and the impact of lifting the 
stay on other creditors. 
     Furthermore, one of the important issues that should be taken into account by 
the Omani legislator is to identify clearly those actions, if any, which are excluded 
from the stay. For instance, as stated in Chapter Three,480 one of the substantial 
dissimilarities between the US and England insolvency proceedings is that while 
suppliers and customers are allowed to exercise contractual termination rights in 
insolvency in England, the US Chapter 11 moratorium prevents suppliers and 
customers from terminating their contracts with a company on grounds of 
insolvency alone.481 In Oman, a stay will be imposed on all contracts and, as a 
result, suppliers will be prevented from exercising their contractual rights. As is the 
case in the US, Oman’s Commercial Code invalidates what is called an ‘ipso facto 
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clause’.482 Inserting this clause means that the counterparty is able to cancel the 
contract in the insolvency of the other.483 In this regard, this thesis argues that the 
approach taken by both the US and Omani law is better than that of England. This 
is due to that fact that not staying these types of contracts during the proceedings 
and allowing the suppliers to terminate their contracts on grounds of insolvency 
alone may impede any attempt to rescue the business of the company, particularly 
if such goods or services are necessary for the success of the rescue.484 In 
addressing this issue Goode stated that the ipso factor clause triggered concern 
between insolvency practitioners, who view such clauses to be detrimental to the 
administration procedure’ and, as a consequence, they should be annulled as 
being contrary to public interest.485 Further, as is the case in both England and the 
US,486 Oman’s Commercial Code gives courts the right to approve any setting-off 
arrangement if it is satisfied that the rights and obligations of the parties are 
associated.487 It is clearly stated that the rights and obligations of the parties are 
considered to be associated if they result from a ‘single cause’ or are included in a 
‘current account’.488 If the conditions of the setting-off arrangement have been met, 
such an arrangement will be exempt from the stay. As a result, to provide certainty 
and predictability, in designing future bankruptcy regime, it is important to state 
clearly the actions that might be excluded from the stay. 
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5.5.4.4 Allowing Post-Financing 
     Besides adopting the notions of DIP and staying creditors’ actions, it is crucial 
for the Omani legislator to facilitate a troubled debtor’s access to new funding 
during the reorganisation phase. This is due to the fact that in the event of financial 
distress, the debtor would not be able to continue its operation unless sufficient 
funding is available.489 However, in order to encourage existing lenders or a new 
lender to provide the required money, it is necessary for bankruptcy law to offer 
them a sufficient guarantee that they will be paid.490 As discussed in Chapter 
Three,491 this is the case under the US Chapter 11 where a post-petition lender is 
granted super priority status. Nonetheless, such status will not be granted to the 
new lender unless it is proven that there is adequate value in the collateral to 
protect pre-petition secured creditors.492 In this regard, the US Bankruptcy Act 
imposes three requirements for authorising post-petition financing: the debtor must 
demonstrate that it is not possible to obtain a loan without granting a super priority 
status, there is adequate protection493 of the interests of the pre-petition secured 
creditors, and that in any court hearing the onus of proving the necessity of new 
finance and the test of ‘adequate protection’ is on the debtor.494 Further, it is worth 
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noting that even though it was proposed in the House of Lords, the UK Enterprise 
Act of 2002 contains no specific provision for super priority new financing.495 It was 
maintained that the decision whether to lend in times of trouble was a commercial 
one and was best left to the commercial judgment of the lending market, and that it 
would be wrong to offer a guaranteed return to super priority investor whether or 
not the rescue proposals had satisfied the market.496 However, in recognition of the 
importance of such finance, in David Cameron’s proposals for reform in July 2008, 
it was clearly affirmed that the Conservative Party would provide a priority status 
for a financier willing to provide ongoing funding post-petition.497 
     Currently, the concept of ‘post-petition financing’ is not recognized since there is 
no rescue regime in Oman. Hence, this thesis encourages the initiation of a rescue 
regime that facilitates the supply of new funding through offering the necessary 
incentives. Such incentives include granting a super priority status to the new 
lender. It is crucial to offer the debtor access to post-petition funds to enable the 
company to continue to pay for the supplies of goods and services, such as 
employees’ salaries, insurance, rent of the property, maintenance of contracts and 
other operating expenses.498 However, this does not mean to prejudice the 
interests of pre-petition secured creditors. This thesis argues that499 in order to 
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pursue a legitimate public policy,500 bankruptcy law should be designed in a way 
that allows pre-bankruptcy entitlements to be adjusted and modified without 
prejudicing the interests of pre-bankruptcy creditors.501 Thus, it is essential to 
reassure them that they are adequately protected against loss. In this regard, a 
lesson can be learned from the experience of the US, where the status of super 
priority is not granted unless the court establishes that the position of pre-petition 
secured creditors at the time of bankruptcy filing is not harmed and they are 
sufficiently protected. The sufficiency of such protection can be achieved by 
compelling the debtor to make a periodic cash payment to secured creditors or to 
provide supplementary collateral equal to the decrease in the value of the effected 
security.502 In this regard, this thesis places emphasis on the fact that in order to 
avoid uncertainty and provide a level of predictability in commercial relationships, 
future bankruptcy law should have clear provisions for post-petition new financing. 
Within the context of these provisions, the requirements for sanctioning post-
petition financing arrangements are made clear and pre-bankruptcy creditors are 
adequately protected. 
5.5.4.5 Creditors’ Participation and the Approval of the Restructuring Plan  
     Once a bankruptcy process is initiated, a rescue plan should be proposed by 
the debtor after seeking advice from a bankruptcy practitioner in order to be 
discussed, modified and approved by the creditors. In this regard, all creditors 
should be entitled to vote ‘for’ or ‘against’ the plan and raise any objections in 
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court, unlike the case under the current preventive composition scheme where 
secured creditors are not allowed to vote unless they relinquish their securities. 
Under both England and the US bankruptcy regimes, secured creditors are 
normally entitled to vote on the restructuring plan. The researcher’s view is that 
secured creditors should be given the right to participate in voting on the plan. In 
reorganisation, for instance, secured creditors have a direct interest in where their 
rights might be adjusted or affected by the rescue plan or where the encumbered 
assets will be essential to the successful implementation of the proposed plan.503 
However, for voting purposes, whether to divide creditors into different classes or 
to treat all creditors as a single class is an issue that needs to be addressed by the 
Omani legislator. As discussed in Chapter Three,504 under both the US Chapter 11 
and the scheme of arrangement in England, voting on the plan is done by dividing 
creditors into a number of classes. However, they differ in the criteria that are used 
in determining these classes. Under the US Chapter 11, for instance, equity is 
always placed in a separate class, and each secured creditor usually placed in a 
single class.505 Under the scheme of arrangement in England, the test of 
determining the number of classes is that a class must be limited to individuals 
whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult 
together with a view to their common interests.506 However, Milman argued that 
having such an arrangement in place generated a persistent problem in 
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determining what a “class” of creditors is since the more classes that are 
recognized, the more challenging it becomes to get the proposed plan approved by 
the requisite majorities in each class.507 Furthermore, it is submitted that 
classification can increase the complexity and costs of insolvency proceedings, 
depending upon how many different classes are identified.508 It is worth mentioning 
that, unlike the case under both the US Chapter 11 and the scheme of 
arrangement in England, the CVA opted for simplicity by treating all creditors as 
constituting a single class for voting purposes, with individual voting powers 
measured by the financial value of each creditor’s claim.509 Thus, it is crucial for 
Oman’s future bankruptcy law to address the issue of classification and in doing so 
a lesson should be taken from the experience of both England and the US. 
     In addition, it is important for the bankruptcy law to have rules addressing the 
issue of cramming-down dissenting creditors. Even though it has not been 
approved by every class of creditors, both England and the US bankruptcy laws 
empowered the court to impose the restructuring plan over the wishes of objecting 
creditors.510 However, it is worth noting that imposing the plan over the wishes of 
dissenting creditors does not mean to prejudice their interests and leave them 
without protection. Rather, besides giving the court discretion, bankruptcy law 
should contain a number of requirements that must be met before imposing the 
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rescue plan over objecting creditors. This can be done by taking lessons from 
Section 1129 (b) of the US Bankruptcy Code. This section details a number of 
requirements that must be met before the approval of the plan. In this regard, the 
court must be satisfied with the fact that objecting creditors must receive at least as 
much under the plan as they would if the company using the ‘best interest test’; 
and the debtor company must be able to implement its commitments as stated in 
the plan ‘feasibility test’. However, the case in England differs since there are no 
specific conditions for approving a restructuring plan and the court is given full 
discretion in determining whether a rescue plan should be approved or not. In 
designing bankruptcy law, this thesis supports the idea that it is better for the 
Omani legislator to combine the experience of both the US and England, that is to 
say, detailing in bankruptcy law a number of requirements that must be met and 
giving courts discretion to determine whether or not to approve the plan based on 
the facts of each case. 
5.5.4.6 Having Qualified Bankruptcy Practitioners  
     As this thesis proposed above,511 it is better for the Omani legislator to allow the 
debtor to run the business during rescue proceedings under the supervision of one 
or more bankruptcy trustees. However, at present, bankruptcy trustees are not 
required to be qualified or have enough training. Having a proper bankruptcy 
regime without having qualified bankruptcy practitioners renders the law to be 
ineffectively implemented. In affirming this point, it is rightly stated that “corporate 
insolvency processes are not mere bodies of rules: they are elaborate procedures 
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in which legal and administrative, formal and informal rules, policies and practices 
are put into effect by different actors”.512 It is the role of bankruptcy practitioners to 
administer bankruptcy processes from the day of filing until bringing the process to 
conclusion. These practitioners should be equipped with the necessary skills in 
order for them to control the process successfully. As stated in the previous 
chapter,513 persons administering bankruptcy procedures in Oman are not required 
to have any particular training. Hence, in this particular area, it is important to 
benefit from the experience of England and the US. This can be done through 
inviting foreign bankruptcy practitioners to train a number of specialists or through 
sending Omani lawyers and accountants to England or the US in order to get the 
required training. This thesis argues that having qualified bankruptcy practitioners 
would help in improving the ranking of Oman on the ease of resolving insolvency. 
According to the World Bank Doing Business Report, Oman stands at 72 in the 
ranking of 189 economies: resolving insolvency cases in Oman takes 4 years on 
average compared to less than two years in many other countries.514 This is due to 
the fact that, at present, there is no exact time frame within which bankruptcy 
procedures should be accomplished. As shown in the previous chapter,515 during 
bankruptcy procedures, Article 665 of the Commercial Code states that the 
bankruptcy trustee, within thirty days of the date of his appointment, should present 
to the court a statement containing the reasons behind the cessation of payments; 
however, the court can extend this period at its own discretion. Also, Article 669 of 
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the same Code states that once the debts have been verified, the bankruptcy 
trustee, within sixty days of this verification, should deposit to the court a list 
containing the names of secured creditors and the amounts of their collateral; 
however, the court also has the power to extend this period. Hence, in both articles 
the court is given the power to extend the period without setting a maximum period. 
Thus, it is important to prescribe a time-limit for the completion of all bankruptcy 
processes. However, it is essential to have qualified bankruptcy practitioners in 
order to complete all bankruptcy procedures within the stipulated time-limit. In this 
regard, it is asserted that if bankruptcy officers (judges, practitioners) are not able 
to respond to the demands placed upon them in a timely manner, it is important to 
take this into account when prescribing a certain time-limit in bankruptcy law.516 
The competence of the legal infrastructure and the proficiency of bankruptcy 
practitioners may have a significant influence on deciding the length of the time 
required for handling bankruptcy proceedings.517 
     In addition, in recognising the importance of the tasks that are carried out by the 
insolvency practitioners, Finch stated that their duties impinge on the public 
interests as they affect the lives and deaths of enterprises and include decisions 
about the livelihoods of both creditors and debtors.518 The functions of these 
practitioners, also, have importance for private rights since pre-bankruptcy 
securities can be stayed and creditors’ efforts to enforce their legal rights can be 
affected.519 Hence, insolvency practitioners should have the capacity and skills to 
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strike a balance between both public and private interests. Moreover, it is 
submitted that a robust insolvency system seeks to achieve a balance between 
rehabilitation and liquidation.520 As a result, the role, powers and the nature of 
bankruptcy practitioners have an impact on determining whether or not it is viable 
to restructure an enterprise.  
     Further, it is worth noting that cramming down dissenting creditors is a difficult 
task since all statutory requirements521 must be met- starting from procedural 
requirements, such as the composition of classes, and ending with the fairness of 
the terms of the rescue plan itself. This causes a scholar to state that “the cram-
down standards appear to be simple, but the appearance is deceiving”.522 Hence, 
this thesis emphasises that reforming the conduct and practice of bankruptcy 
practitioners in Oman is of high importance. This is due to the fact that the 
complexity of bankruptcy cases requires having in place persons who are able to 
deal with them in an orderly manner. As is recommended, the regulation of 
bankruptcy practitioners can be achieved either through statutory professional 
bodies or by a specially mandated department of government.523  By its nature, 
regulatory oversight of the bankruptcy profession restricts entry to those who have 
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the necessary qualifications and attributes.524 In designing the regulation of 
bankruptcy practitioners, it is appropriate to seek advice from some international 
organisations (i.e. the World Bank, UNCITRAL, and INSOL International) and to 
learn from the experience of both England and the US. 
5.6 Reviewing Mechanism  
     This chapter proposed the introduction of future bankruptcy reform in Oman by 
outlining its necessity. In designing a bankruptcy law, this thesis encouraged the 
adoption of some of the principles that are found under both England and the US 
bankruptcy laws. Examples of these principles are the notion of debtor-in-
possession, the concept of post-petition financing, and the notion of cramming 
down dissenting creditors. Further, offering distressed debtors an alternative 
procedure other than liquidation is important to encourage the rehabilitation of 
viable enterprises. As stated above, having in place qualified bankruptcy 
practitioners and a developed institutional framework is crucial for the 
implementation and administration of bankruptcy processes in a timely manner.525 
However, in order to assess the impact of adopting bankruptcy principles and the 
impact of establishing a rescue regime, it is essential to continuously review the 
implementation of the law. This can be done by organising a government 
symposium every five years in order to evaluate the impact of the reform and to 
ensure that the law is being implemented in accordance with the policies and 
objectives of its design. Also, the aim of this symposium should be to propose 
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solutions that deal with any unintended consequences that might result from 
reforming bankruptcy law.   
5.7 Conclusion 
     This chapter has called for future reform of the current bankruptcy regime in 
Oman. It is argued that in reforming bankruptcy law, countries tend to observe the 
experience of other developed jurisdictions.526 However, in doing that caution 
should be taken since wholesale transplantation is not applicable. This chapter 
started by highlighting various approaches underpinning legal transplantations.527 
These approaches can be divided into two groups.528 The first group took the view 
that legal transplantations are impossible.529 This is due to the fact that, according 
to this group, legal rules are normally encumbered by historical and cultural 
aspects and these rules mirror the needs of the societies in which they have 
developed. Thus, legal rules cannot travel from one society to another and, as a 
result, legal transplantation cannot happen. The view of the second group was that 
legal transplants are not merely possible; but actually quite essential in the path of 
legal development.530 However, the supporters of this group disagreed on the 
scope of such transplantations.531 While some of them support the idea that legal 
transplantation is possible without the need for knowledge of the political and social 
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conditions in the donor jurisdictions,532 others argued that to avoid the risk of 
rejection, it is necessary to have enough knowledge of such conditions.533 As 
mentioned above,534 notwithstanding the dissimilarity of social, political and legal 
systems, this thesis favoured the view that legal transplantation is possible and it is 
applicable as long as it serves the needs of the importing country.535 Then, this 
chapter dealt with the issue of transplant effects and how these effects can have 
an impact on the receiving systems.536 After that, this chapter questioned the 
possibility of measuring the success of legal transplantation.537 In this regard, 
scholars had various opinions concerning the criteria that can be used to measure 
the extent of such success.538 However, as discussed above, scholars failed in 
defining the notion of success and, as a result, it was proposed that the success of 
legal transplants can be assessed on a case by case basis. Further, 
transplantation within the area of bankruptcy laws was discussed and it was 
demonstrated that new reforms of bankruptcy laws did not mirror the societies of 
the importing countries.539 Rather, these reforms were transplanted from other 
jurisdictions despite divergences in culture between the exporting and receiving 
systems. 
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     In addition, this chapter explored the experience of Oman in acting as an 
importing country.540 Since the start of the legislation path in 1973, Oman relied 
heavily on the experience of other jurisdictions, mainly western laws. As explained 
above,541 the Omani Commercial Code of 1990, Oman’s Penal Law of 1974, and 
Commercial Companies Law of 1974 all abandoned a number of Sharia laws and 
incorporated, instead, western principles. For instance, even though one of the 
fundamental principles of Sharia is the prohibition of riba, this principle is allowed 
under both Oman’s Commercial Code and Commercial Companies Law. Hence, in 
reforming laws, Oman usually does not start from the very beginning, but rather 
learning from the experience of others has been the main source of legal 
development. 
     Further, this chapter questioned the reasons for the lack of interest in Islamic 
principles, particularly in regard to bankruptcy. Desires to meet the requirements of 
today’s business, attracting foreign investment, and the irrelevance of Sharia 
bankruptcy principles, all are reasons behind the lack of interest in Islamic 
principles.542 Hence, this thesis supports the idea that in reforming bankruptcy law, 
Oman should transplant the principles of modern bankruptcy law from developed 
jurisdictions.543 In this regard, this thesis highlighted the importance of taking 
lessons from the experience of both England and the US. Based on a number of 
justifications, this thesis demonstrated that the importation of some western 
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bankruptcy concepts will be accepted in Oman, despite the differences in cultural 
views and legal institutions between Oman and these jurisdictions.544 
     This chapter, furthermore, underscored the necessity for bankruptcy reform in 
Oman.545 Such necessity emerges from the government’s desire to attract foreign 
direct investment and by formulating this desire to be one of the main pillars of 
Oman’s 2020 economic vision.546 Also, the role played by SMEs in promoting the 
national economy necessitates the introduction of bankruptcy reform in Oman.547 
Having acknowledged the importance of modernising Oman’s bankruptcy regimes, 
this chapter proposed a map for future bankruptcy reform.548 As discussed, this 
map includes having a clear statutory mandate,549 making bankruptcy law certain 
and predictable,550 and establishing a bankruptcy regime that encourages the 
rehabilitation of viable enterprises instead of liquidating them.551 However, due to 
the complexities of bankruptcy cases, having in place qualified practitioners is 
highly important.552 Further, this chapter highlighted the importance of reviewing 
the implementation and administration of bankruptcy law in order to deal with any 
unintended consequences.553 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
     Each country has its own legal rules that are designed to deal with the 
bankruptcy of companies;1 however, these legal rules vary from one jurisdiction to 
another.2 On the one hand, bankruptcy rules in some countries are designed 
merely to wind up distressed enterprises without giving them a chance to 
rehabilitate their businesses.3 This is the case in almost all Arab States where the 
philosophy of a rescue culture has not yet been adopted. On the other hand, some 
countries have set up their bankruptcy laws in a way that encourages the 
rehabilitation of viable enterprises instead of liquidating them.4 This is the case, for 
example, in the United States, the United Kingdom and more recently France.5 
     This study set out to examine the current bankruptcy regime in Oman. As a 
consequence, a number of questions were considered, for examples what types of 
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 See above Chapter Four, footnotes 1 & 2. 
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bankruptcy proceedings are currently available for distressed debtors in Oman and 
how effective are they? Does Oman encourage the rehabilitation of viable 
enterprises or not? Are there special proceedings available for small and medium 
enterprises? To what extent can Oman take lessons from the experience of both 
England and the US? And what kind of values should be protected by bankruptcy 
law? 
     These questions and others have been explored in this thesis. Thus, the aim of 
this overall conclusion is to reveal the original contribution made by this thesis. 
Also, this chapter will restate the research undertaken and the approach made by 
this thesis. Furthermore, based on what has already been discussed, this chapter 
offers suggestions for further development and research. 
     The central theme of this study was to examine the efficiency of the bankruptcy 
regime in Oman. Based on this examination, it was demonstrated that Oman’s 
current bankruptcy regime is insufficient and inconsistent with the requirements of 
today’s business environment.6 This has been proven by identifying the main 
reasons behind its inefficiency.7 However, this thesis held the view that it was 
inappropriate to examine the effectiveness of Oman’s bankruptcy regime unless 
proper recourse were made to more developed bankruptcy regimes.8 Such 
recourse is important in order to discover areas of weaknesses and to propose 
means to overcome them. Also, it was felt that starting this thesis by exploring a 
number of the theories underpinning the bankruptcy system is of great 
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importance.9 Hence, apart from Chapter One (the introduction) and Chapter Six 
(the overall conclusion), this study is divided into four main chapters. 
     This study gained its importance from examining the current bankruptcy 
regimes in Oman. In this regard, it is worth noting that even though this thesis 
expressed the researcher’s own views in regard to a number of issues discussed in 
Chapter Two10 and Chapter Three,11 the original contributions of this thesis can be 
found in both Chapter Four and Chapter Five. In Chapter Four, this thesis critically  
examined various bankruptcy procedures in Oman in an attempt to identity the 
main deficiencies.12 This examination took into account bankruptcy principles that 
are adopted by both England and the US (for instance, the notion of DIP, staying 
creditors’ actions, cramming-down dissenting creditors) and the ranking of Oman in 
resolving bankruptcy cases based on the 2014 World Bank Doing Business 
Report. This thesis demonstrated that the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is 
not sufficiently regulated, as well as being outdated and inconsistent with the 
needs of today’s business. 
     The original contribution of this study can also be found in Chapter Five. A 
number of factors which necessitate the importance of introducing bankruptcy 
reform in Oman have been stated, for examples are (i) the significant roles that are 
played by SMEs; (ii) the desire of the Omani Government to attract foreign 
investment; and (iii) the inconsistency of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman 
with the needs of today’s business. Furthermore, this thesis made a number of 
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proposals that the Omani legislator should take into consideration while designing 
future bankruptcy law.  Examples of these proposals are (i) setting a clear statutory 
mandate in regard to both reorganisation and liquidation proceedings; (ii) offering 
clarity and predictability in regard to both the meaning of the phrase ‘inability to pay 
debts’ and a priority entitlement rule; (iii) establishing a rescue regime that offers 
easy access to the process, provides incentives for directors to apply for the 
process as soon as they notice the problem, stays secured and unsecured 
creditors’ claims during bankruptcy proceedings, facilitates access to post-finance 
and crams-down dissenting creditors. Hence, the originality of this thesis lies in 
suggesting some means that might help in overcoming the deficiencies of the 
existing bankruptcy regimes in Oman. However, as was emphasised throughout 
this chapter, in taking lessons from the experience of England and the US, 
wholesale transplantation should be avoided since there is no one size which fits 
all.     
6.2 Theories Underpinning Bankruptcy Law 
      The second chapter of this thesis discussed some theories relating to the aims 
and philosophy behind bankruptcy laws, namely creditors’ bargain theory,13 the 
bankruptcy choice theory,14 the communitarian theory,15 the forum theory,16 the 
multiple values theory17 and the explicit value theory.18 The focus of the debate 
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between these theories was what kind of values should be protected and 
recognised by bankruptcy law? The issue of whether bankruptcy laws should be 
designed to deal merely with the interests of creditors or other interests that 
deserve such protection is subject to debate. 
     Supporters19 of the creditors’ bargain theory view bankruptcy law as a system 
designed to maximise only the interests of creditors by having in place a 
compulsory collective system where all creditors’ claims are stayed.20 Staying 
creditors’ claims is important in reducing the cost of debt collection, as well as in 
maximising the aggregate pool of assets and it is also administratively effective.21 
Thus, based on their view, it is not within the role of bankruptcy law to protect the 
interests of employees, customers and local community.22 Rather, these values 
should be protected within the context of the general law.23 In this regard, general 
law should prescribe priorities for employees or tort claimants and there is no 
scope for the bankruptcy law to prescribe such priorities.24 Bankruptcy rules should 
deal only with the rights of creditors and, as a consequence, rescuing the business 
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of the company should not be attempted unless it is intended to maximise the 
interests of existing creditors’ rights.25 Even though this theory emphasises the 
importance of imposing a moratorium on the creditors’ action, its scope has been 
criticised.26 The promoters of the bankruptcy choice theory, for instance, expressed 
the view that all parties in society are affected  by the bankruptcy of the company 
and, as a result, they should be given the opportunity to bargain ex ante and 
choose the principles that govern their relationship in the event of bankruptcy.27 
Nonetheless, this theory is criticised since it is not clear how agreement can be 
reached ex ante between various parties, since each party has distinct interests 
from the others.28 
     Furthermore, even though the communitarian, the forum, the multiple values 
and the explicit value theories oppose the view of the creditors’ bargain theory, 
each of these theories has its own arguments.29 The communitarian theory, for 
instance, argues that besides protecting the interests of creditors, bankruptcy law 
should take into account the interests of all stakeholders such as employees, 
suppliers, customers and local authority.30 However, this theory leads to the 
problem of indeterminacy since there are so many community interests in each 
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bankruptcy case.31 Also, the forum theory argues that bankruptcy law should 
establish a mechanism whereby all interests affected by the failure of the business 
are recognised and heard through their representatives.32 However, the promoters 
of this theory fail to provid clear guidelines for implementing their theory in reality.33 
In addition, the multiple values theory agreed with the creditors’ bargain theory in 
that a stay should be imposed upon all creditors’ claims.34 However, the promoters 
of the multiple values theory propose the idea that it is the aim of the bankruptcy 
law to take into account the interests of all stakeholders.35 Thus, this theory asserts 
that bankruptcy law should establish priorities between creditors, protect the 
interests of future interested claimants, by offering opportunities for continuation of 
the business, and thus serving the interests of those who have no formal rights but 
who have an interest in the continuation of the business.36 This theory supports the 
philosophy of rescuing viable businesses because it plays a role in maximising the 
interests of all participants.37 Nonetheless, the main criticism of this theory is that it 
lacks clear guidance for the policy-makers on the controlling of tensions and 
conflict between various values that are affected by the bankruptcy of debtors.38 
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Moreover, despite the fact that the explicit value theory is of the opinion that 
bankruptcy law should take into account the interests of both private and public 
rights,39 it is acknowledged that striking the right balance between various 
conflicting values is not an easy process40 and requires a final political judgment.41 
However, based on this approach, in establishing the principles of bankruptcy law, 
reference should be made to the following four benchmarks:42 efficiency (having a 
clear mandate), expertise (having qualified bankruptcy practitioners), accountability 
(controlling the bankruptcy processes by competent bodies), and fairness (having 
fair procedures that give due access for all affected parties).43 Nonetheless, this 
approach was criticised since it did not offer a reasonable justification of the 
relationship between these benchmarks.44 
     This thesis concluded the second chapter by asserting that each of the 
discussed theories carries its own merits.45 As a consequence, in designing 
bankruptcy laws it is worthwhile for legislators to have recourse to the issues posed 
by these theories. For instance, both the creditors’ bargain theory and the multiple 
values theory recognise the importance of staying creditors’ actions during 
bankruptcy processes, since such a stay has its impact on promoting the concept 
of collectivity. This is the case under both England and the US regimes where all 
creditors’ claims are stayed during bankruptcy proceedings. However, this is one of 
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the main deficiencies of the current bankruptcy regime in Oman since secured 
creditors’ actions are not stayed during bankruptcy processes.46 Hence, unlike the 
case in England and the US where the concept of collectivity is recognised, such a 
concept is not encouraged by Omani law. 
6.3 Bankruptcy Proceedings in England and the US 
     The aim of the third chapter was to explore the experience of both England and 
the US and to observe the similarities and differences between them. It was stated 
that both England and the US promotes the concept of rescue culture by offering 
distressed enterprises alternatives to liquidation.47 In the US, for example, there is 
Chapter 11 which is designed to deal with the bankruptcy of distressed debtors.48 
Also, in the England, there are administration proceedings, CVAs and schemes of 
arrangement, all of which support the idea of rehabilitation. However, the principles 
adopted by England differ from those of the US.49 Whereas the management of the 
company is displaced during administration proceedings in England, it remains in 
place without the supervision of licensed bankruptcy practitioners once the US 
Chapter 11 is initiated.50 The case under the scheme of arrangement in England is 
similar to that of the US Chapter 11. However, although during CVA in England 
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directors retain their position, they run the business under the supervision of 
insolvency practitioners. This is analogous to the case of Oman’s preventive 
composition scheme where directors run the business under the supervision of 
bankruptcy practitioners.51 In this regard, this thesis supports the idea that allowing 
directors to retain their position during the process encourages directors to apply 
for bankruptcy as soon as they perceive the disturbance of the business. However, 
it is important to appoint bankruptcy practitioners to supervise their conduct since 
this provides a level of credibility and assurance for creditors. Also, appointing 
bankruptcy practitioners helps in opposing any over-investment decisions that 
might be taken by the management during bankruptcy proceedings. 
     In addition, one of the main features of both the US Chapter 11 and 
administration regime in England is that creditors’ actions, both secured and 
unsecured, are stayed during insolvency processes.52 Lack of stay has an impact 
on wasting the assets of debtors since once bankruptcy procedures are initiated, 
creditors will run to the court-house in order to be first to obtain a court ruling 
against the debtor.53 Thus, staying creditors’ actions helps in avoiding this type of 
race between creditors.54 Also, imposing a stay helps in maximising the returns of 
debtor’s creditors.55 As discussed in Chapter Three,56 one of the main deficiencies 
of CVA and the scheme of arrangement is the lack of staying creditors’ claims. This 
is also the problem under the current bankruptcy regime in Oman where secured 
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creditors are allowed to pursue their claims during bankruptcy proceedings and 
liquidation procedures.57 
     Moreover, the concept of post-financing was one of the principles discussed in 
Chapter Three.58 During financial distress, troubled debtors are not normally able 
to continue their operations unless access to new funding is facilitated.59 Such 
facilitation includes offering incentives to new lenders and sufficient guarantees to 
existing lenders. This is the case under the US Chapter 11 where distressed 
debtors are allowed to seek new financing during bankruptcy processes.60 In this 
case and as an incentive, the new lender is granted a super priority status.61 
However, this status is not granted unless it is proven that pre-petition creditors are 
sufficiently protected.62 The case in England differs, since no super priority status is 
granted to the new lender. Rather, post-petition fund is considered as 
administration expenses and the new lender will not supersede existing secured 
creditors.63 In this regard, this researcher’s view is that the approach adopted by 
the US is better than that of England.64 Hence, it is essential to facilitate access to 
new financing during the reorganisation phase by granting a super priority status to 
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the new lender. However, this should be done in a way that does not prejudice the 
interests of existing secured creditors. 
     Moreover, it is not possible to convince all parties to accept the reorganisation 
plan. Thus, there is a need for a statutory mechanism whereby the plan is enforced 
against the wishes of the dissenting creditors.65 This mechanism is called ‘cram-
down’. As stated in Chapter Three,66 both England and the US have in place 
measures for approving the rescue plan, even if it is rejected by a minority. 
However, such plan will not be approved unless it is proven that pre-bankruptcy 
creditors are sufficiently protected.67 This is the case in the US, where there are a 
number of statutory conditions that have to be met in order to impose the plan 
against the wishes of objecting creditors. However, the case in England differs, 
as68 there is no statutory requirement, but rather the court is given total discretion 
to decide whether to approve the rescue plan or not.69 In this regard, the view of 
this thesis is that it is better to combine the experience of both England and the 
US.70 Hence, besides giving the court discretion, it is better to detail a number of 
statutory requirements that have to be met. 
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6.4 Examining the Current Bankruptcy Regime in Oman 
     Having explored some of the theories underpinning bankruptcy law and 
observed the experience of both England and the US, Chapter Four examined the 
current bankruptcy regime in Oman. This examination took into account the issues 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three. This chapter started by providing an 
overview of the statutory framework for bankruptcy in Oman.71 It is clearly stated 
that unlike the case in England and the US, there is no separate bankruptcy law in 
Oman. Rather, both Oman’s Commercial Code of 1990 and the Omani 
Commercial Companies Law of 1974 provide a statutory framework for the 
bankruptcy and liquidation of traders. 
     Chapter Four demonstrated that the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is 
ineffective and inconsistent with the needs of today’s business.72 This 
demonstration is based on a number of justifications.73 Currently, rehabilitation of 
viable enterprises is not encouraged, since there are no statutory proceedings 
designed to facilitate the reorganisation of distressed businesses. Also, the tests 
used to determine the state of ‘inability to pay debts’ is not sufficiently regulated. It 
is unlike the case in England and the US where such status is determined by a 
reference to two bankruptcy tests, namely the ‘cash flow test’ and ‘balance sheet 
test’.74 In Oman it is unclear what sorts of tests are intended to be relied on.75 
Further, the bankrupt in Oman is considered as a wrongdoer and, as a 
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consequence, he will be deprived of a number of rights.76 He is not viewed as an 
economic actor that deserves such protection. Moreover, there is no clarity in 
regard to the ranking of creditors.77 This leads this thesis to argue that having a 
clear priority ranking provides a level of predictability and certainty within the 
context of bankruptcy law.78 Also, one of the obstacles of the current bankruptcy 
regime in Oman is that bankruptcy trustees and liquidators are not required to hold 
a specific qualification or obtain specific training.79 
     The available bankruptcy procedures in Oman include bankruptcy proceedings, 
the preventive composition scheme and liquidation procedures.80 Whereas the 
debtor himself, creditors, or the court can apply for bankruptcy proceedings,81 only 
the debtor is able to apply for the preventive composition scheme.82 Also, while the 
aim of the preventive composition scheme is to give the troubled trader the 
opportunity to escape the declaration of bankruptcy, the purpose of bankruptcy 
proceedings is to declare the bankruptcy of the distressed debtor and to release 
the bankrupt from his liabilities and debts.83 Thus, rehabilitation of the business of 
the distressed debtor is not the aim of either bankruptcy or the preventive 
composition scheme. Furthermore, whereas liquidation procedures apply only to 
companies, both bankruptcy proceedings and the preventive composition scheme 
apply to all debtors whether an individual debtor or a company. 
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     As explained in Chapter Four,84 each of bankruptcy proceedings suffers from a 
number of problems. For instance, during both liquidation proceedings and 
bankruptcy procedure, secured creditors’ actions are not stayed.85 Thus, the assets 
of the debtor will be wasted during bankruptcy processes which will hinder any 
attempt to rescue the business of the distressed debtor. Also, even though secured 
creditors’ claims are stayed during the preventive composition scheme, they are 
not allowed to participate in voting on the preventive composition’s plan.86 In 
addition, it is clearly stated that the problem with the bankruptcy regime in Oman is 
that, at present, there is no specific time limit wherein liquidation procedures, 
bankruptcy proceedings and the preventive composition scheme should be 
completed.87 
     Moreover, the main reasons behind the lower ranking of Oman based on the 
World Bank Doing Business Report of 2014 were discussed.88 This ranking is 
judged by reference to three benchmarks: the cost of proceedings, length of the 
process and recovery rate for creditors.89 Out of 189 economies, Oman’s ranking is 
72.90 In this regard, this thesis gave a number of reasons that, based on the 
researcher’s view, are associated with the lower ranking of Oman.91 Lack of stay, 
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not prescribing an exact time-limit and disqualification of bankruptcy persons, all 
are examples of such reasons. Also, this chapter demonstrated the researcher’s 
point of view that the Omani bankruptcy regime, as it currently stands, can be 
categorised as a creditor-friendly regime.92 This is due to a number of factors such 
as lack of appropriate reorganisation procedures, displacing directors during 
bankruptcy proceedings and allowing secured creditors to enforce their securities 
during bankruptcy processes.93 
6.5 Proposals to Overcome the Current Problems 
     Since Chapter Four critically examined the current bankruptcy regimes in 
Oman, the purpose of Chapter Five was an attempt to propose a map for future 
bankruptcy reform in Oman. Thus, Chapter Five proposed a number of means in 
order to overcome the problems of Oman’s current bankruptcy regime. This 
proposal took into account some of the bankruptcy principles promoted by various 
theories discussed in the second chapter and the experience of both England and 
the US. 
     This thesis acknowledged the fact that it was not possible to transplant all 
bankruptcy principles that are adopted by both England and the US.94 Rather, 
while proposing such principles caution was exercised. In this regard, this thesis 
believed that what was applicable in England and the US might not be applicable in 
Oman.95 For instance, it is not advisable to follow the approach adopted by the US 
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Chapter 11 where directors run the business of the company without any kind of 
supervision; rather, opting for the approach adopted by England during CVA 
proceedings is more suitable for Oman.96 In this case, allowing directors to run the 
company under the supervision of the appointed bankruptcy practitioners is better. 
The rationale behind this view is that allowing directors to retain their position plays 
a role in encouraging them to file for bankruptcy procedures as soon as they 
become aware of the crisis and appointing bankruptcy practitioners to supervise 
their conduct provides a level of credibility and assurance for creditors.97 
     This chapter discussed the applicability of legal transplantations based on two 
conflicting views.98 While one view argued that legal transplantation is possible,99 
the other view was that legal transplant is impossible.100 Also, the experience of 
Oman in transplanting others countries’ laws was dealt with.101 In this regard, even 
though some principles are not found under Sharia Law, this thesis argued that it 
would be possible for Oman to transplant some of the bankruptcy principles that 
are adopted by both England and the US.102 To support this belief, this thesis 
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provided a number of justifications.103 For instance, the Omani legislator has 
already transplanted some of western principles and such principles have been 
accepted, even though they were against the concepts of Sharia. The prohibition of 
riba (usury) is one of the fundamental principles of Sharia. However, as stated in 
Chapter Five,104 the riba was not prohibited under both the Omani Commercial 
Code of 1990 and the Commercial Companies Law of 1974. Also, Oman’s 
membership in the World Trade Organisation in 2000 and Oman’s Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States played an important role in fostering such 
transplantations. 
     After a critical examination of the bankruptcy regime in Oman had been made, it 
was clearly stated that the current bankruptcy regime in Oman is inefficient and 
inconsistent with the requirements of today’s business. Hence, in Chapter Five, this 
thesis made the point that there are a number of factors that necessitate the 
introduction of bankruptcy reforms in Oman.105 One of the factors discussed was 
that attracting foreign direct investment is one of the main pillars of Oman’s 2020 
economic vision. However, this researcher’s view was that to attract such 
investment it is not sufficient merely for Oman to facilitate access to the market.106 
Rather, regulating a company’s exit from the market in an orderly manner is also 
important in offering a tempting economic climate.107 Also, the significant role 
played by small and medium enterprises in promoting Oman’s national economy 
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necessitates the establishment of a bankruptcy regime in a way that facilitates and 
encourages the rehabilitation of viable enterprises and quickly liquidates those 
which are unviable.108 These two factors and others discussed in Chapter Five 
demonstrated the need for future bankruptcy reform in Oman. 
     Having stated the factors that demand the availability of a proper bankruptcy 
regime, the thesis proceeded by drawing a map for future reform.109 This thesis, 
first of all, asserted that future bankruptcy law in Oman should have a clear 
statutory mandate concerning the aims of each bankruptcy proceedings.110 This is 
similar to the case under administration proceedings in England where the 
purposes of such proceedings are clearly formulated in the Enterprise Act 2002.111 
Also, in determining the bankruptcy of the debtor, reference should be made to 
both the cash flow bankruptcy test and the balance sheet bankruptcy test.112 
Further, establishing a clear priority rule provides a level of certainty and credibility 
for creditors and other stakeholders.113 Moreover, due to their importance and their 
contribution to the national economy in Oman, the researcher’s view was that 
designing a special bankruptcy regime for SMEs is necessary.114 Finally, this thesis 
highlighted the importance of establishing a rescue regime besides liquidation.115 
However, this thesis made the point that in designing a rescue regime, a number of 
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requirements should be taken into account.116 Examples of these requirements are 
easing the access to the rescue processes, staying creditors’ claims, adopting the 
concept of debtor-in-possession, allowing access to new funding during 
restructuring proceedings and implementing the rescue plan in a way that does not 
prejudice the interests of objecting creditors. In considering these requirements, 
lessons should be taken from the experience of both England and the US. 
However, it was clearly explained that wholesale transplantations are not possible 
and care should be taken in importing such principles. 
6.6 Areas for Future Research 
     One of the issues discussed in this study is the relationship between attracting 
foreign direct investment and the quality of bankruptcy law. In Chapter Five, it is 
argued that the flows of foreign direct investment are determined by the quality of 
the legal system of the host country.  However, it is statistically unclear how the 
lack of a proper bankruptcy law in Oman deters the attraction of such investments. 
Thus, this issue needs to be examined through questioning the determinants and 
deterrent of foreign investment in Oman to ascertain whether or not lack of 
sufficient bankruptcy regimes is one of the deterrents of such investment. 
     Further, this study proposed the initiation of future bankruptcy reform in Oman. 
Nevertheless, this has been done without examining the impact of such reform on 
particular sectors, such as banking, agricultural and industrial sectors.  Thus, future 
empirical research needs to be undertaken in order to examine the impact of 
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reforming bankruptcy law on these sectors. However, this research needs to be 
done after the enactment of a new bankruptcy law. 
6.7 Concluding Remarks 
     Unlike the case in many jurisdictions, at present, Oman does not have a 
separate bankruptcy law. Rather, a number of bankruptcy provisions are 
incorporated in both the Commercial Code of 1990 and the Omani Commercial 
Companies Law of 1974. As explained in this thesis, there are three bankruptcy 
proceedings in Oman: bankruptcy proceedings, the preventive composition 
scheme and liquidation procedures. The main purpose of this thesis was to 
examine the efficiency of these proceedings and to propose means to overcome 
their deficiencies.  
     The aim of this concluding chapter was to provide a brief overall conclusion of 
all chapters. Firstly, the main contributions made by the researcher in this study 
were stated. Also, the main ideas that were discussed in this thesis have been 
highlighted. Finally, this study proposed areas that might be an appropriate subject 
for future research.  
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